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Introduction 
 
Recent debates about the continued relevance of postcolonial studies stake three broad 
positions. In the first, Robert Young argues that postcolonial studies are born of and continually 
engaged with anticolonial political struggle. Simon During represents the second argument, 
which holds that Young's version of postcolonialism caricatures the fragmented and 
contradictory reality of colonialism, which "moved forward fitfully" and varied from violent 
expropriation to "acts of exchange and mutual benefit," rarely evincing the kind of "clear 
decisionism" anticolonial movements necessarily attribute to them (335-36). Moreover, During 
argues, the age of formal empires has passed, so a paradigm built on those moorings must 
necessarily be swept away. Dipesh Chakrabarty articulates a third set of arguments, less in 
defense of postcolonial studies than as a broad outline of their current tasks in the context of 
anthropogenic climate change.   
The author of Provincializing Europe writes that thinking human agency in the current 
moment requires analysis across “multiple and incommensurable scales at once,” a strength of 
postcolonial studies generally and its literary branch specifically (1). The first level is the 
universal human subject bequeathed to us by the Enlightenment, the human that is potentially the 
same across spaces and times, the subject of human rights. The second level of human agency 
sits adjacent to the first but acknowledges the contingencies of history, race, class and gender 
that overdetermine the rights-bearing subject. The third level analyzes humans as a parasitic 
collective who have created a geological age, the Anthropocene, which has altered the climate in 
ways that endanger their planetary habitat. Chakrabarty is careful to say that no one of these 
views “is rendered invalid by the presence of others. They are simply disjunctive” (2). In fact, 
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any effort to conceptualize the world today "encounters the necessity of thinking disjunctively 
about the human, through moves that in their simultaneity appear contradictory" (2).  
Postcolonial literature works across several of these disjunctures. The archive I assemble 
in this dissertation take seriously the universal rights-bearing human as well as the historical 
circumstances such as genocides and systemic discrimination that obviate such universality. In 
so doing, these texts bring together Chakrabarty's discontinuous modes of agency into rich 
palimpsests that never quite cohere. Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children (1981) and Boubecar 
Boris Diop’s Murambi, The Book of Bones (2000), the subject of my first two chapters, concern 
genocides in Bangladesh and Rwanda respectively. In chapters 3 and 4 I take up M.G. Vassanji’s 
The In-Between World of Vikram Lall and Aravind Adiga’s The White Tiger to analyze the weird 
arguments offered by protagonists who claim that capitalist entrepreneurship and its attendant 
accumulation constitute a mode of self-defense against the contingencies of racist states.  
While Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children and Diop’s Murambi concern genocides that differ 
across time and place, both novels share a concern with the overdetermination of Southern 
conflicts by Northern weapons and geopolitical strategies. Written during the Cold War, 
Rushdie’s novel examines the consequences of that Great Power showdown for the subcontinent. 
Specifically, the novel locates in this larger global arena the 1971 war of independence waged in 
Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) and the genocidal repression meted out by (West) Pakistan. 
America and Europe supply weapons and political support to Pakistan while the Soviet Union 
sides with Bangladesh and India’s intervention into that crisis. The 1994 Rwandan genocide, the 
subject of Diop’s novel, similarly attends to the international forces abetting the genocidaires and 
aiding their victims. France, which supplied Pakistan with fighter jets in 1971, provides weapons 
and diplomatic support for the murderous Hutu Power militias while also taking the lead in the 
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ostensibly humanitarian Operation Turquoise. Rushdie’s novel, I argue, asks what it means to 
indict individual perpetrators given the international weapons and geopolitics that enabled their 
crimes. In contrast, Diop’s novel critiques the narrative of global “indifference”—no one cared 
about Rwanda—repeated across analyses of the genocide. Murambi, in my reading, foregrounds 
the over investment of European powers, France and Belgium specifically, which belies their 
ostensible apathy.  
M.G. Vassanji’s The In-Between World of Vikram Lall and Aravind Adiga’s The White 
Tiger continues the focus on the influence of global machinations on local conflicts. These 
novels, however, allow me to turn away from Northern powers to emergent Southern powers and 
their dominations of other Southern spaces. Although these novels focus on East Africa and India 
respectively, they concern Southern businessmen negotiating structural discrimination in their 
countries by leveraging the influx of international capital enabled partly by a neoliberal shift in 
economic policy. Vikram Lall, the namesake of Vassanji’s novel, belongs to the South Asian 
diaspora in East Africa, which is demonized in the novel as “Asian Shylocks,” a class of imperial 
collaborators and self-interested merchants. In response, Lall weaponizes capital accumulation to 
guard against a racist state. Adiga’s The White Tiger offers a parallel to this strange logic so that 
its protagonist, Balram Halwai, argues that neoliberal entrepreneurship allows him to escape 
India’s caste system.  
Collectively these texts negotiate particular “distribution[s] of the sensible” that, for 
Jacques Ranciére, constitute the basis of community. He argues, “The distribution of the sensible 
reveals who can have a share in what is common to the community based on what they do and on 
the time and space in which this activity is performed” (12). Communities abstractly, and nation 
states particularly, begin with a shared commonsense, a field of intelligibly that delineates what 
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is visible and what is not, which people may participate in this society and how they may do so. 
Both politics and aesthetics earn their name with the interruption of this given distribution and 
the disruption of its commonality. Midnight’s Children and Murambi both demonstrate how 
genocidal violence aims to create the commonsense of ethnic or cultural homogeneity through 
annihilation; however, these novels also foreground the ways such violence helps sustain 
international alliances. In contrast, Vikram Lall and White Tiger posit capital accumulation as the 
means by which marginal groups can protect themselves within regimes that can only see them 
as pariahs. If the first two novels bespeak the violence founding a given “distribution of the 
sensible,” the latter two illustrate the violence enforcing this dominant commonsense within their 
communities. Taken together, the postcolonial literary fictions in this dissertation intervene in 
their historical moment by rupturing the given distribution of perceptibility. Specifically, these 
texts use literary strategies—hyperbole and counterfocalization—to stretch out the dominant 
commonsense to a breaking point. In this way, I argue, these works advance the need for 
alternate narratives that require neither annihilation nor accumulation.      
In chapter 1, I examine the 1971 genocide in Bangladesh when Pakistan tried to violently 
suppress the independence movement of then East Pakistan at the cost of nearly three million 
lives. Placing this event at the center of Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children, I argue, turns the 
focalizer's the narrative in to the elaborate self-defense of a genocidaire, who claims to be 
innocent of these crimes by indicting himself for the entire twentieth-century history of the 
subcontinent. This hyperbolic self-indictment produces a crisis of history by blurring the 
boundaries of an event and individual agency until one is forced into an infinite regress to 
explain the historical origins of a war crime. This crisis of historical accountability also plagues 
the International Criminal Tribunal currently being held in Bangladesh as it seeks justice for the 
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victims of the genocide; as I show in chapter 2, a similar problem afflicts the United Nations 
during the Rwandan Genocide. Such a crisis also works spatially to indict the flow of arms from 
America, China, and the Soviet Union, along with their diplomatic support. Examining such 
international networks both broadens our understanding of genocides and obfuscates the agency 
of individuals as war criminals by recognizing their entrapment within overdetermining forces. 
The dead, rights-bearing humans and their killers suffer from "too much history" (Rushdie 36).  
In view of such international forces and their specific role in the Rwandan Genocide, I 
argue in chapter 2 that we should no longer speak of “indifference.” Reading across a variety of 
texts in different genres, including Philip Gourevitch's We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow 
We Will be Killed with Our Families (journalism), Roméo Dallaire's Shake Hands With the 
Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (military memoir), and Boubicar Boris Diop's 
Murambi, The Book of Bones (literary fiction), I examine "indifference" as a trope that repeats 
across most commentary on the Rwandan Genocide, in which 900,000 Tutsis and moderate 
Hutus were massacred. The accusation of international apathy makes little sense when we 
consider, at minimum, French support of the ruling Hutu Habyarimana regime, Belgian supply of 
arms, as well as the humanitarian aid these nations proffered. To grasp these contradictions I use 
Michael Herzfeld's argument on the production of indifference but broaden its implications to 
demonstrate that the clash of conflicting forces, weapons and humanitarianism specifically, 
yields this affect. The UN’s stasis during the genocide, I argue, was not the result of an uncaring 
malaise but the product of an overidentification with its own bureaucracy, which clashed with its 
member nations' strategic investments of as well as the needs of Rwandans. Such bureaucratic 
self-preservation also allowed the UN to “distribute accountability to the point that it becomes 
irretrievable,” allowing one to “point fingers in all directions” (Bennett 575). In this way, I return 
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to the concerns with the difficulty of justice in view of international forces supplying arms to 
genocidaires and humanitarian aid to their victims. I build on this argument in chapter 2 by 
locating the key narrative term—indifference—that obfuscates these transnational forces by 
distributing the blame to global apathy rather than geopolitical economy, where it belongs.   
In the third and fourth chapters I develop a nascent theme in the first two chapters, 
namely a shift away form North-South relations to South-South relations. In doing so, I contend 
that the relevance of postcolonial studies in the twenty-first century lies in its attention to the rise 
of Southern powers and their emergent informal empires. Specifically, I focus on India’s relation 
to East Africa and the correspondence between India and China, both of which must necessarily 
travel the routes of global capitalism. I demonstrate the allure of neoliberal capitalism and capital 
accumulation within the marginalized populations of Kenya and India who use these 
international financescapes to battle against or overcome local racism and the caste system 
respectively.1 In chapter 3, I analyze the argument for capital accumulation put forward by M.G. 
Vassanji’s focalizer in The In-Between World of Vikram Lall. The novel's namesake belongs to 
the East African Asian diaspora, whose presence as traders and shopkeepers predates the arrival 
of European powers. Drawing on the rich historical work of Thomas Metcalf and Robert 
Gregory, I contextualize this early history as well as the impact of the British Empire, which 
added to this diaspora with the indentured servants it brought in to build the Uganda Railway 
and, more troublingly, as an active settler colonial population. These historical tensions propelled 
Idi Amin's 1969 expulsion of Asians from Uganda who, in the novel, are slandered as "Asian 
Shylocks." Lall locates in this slur both the reason and means to accumulate capital, which 
protects against the contingencies of a racist state and its perpetual threats. I take this argument 
seriously to understand the allure of capital accumulation within this diaspora while also pushing 
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against it by attending to the radical history of solidarity between Asians and their Black 
compatriots both during the independence struggle and the labor organizing efforts in the new 
nation.  
Balram Halwai, the focalizer of Aravind Adiga's Booker Prize winning novel The White 
Tiger, posits a similar argument by claiming that an embrace of neoliberal entrepreneurship and 
its impersonal calculus represents an advance for the victims of the caste system’s intimate 
violence. In chapter 4, I draw on the primary theorist and hero of lower-caste struggle, Bhimrao 
Ramji Ambedkar, author of The Annihilation of Caste and The Buddha or Karl Marx. In these 
works Ambedkar critiques Mohandas Gandhi's conservative reformism. This allows me to 
foreground the primacy of caste as an organizing principle and structure of violence, the battle 
against which cannot be subsumed necessarily within anticapitalism, a position Gopal Guru 
argues for. The sparse scholarly attention to this novel does not pay sufficient attention to caste 
or its relation to the text's brutal satire of both individual entrepreneurship and the atomizing 
freedom this neoliberal ethos promises as well as India's Socialist parties and their leaders. I 
argue that these tensions help us understand the context of subaltern accumulation and its 
suspicion of the anticapitalism voiced by parties who often shore up the caste system rather than 
annihilate it.  
In these close readings I unpack the peculiar arguments offered by Vassanji's and Adiga's 
focalizers: that capital accumulation is a mode of self-defense against the hostilities of a racist 
state; that adopting neoliberal entrepreneurship's profane accumulative spirit helps escape from 
the caste system's sacred predestination that denies Dalits (the downtrodden) any escape from 
poverty. Although these arguments reflect a concern with the neoliberal turn in their nations' 
economic policy—privatization of national industries, decentralization of national authority for 
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increased local autonomy, deregulation of financial markets, and concerted efforts to weaken 
trade unions—these novels do not present national allegories as Fredric Jameson once theorized.2 
Allegories aim to represent a totality even while necessarily failing at that task; these novels and 
their focalizers, on the other hand, articulate the perspectives of a marginalized community 
engaged in a civil war with other more dominant groups. They do not allegorize the nation but 
fight against it.  
These arguments for the virtue of international capital, moreover, help us understand the 
emergent primacy of South-South exchanges. Vassanji’s novel, for instance, focuses on the 
descendants of a South Asian diaspora brought to East Africa to build the Ugandan Railway for 
the British Empire. This diaspora, however, also dominates the financial and mercantile sectors 
of Kenya’s economy, enriching themselves through Indian Ocean trade. More troublingly, this 
diaspora’s correspondence with the subcontinent now involves the massive influx of capital from 
India to East Africa, which includes the purchase of millions of hectares of farmland in Uganda, 
Tanzania, and Ethiopia, as well as multibillion-dollar "resource-seeking deals in exchange for 
infrastructure investments" (WTO 52). India's bilateral trade with Africa ($63 billion) now 
surpasses its trade with the US ($56 billion), and the difference continues to grow exponentially 
(WTO 15). India imports African minerals and fuels to support its booming manufacturing and 
energy needs, which if unabated, will nearly triple the value of their current trade ($176 billion) 
by 2015 (WTO 15). All of this places India in direct conflict with China, Africa's second largest 
trading partner ($166 billion), and its own strategic investments to access the resources that will 
insure it remains the world’s factory.  
Adiga’s novel takes up this rivalry through its epistolary form, in which the narrator 
writes to the Chinese premier on the eve of his visit to India to tell him the real way Indian 
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entrepreneurs are made, rather than the sanitized version the premier will hear from his guides. 
The contest between India and China in Africa undoubtedly influences the premier’s interest in 
Indian business culture. In chapter 4, we see the rise of one such businessman in India. Balram 
Halwai does not address East Africa nor does it seem that Africa generally registers on his map 
of the world. However, he does describe the Indian Ocean as a force that brings “light to my 
country. Every place on the map of India near the ocean is well-off” (Tiger 14). When combined 
with the epistolary form of the novel and its explicit address to the Chinese premier, this 
laudatory attention to the ocean discloses an interest in the complex networks of exchange across 
the contested waters of the Indian Ocean. Specifically, India and China, who have already fought 
a month long war in 1962 across their Northeast border, now vie for shipping routes as well as 
the goods traversing those routes. This is, in part, the reason why India has remained the world’s 
largest weapons importer since 2010. One analyst at the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI) argues that "China’s naval modernization is starting to infringe on the Indian 
Ocean, which India considers its backyard," which is "why you see both countries expanding 
naval forces slowly and carefully toward Southeast Asia” (cited in Pizzi). 
These twenty-first century tensions depend on colonial histories, of course, but 
postcolonial studies has more to offer than the back story to the current moment. Instead, they 
may help us recognize the emergence of informal empires within exchanges that must be seen as 
collaborative and domineering at once, and which may advance some racial minorities at the 
expense of others. The lack of official colonial structures or government does not make 
postcolonial studies irrelevant, as Simon During suggests, but necessary precisely because of 
their absence. In this, I veer closer to Robert Young’s argument that postcolonial studies must be 
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anticolonial because it emerged from and continually engaged with a decolonizing political 
project. For Young,  
the only criterion that could determine whether “postcolonial theory” has 
ended is whether, economic booms of the so-called “emerging markets” 
notwithstanding, imperialism and colonialism in all their different forms 
have ceased to exist in the world, whether there is no longer domination 
by nondemocratic forces (often exercised on others by Western 
democracies, as in the past), or economic and resource exploitation 
enforced by military power, or a refusal to acknowledge the sovereignty 
of non-Western countries, and whether peoples or cultures still suffer 
from the long-lingering aftereffects of imperial, colonial, and neocolonial 
rule, albeit in contemporary forms such as economic globalization. (20)  
I agree with much of this argument insofar as it aligns postcolonialism generally and 
Postcolonial studies specifically with an ongoing anticolonial project. However, I want to 
amplify Young’s concerns by attending to emergent South-South patterns of domination, which 
draw on recent “economic booms” to drive “economic and resource exploitations enforced by 
military power” (20).  
For During, much of this is “posturing” since it ignores “colonialism’s limits and 
disjunctions” (336). These “disjunctions” continue into a present in which a paradigm born of 
resistance against formal colonial power cannot make sense of the “postcolonized today,” who 
“find a comfortable berth in democratic state capitalism.” For instance,     
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the political party that represents New Zealand’s indigenous peoples—
the Maori Party—is currently in power in coalition with a fiercely 
neoliberal party. Why has it joined the coalition? Partly best to protect 
the considerable capital sums that have accrued to iwi (tribes) by virtue 
of their successful appeal to the 1840 Waitangi treaty by which Maori 
seceded sovereignty to the British. How does anticolonialist 
postcolonialism apply here? (333)  
One answer to the first question—why has the Maori Party joined a coalition with a 
neoliberal party?—may be found in the novels examined in chapter’s 3 and 4, both of which 
posit the use of capital accumulation as a mode of self-defense against a racist state. The 
relevance of “anti-colonial postcolonialism,” then, lies in its ability to contextualize and evaluate 
the emancipatory strategies now pursued by dominated populations. The Maori Party, if it is 
anything like the focalizers I examine in chapters 3 and 4, fails to be anticapitalist in the way we 
want our indigent populations to be, which is not the same as saying that they lack a radical 
anticolonialist politics. This is not to argue, of course, that aligning with neoliberal capitalism 
now constitutes radical politics but to recognize this strategy for what it is. Furthermore, the 
anticolonial version of postcolonialism also helps point to the limits of these strategies—just as it 
acknowledges the limits of an emancipatory project founded on sovereign nation states—in part 
by drawing on historical examples of broader solidarities such as the Non-Alignment Movement 
to inspire the creation of new projects, which like their predecessors, must bring new kinds of 
South-South relation into being. If the economic "partnerships" brokered between India and 
Africa constitute a new form of South-South exchanges—perhaps as part of a defensive strategy 
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against reliance on, and domination by, the North—the task will be to interrogate the material 
and cultural flow between these spaces as well as their impact on the 900 million people living in 
extreme poverty within their borders.  
Again this does not necessitate a narrow focus on formal colonial institutions, which are 
less viable in part due to the success of anticolonial struggles. Rather, we must attend to the 
informal. The literary wing of Postcolonial studies teaches us how to listen to the silences, the 
unremarked, the unofficial, which on examination, disclose the grounding premises of the whole 
narrative. 
Two literary strategies characterize the otherwise disparate range of texts examined in 
this dissertation. The first is counterfocalization, which doubles as a reading and writing strategy. 
To counterfocalize, according to Gayatri Spivak, is to “shuttle between focalization and the 
making of an alternate narrative as the reader’s running commentary” (22). This “effortful and 
active” practice grounds the “‘political’ in political fiction” because it activates the “readerly 
imagination”; “Literature advocates in this special way,” and such literary reading “has to be 
learned” (22). In other words, literary texts do not merely offer expository prose to marshal a 
particular argument and supporting evidence. Rather, literature activates readers through 
strategic failures, which beg for an alternate narrative that draws from the given text to arrive at 
different conclusions. This mode of advocating must remain “singular and unverifiable,” insofar 
as the text cannot entirely frame the reader’s alternate narrative nor can readers be sure of their 
own productions (23). While Spivak argues that such modes of championing are particular to 
literature, she does not explicitly say that the prods to counterfocalize constitute a particular 
aesthetic practice. I want to make this claim clearer. The literary texts analyzed in this 
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dissertation push readers to counterfocalize as a part of their aesthetic strategy. This is not a 
statement about authorial intention but an argument about the formal practices employed.  
This brings us to the second literary strategy shared by the novels analyzed in this 
dissertation: hyperbole. There seems little need to argue that Midnight’s Children, for instance, 
uses hyperbole, but the specific term remains undertheorized. The New Princeton Encyclopedia 
of Poetry and Poetics, for instance, quotes Quintilian, who defines hyperbole as “an elegant 
straining of truth” (546). The truth here can be found either in the ostensive situation—“the 
pragmatic context of the utterance”—so that the hyperbole is relative to the local conditions or in 
more conventional hyperbole—“I’ve told you a million times”—that “evades the necessity of 
reference to the ostensive situation” (547). Within the scope of this dissertation, the ostensive 
situations concern postcolonial nations experiencing various upheavals. The strategic use of 
hyperbole breaks the narrative, spurs readers to counterfocalize, and produces an alternative 
narrative that speculates on the divergent possibilities that were not explored or rejected. More 
concretely, Rushdie employs hyperbole—produced by making allegories literal—to explore and 
parody the causality between individual agency (a war crime) and the event (war), between the 
actor (the nation state) and the stage (global weapon flows), during the violent suppression of the 
Bangladesh independence movement. Vassanji, by contrast, uses hyperbole—caricaturing a 
racist caricature—to critique the class politics of the East African Asian community relative to 
their Black compatriots as well as the racist epithet “Asian Shylock,” which functions by belying 
the histories of solidarity between these two communities. Such hyperbole not only relies on the 
immediate ostensive situation of an annunciation but the larger political context that makes and 
unmakes a given focalizer’s narrative. Moreover, the texts intervene in these contexts through 
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their hyperbole, often articulated by focalizers that exaggerate or understate their relation to 
those contexts, and thereby fail to realize other more desirable trajectories. 
Claudia Claridge’s Hyperbole in English: A Corpus-Based Study of Exaggeration argues 
that hyperbole is not a “primary means to create new lexical material or new senses” (176). 
Hyperbole “is never a ‘necessity’ in that sense but always an option,” unlike metaphor or 
metonymy, which may fill an “expressive ‘gap’” (176). The texts studied in this dissertation 
counter these claims. Hyperbole does seem necessary to fill an expressive gap in these texts 
partly to drive the production of new lexical material, which may not be found in the text itself 
but in the reader’s alternate narrative. That is to say, my primary material finds hyperbole 
necessary as an aesthetic strategy to produce the kind of counterfocalization necessary to engage 
readers and advocate for alternate political possibilities. All of this, however, does not help us 
understand why these texts use hyperbole and the resultant counterfocalization or how precisely 
the contexts of their annunciations drive these aesthetic choices. Some speculative answers 
emerge in this dissertation.      
First, these writers may choose hyperbole as their representational strategy in part to 
index the way their global English audiences must perceive them, as caricatures of Western 
referents: the savage militants, the unscrupulous businessmen. The latter especially appear 
rapacious and corrupt, feral entrepreneurs who do not merely emulate the behavior of the North 
but make it grotesque. It is as if the adoption of neoliberalism elsewhere and the ferocity of its 
agents suddenly reveals the global threat of these political economic methods; they are called 
“Tiger” and “Dragon” economies because they have become apex predators.  
There is little doubt that Vikram Lall and Balram Halwai—the focalizers of chapters 3 and 4 
respectively—are caricatures of neoliberalism's promise of a first-world life for all if only free 
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market forces are unleashed from the tethers of these formerly socialist states. However, and here 
is where the trouble begins, these texts also take seriously the violent and racist underpinnings of 
existing structures within their societies. These hyperbolic narratives must "balance between 
similarity to the target" and critique, deforming the referent even while taking care to ensure it 
remains recognizable (Claridge 257). That these focalizers look to capital for rescue, therefore, 
parallels not only their state’s shift in economic policy but also the ostensible lack of alternatives 
available today; remember, these are states that began with centrally planned economies. In lieu 
of other political and economic models, then, capital accumulation seems desirable to protect 
against local exigencies in the short term. In the long term, depending on neoliberalism for 
freedom is as misguided as imagining that austerity measures will solve economic crises. 
However, the local and immediate advances capitalism presents for certain indigents as they 
battle entrenched hierarchies should be taken seriously lest we misunderstand the lure of 
accumulation in emerging economies.  
In a strange way, these arguments in defense of capital accumulation parallel the 
presentism humanitarianism sometimes suffers from. David Rieff articulates this position 
elegantly by outlining the problems of humanitarian aid and its exacerbation of the very 
circumstances it aims to alleviate, sometimes by collaborating with the perpetrators to triage 
victims. While Rieff points out the limits of such humanitarianism, he does not concede that we 
simply abandon the cause due to the messy politics involved, because doing so causes more harm 
than good. He holds that supplying a bed for a night still matters. Unlike Rieff, however, neither 
Lall nor Halwai seem to acknowledge the unsustainability of their positions in the long term and 
focus instead on the alleviation of present trouble.  
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Hyperbole may also be understood as the “resource of lost causes used by speakers in the 
view of formidable opposition” (cited in Claridge 219). This is evident in chapter 1 through 
Saleem Sinai's use of hyperbole to absolve himself of war crimes during the Bangladeshi 
Genocide by straining the borders of agency, events, history, and international networks. 
Saleem's attempted exoneration demonstrates the pragmatic difficulty faced by tribunal courts 
attempting to serve justice for victims when Jameson's dictum to always historicize turns 
hyperbolic. This struggle echoes in chapter 2 when the UN's deputy of Peacekeeping Operations, 
Iqbal Riza, argues that he ignored the faxes from the field general warning of an imminent 
genocide because, “We get hyperbole in many reports” (Gourevitch 106). Roméo Dallaire, the 
issuer of these faxes, suffered from the representational impossibility of announcing an 
emergency without urgent language—panic without an exclamation mark—because such a 
communiqué will be read as a hyperbole meant to draw scarce attention. Riza’s cynicism seems 
to evince the kind of “indifference” exhibited by much of the world, an argument that repeats 
across writings about the Rwandan Genocide. To undermine this commonsense I demonstrate 
that the very powers supplying the peacekeeping mission—France and Belgium specifically—
also sold weapons to the genocidaires and supported that murderous regime. The international 
community was anything but indifferent; indeed, the claim to indifference is hyperbolic because 
it is the last resource of powers that continually intervened in these nations.   
Another way of understanding hyperbole as a resource of lost causes comes through the 
neoliberal businessmen of chapters 3 and 4. This mode of hyperbole is superficially 
contradictory because it seems to imply weakness rather than the vigor of emergent powers. 
However, these caricatures also articulate the “lost causes”—alternate modes, trajectories 
unexplored, solidarities lost—overwhelmed by global capitalist relations. In this view, Vassanji 
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and Adiga do not draw on hyperbole to defend lost causes, at least not overtly, but produce 
readerly counterfocalization through the given narrative's deformations. In these alternate and 
simultaneous narratives lie not only the lost causes of the past but also the future possibilities to 
be shaped within and against formidable opposition.  
Finally, I would like to note that these strategic uses of hyperbole follow some principles 
outlined by the great Japanese martial artist and founder of Aikido, Moreihei Ueishiba. In The 
Art of Peace, Ueishiba Sensei meditates on the responses one may have to the hostile energies an 
attacker brings. Tensing, becoming rigid, or anchoring in your position to stop the partner’s force 
is inefficient, Ueishiba demonstrates, and merely results in a contest of strength. This position 
can be roughly equated to the historical Luddites or the current ostensibly “autonomous” 
communities whose local chickens do not affect the machinations of Goldman Sachs. The 
preferred response, both pragmatically and spiritually, merges with that energy, directs it, even 
amplifies it toward a more peaceful end, one that takes the partner under control without hurting 
them or minimally so. I imagine this method as a physical allegory of Marxism, insofar as the 
aim is to take control of the massive productive forces capitalism develops toward more just 
ends. Hyperbole too merges with the given material of the world, critiquing not by way of 
polemic (rigidity) but by amplification (fluidity), guiding narratives to absurd ends that reveal the 
faults of their violent premises. 
 
 !  
18 
Chapter 1: The Midnight’s Children of Bangladesh 
 
…morality, judgment, character…it all starts with memory…and I am 
keeping carbons. (Rushdie 241) 
 Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children investigates the Bangladesh Liberation War of 
1971 through its narrator, Saleem Sinai, who commits war crimes as a member of the invading 
West Pakistan Army.3 Saleem claims he suffered amnesia in 1965 just before the West Pakistani 
army conscripted him into military service. However, he confesses to his role in perpetrating 
massacres but folds this confession into a megalomaniac self-indictment for the subcontinent’s 
twentieth-century history, claiming to be its literal embodied allegory. Saleem’s hyperbolic 
memory underpins this allegory by remembering unintended and extended repercussions, and 
rewriting them in causal chains that bind him in infinite guilt. But the novel succeeds because 
Saleem fails to exonerate himself, pushing us toward a critique of professional armies and global 
weapons flows without absolving war criminals. Placing the novel’s account of the Bangladesh 
Liberation War at the center sheds new light on recent literary criticism of Rushdie’s work. 
 Critics read Rushdie’s oeuvre generally and Midnight’s Children specifically with 
attention to the liminal, migrant, hybrid and religious, without sustained attention to the novel’s 
indictment of military service. Saleem’s role in West Pakistan’s invasion and genocide of then 
East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) couples soldiering and amnesia, two tropes unattended to by the 
novel's critics either individually or in their peculiar entwinements.4 The novel challenges a 
common sense understanding that military service epitomizes citizens’ allegiance to fellow 
compatriots; it argues instead that the soldier must forget the nation and his responsibility to 
fellow citizens precisely when these resources ostensibly energize fighters. Saleem’s role in the 
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1971 war, then, requires attention to the relationship between memory, military service, and 
nationalism, three issues woven together in the novel’s allegory of history.5  
 Saleem asks emphatically, “Why alone of all the more-than-five-hundred-million, should 
I have to bear the burden of history?” (440, emphasis in original). His fictional autobiography 
answers this question through a narrative that entwines his personal and family’s story with that 
of the subcontinent. Saleem claims to bear the “burden of history” because he and India were 
born simultaneously on August 15, 1947. But Saleem asks the question while fleeing Bangladesh 
after serving in West Pakistan’s army as it tried to violently suppress the independence 
movement. Another question precedes the burden of history. “Why should I,” Saleem asks, 
“accept the blame for what-was-not-done by Pakistani troops in Dacca?” (440). This is the 
primary question at hand, and the “burden of history,” indeed the whole of Saleem’s narration, 
may be read as an elaborate obfuscation of his self-admitted guilt.  
 To demystify Saleem’s account, this essay reads the literary logics of his defense—
metaphor, allegory and hyperbole—as well as their mnemonic foundations against the historical 
background of the Bangladesh Liberation War. I begin with Saleem’s conscription into and 
service with the West Pakistani army during a bout of amnesia to demonstrate the novel’s 
decoupling of nationalism and soldiering. Saleem participates in the violent suppression of the 
Bangladesh independence struggle but tries to exonerate himself, strangely, by pleading guilty 
for causing the whole war. His claim depends on a hyperbolic memory that remembers strange 
and disconnected consequences, rewriting them in causal chains that render him guilty for the 
1971 war, thereby obfuscating the particularities of his crimes. These weird mnemonic relations 
also underpin Saleem’s claim to allegorize the nation and admit infinite guilt for all that befalls it. 
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This absurdity prompts a turn to his midnight twin, Shiva, and a brief material account of Cold 
War weapons flows.  
 In these militant shadows, Saleem’s defense rings true by lampooning atomized 
indictments as caricatures of justice, blaming individuals instead of, say, arms dealing Security 
Council powers. Saleem’s allegory is already entrenched in the geostrategic flow of Cold War 
weapons supplied by the United States, France, the Soviet Union and China. These machinations 
render individual indictments absurd without also letting perpetrators off the hook as 
overdetermined victims of history. Moreover, the novel’s account of weapons trafficking 
troubles the ostensible antiimperialism of national sovereignty and critiques standing armies as 
the open wounds of capital unsheathed. The essay’s final section attends to this tension by 
returning to Kashmir, a contested space host to the ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan, 
a battle for which both nations seek weapons. Saleem begins his story in Kashmir to both 
foreshadow and obfuscate the real beginning in Pakistan.   
War Crimes 
 A few years after Saleem’s family emigrates to Pakistan, the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 
begins. During Indian air raids a bomb strikes his family home in Lahore, killing everyone, and 
throwing a family heirloom high in the air and down onto Saleem’s head. This item from the past 
becomes “what-purifies-and-sets-me-free”; Saleem attains amnesiac purity in Pakistan, the Land 
of the Pure. Conscripted into the West Pakistani army, “emptied of history” and having learned 
the “arts of submission” he does what he is told to do. “To sum up: I became a citizen of 
Pakistan” (403).  
 Saleem seems to agree that military duty—“the arts of submission”— epitomizes 
citizenship but eliminates any honor or romance such service usually confers. For Benedict 
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Anderson, an imagined “fraternity” makes it possible “for so many millions of people, not so 
much to kill, as willingly die” for their nation (7). Saleem, however, is “unable to remember grief, 
numb as ice [and] wiped clean as a slate” (402). The fraternity produced by imagined 
communities vanishes at the precise moment when it ostensibly drives soldiering. He does not 
volunteer for army service but rather is betrayed into it by his (not biological) sister after 
professing to love her. Rejecting his impure love, Jamila hands the hospitalized Saleem over to 
the army and continues her career singing patriotic songs that serenade troops to their death. 
Saleem’s army duty begins with the failed fraternity of family betrayal and requires numbness, 
not the overwhelming passion for another that rejuvenates the hero to risk his life again.6 Instead, 
“wiped clean,” Saleem does not even remember his own name. He takes the nickname buddha, 
“old man” (402).7 
 When the fellow soldiers of his small unit ask, “you don’t feel bad? Somewhere you’ve 
maybe got mother father sister”; the buddha replies, “Don’t try and fill my head with all that 
history. I am who I am, that’s all there is” (403, italics in text). Only the numb present exists 
during Saleem’s stint in the army. The three sixteen-year-old soldiers he trains with are 
amnesiacs of a different sort. Too young to have those memories of “love or famine” that enable 
a firm grasp of reality, they fall prey to “legends and gossip,” imagining themselves as action 
heroes and secret agents (401). Unmoored from history, they, like Saleem, “obey 
unquestioningly,” “seek unflaggingly,” “arrest remorselessly” (400). Together, they form Unit 22 
of CUTIA—Canine Units for Tracking and Intelligence Activities. 
 Tasked with rooting out “undesirable elements” the CUTIA units, joining ninety 
thousand West Pakistani troops, fly into the East Wing dressed as civilians. After landing they 
change back into military uniforms and on March 25, 1971, begin the violent suppression of the 
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East Wing’s independence movement. As the designated canine of his unit, the buddha leads his 
fellow soldiers to arrest Sheik Mujib Rahman, the opposition Awami League’s political leader 
who declared independence earlier that day. They watch the massacre of intellectuals at the 
University of Dacca, witness soldiers raping women, burning newspaper offices and city slums. 
West Pakistani soldiers seize poets and professors, shoot Awami Leaguers along with 
Communists. The soldiers of Unit 22 vomit from the stench of burning flesh and turn away from 
the “weren’t-couldn’t-have-been true” events unfolding around them to continue their work 
(410). The buddha merely sniffs out the undesirables and leaves “the rest to the soldier boys” 
(411).  
 The soldiers assassinate “Father Time” in a rice paddy before fleeing into the Sundarbans, 
“the jungle which is so thick that history has hardly ever found the way in” (413). They emerge 
months later after the monsoon season in a “drowned rice-paddy” (423).8 This journey of zero 
distance draws them into “a darker heart of madness,” a hallucinatory voyage that, echoing 
Joseph Conrad, figures the perpetration of genocide, not an escape from it. Freezing time, 
hallucinations, the soldiers’ awakenings to guilt—these experiences are not incompatible with 
continuing military service but the novel’s representation of its psychic process. Indeed, Saleem 
hopes this chapter of his autobiography articulates the “condition of spirit” in which the real 
world of their genocidal mission takes on the “altered light” of “absurd fantasy” (417). This 
altered condition suffers from an “overdose of reality,” which gives birth “to a miasmic longing 
for flight into the safety of dreams” (414). However, the “historyless” rainforest provides no 
safety but instead assaults them with the “accusing eyes of the wives of men they had tracked 
down and seized, the screaming and monkeygibbering of children left fatherless by their work” 
(418). His fellow soldiers deafen their ears with jungle mud to mute the “lamentations of 
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families”; the buddha, however, continues to listen “as though he were bowing his head before 
the inevitability of his guilt” (421).  
Hyperbolically (Not) Guilty 
 Saleem does not distance himself from his role in war atrocities although, strictly 
speaking, he never pulls the trigger. Saleem, however, cannot entirely identify himself with “the 
buddha” who remains a strange doppelganger that must be addressed simultaneously as “he (or I)” 
or “I, he” (403). Saleem does not finally take recourse in estrangement or amnesia. Instead, he 
makes the double move of distancing himself from his amnesiac double, “not I, He. He, the 
buddha,” and conversely arguing that, “even in those depths of withdrawal from responsibility, I 
remained responsible, through the working of the metaphorical modes of connection, for the 
belligerent events of 1971” (405).  
 Saleem encases his admission in the literary logics of metaphor and hyperbole; his 
amnesiac secession from history serves as a metaphor for the East Wing’s secession from West 
Pakistan. But Saleem’s narration inverts this relationship so that East Pakistan’s drive for 
regional autonomy and Sheik Mujib Rahman’s declaration of an independent state take as their 
guiding metaphor Saleem’s break with the consciousness of being a “homogeneous entity in time” 
(404). To these “metaphorical modes of connection,” Saleem pleads guilty. He confesses to 
tracking and arresting Rahman but enfolds this admission in the larger claim to be guilty for the 
very reason the opposition leader’s arrest was sought—breaking from (West Pakistan’s) 
consciousness. He is guilty of the crime, its context, and the victim’s provocations. Saleem uses 
memory not merely as the guiding metaphor—amnesia secedes from history—but the apparatus 
of prosecution; his hyperbolic memory remembers his intimate connections to the subcontinent, 
which ground his hyperbolic guilt. Such hyperbole undercuts his self-indictment by exaggerating 
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guilt to the point of absurdity. Saleem actually pleads innocence by indicting himself for the 
whole war, hyperbolizing the respondent superior plea until he remembers only an inverted—
because innocent—caricature of his role in war atrocities.  
Remembering in Hinglish 
 For Saleem, memory centers self-identity and judgments of previous actions as their 
secondary and tertiary consequences come to light. He defines consciousness as “the awareness 
of oneself as a homogenous entity in time,” which depends on “a blend of past and present” and 
holds together “our then and our now.” The homogeneity of our being depends on our memory, 
which acts as “the glue of personality” because we need not repeat the same behaviors to identify 
as the same person (404). Secondly, if we lose the “powers of retention,” we “become incapable 
of judgment, having forgotten everything to which [we can] compare anything that happened” 
(512). Indeed, “morality, judgment, character…it all starts with memory…and I am keeping 
carbons” (241, ellipses in original).9  
 These Lockean notions recall Francis Ferguson’s argument that “romantic memory” 
marks an inward turn invested in recognizing the connection between my self and my actions in 
the world. Since an act’s secondary or tertiary consequences only register in the past tense, 
memory obliges one to reexamine and “redescribe” the link between action and results (523). 
Such redescriptions, however, risk producing infinite guilt by joining an act and all its 
unintended consequences in causal chains. The resulting guilt paralyzes actors by denying them 
the ability to endorse any action, fearful of all that may follow. Saleem seems to indict himself in 
precisely this way, retrospectively redescribing strange and unintended consequences until he 
assumes guilt for the subcontinent’s twentieth-century history. This hyperbole of self-indictment 
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requires a frantic narrative form that remembers ever more events and sequences them into 
causal chains.  
 In his preface, Rushdie argues that the novel’s narrative style attempts to create a 
“literary idiolect to blend with the idiosyncrasies of ‘Hinglish’ and ‘Bambaiyya,’ the polyglot 
street slang of Bombay” (xi). A part of this idiolect is repetition, of clauses—“there will be knees 
and a nose, a nose and knees”—of Saleem’s self-consciousness—“And already I can see the 
repetitions beginning”—and the repetition of his autobiography; he recounted his story three 
times already and recites it to his lover Padma while writing, doubling the moment of 
composition (96, 7).10 His first recitation comes in the Sundarbans jungle where, “incapable of 
continuing in the submissive performance of his duty,” he leads his fellow soldiers in a bid to 
desert the army (414). Haunted by the memories and guilt of their war crimes, Saleem ascends 
from amnesia’s false Eden when a snake bites him. Saleem’s story pours out, beginning with his 
midnight birth to the unholy war the buddha and his unit currently wage. His fellow soldier 
replies, “so many bad things, no wonder he kept his mouth shut” (420). Rather than silence and 
amnesia, Saleem defends himself by speaking prolifically, repeating his story repeatedly and 
blaming himself for the subcontinent’s twentieth-century history to obfuscate his role in war 
atrocities.  
 At the moment of his birth, for instance, Saleem’s father Ahmed clumsily drops a chair 
and shatters his toe. Saleem duly indicts himself for the accident:  
Yes, it was my fault (despite everything)…it was the power of my face, 
mine and nobody else’s, which caused Ahmed Sinai’s hands to release 
the chair; which caused the chair to drop…the falling chair shattered his 
toe. (130)  
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That Saleem would blame his infant self for another’s awkward handling of a chair is strange 
enough, but utterly bizarre when one considers that he is not the infant. Rather, it is Shiva, his 
midnight twin with whom he is switched at birth. The drive to create this illogical causal link 
pauses with the parenthetical “(despite everything),” which both insists on the causal chain and 
breaks it apart by acknowledging that these events (birth and broken toe) do not cohere. 
Ferguson terms “circumstantial memory” such events that cannot link together but must stand 
alone and retain their vividness. Saleem drives to overwrite these moments through a hyperbolic 
memory that trumps its own disintegration by insisting “it must be true; because what followed, 
followed” (474). These circular arguments recur when he cuts out the newspaper headline, 
“After Nehru, Who?” for the question mark (298). The answer indicts Saleem:  
And my grandfather was the founder of my family, and my fate was 
linked by my birthday to that of the nation, and the father of the nation 
was Nehru. Nehru’s death: can I avoid the conclusion that that, too, was 
all my fault? (319)   
Despite the absurdity of Saleem’s final claim to responsibility for Nehru’s death, the moment 
offers an insight into the way he produces guilt. Saleem’s grandfather, Nehru, and his own fate, 
are brought together in a narrative arc, the keystone of which conflates “father” and “founder.” 
Aadam Aziz, Saleem’s grandfather, founds his family and Nehru fathers the nation and both 
social units have their center in Saleem who is fathered-founded by fate, the grandest patriarch of 
all. More than mere alliteration but less than rational––certainly below the threshold of legal 
prosecution––Saleem’s self-centered muddling of nation and family evinces another literary 
logic of his defense; he allegorizes the nation and therefore is guilty of all that befalls it.  
National Allegory 
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 If the novel’s allegory is a “literalization of metaphor,” Saleem gives literal life to the 
dead metaphor of a nation’s ‘birth,’ and channels his hyperbolic memory and guilt by narrating 
himself as an allegory of India (Kortenaar 43). By making dead metaphors literal the novel’s 
allegory also makes events hyperbolic. Although the OED dictates that one should not 
understand hyperbole “literally,” Saleem creates hyperbole precisely by making metaphors literal. 
For instance, India’s rapid and uneven industrialization registers literally on Saleem’s bandied 
toddler legs, a base allegorically bent under the weight of his responsibility for the nation. As 
Kortenaar remarks, “if India were a person, it would be a grotesque such as Saleem, its paternity 
would be in dispute, and its ability to tell its story would be in question” (46). Nationalizing 
himself through allegory, Saleem disburses the blame of his war crimes by literalizing the 
“imagined communion” Benedict Anderson argues helps establish the nation as an imagined 
community.  
 Saleem’s strongest communion with India comes through his telepathic communications 
with the other magical children born in the first hour of India’s independence. He becomes a 
radio and acts “as a sort of national network.” By transforming his mind he could “turn it into a 
kind of forum in which they could talk to one another, through me” (259). Beyond the sudden 
shock of discovering this power and the onrush of voices, Saleem hears the subcontinent’s 
multilingualism as “the voices babbled in everything from Malayalam to Naga dialects, from the 
purity of Lucknow Urdu to the southern slurrings of Tamil” (192). Deeper probing, “below the 
surface transmissions” reveals “universally intelligible thought-forms which far transcended 
words” (192).  
 In Rushdie’s novelistic vocabulary, universal “thought-forms” become the magical-realist 
equivalent to Anderson’s print-language, a shared field of intelligibility that transcends local 
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particularities and grounds national consciousness. Such universal comprehensibility allegorizes 
the imposition of Hindi as India’s national language by making literal its elision of intra-national 
linguistic battles. It is no mistake that Saleem juxtaposes his discovery of “universal thought-
forms” with “the partition of [his home] state of Bombay along linguistic boundaries––the dream 
of Maharashtra was at the head of some processions, the mirage of Gujarat led the others forward” 
(191). These language marches succeed and Bombay is divided into two states. In this context, 
the desire for unity is an understandable, if not endorsable, response to the state’s fragmentation. 
Moreover, Saleem’s ruminations on linguistic sectarianism allude to the first confrontations 
between East Pakistan and its rulers in Rawalpindi.  
 Without the sutures of universal thought forms, the question of official language remains 
an open wound. In 1948, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liquat Ali Khan rejected the Bengali 
speaking East Wing’s demand for dual official languages, Bengali and Urdu. He claimed that 
Urdu was both a lingua franca and the “language of the Muslim nation” (cited in Ayoob and 
Subrahmanyam, 31). M.A. Jinnah, the ‘father’ of Pakistan, argued the same line at Dacca 
University in the East Wing, and the students—Mujibur Rahman among them—jeered him off 
the stage (Ayoob and Subrahmanyam, 31).11 When Saleem and his fellow Pakistani soldiers 
arrive in the Eastern wing to set the stage for military repression they tap their feet to the tune of 
“Amar Sonar Bangla” (Our Golden Bengal), although “none of [them] could understand Bengali” 
(408). Unable to comprehend the verses of Rabindranath Tagore’s song turned into a hymn for 
independence, the Pakistani soldiers are “protected from the insidious subversion of the lyric” 
(408). Saleem’s sardonic comment and translations of select verses—“they madden my heart 
with delight”—foreground the linguistic discordance between Pakistan’s two wings (408, my 
emphasis). In this context, language divides and cannot make compatriots legible. Saleem’s unit 
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shuffles past “fluttering newspapers in curious curlicued script, through [the] empty fields and 
abandoned settlements” left in the wake of genocide (425). Universal thought forms ultimately 
allow Saleem to elide, if not entirely ignore, the dire consequences of the subcontinent’s 
numerous languages; but even telepathic communion with magical children cannot create the 
imagined ground for Saleem to practice a democratic union with his fellow citizens, a solidarity 
worth fighting for.   
 The Midnight’s Children’s Conference communes daily from midnight to one a.m. “in [a 
telepathic] lok sabha or parliament” (259). Differences between their (magical) powers and 
material lives rive the MCC just as they do the nation’s governing institutions. Unable to decide 
whose power is greatest, the children defer to Saleem, their medium of communication. He 
rejects the title “chief” and insists that they form a “family, of a kind,” of which he is “just the 
oldest,” a “big brother” (260-1). Available here are all the ingredients for a national imagined 
community but rather than solidarity a “many-headed monster, speak[s] in the myriad tongue of 
Babel” (262). Nationalism fails at the point of emergence. The MCC literalizes the voices of 
democratic constituencies clamoring to be heard and lead the way forward. Shiva offers that he 
and Saleem should be “joint bosses of this gang” because, the future army major argues 
tautologically, “gangs need gang bosses” (252). 
Shiva 
 If Saleem is India born disfigured, then his midnight twin Shiva is the nation’s militant, 
impoverished other half. When “the memory of his actuality” grows dull, Saleem’s rival comes 
to represent “all the vengefulness and violence and simultaneous-love-and-hate-of-Things in the 
world” (342). The ambiguity of simultaneous love and hate tempers Shiva’s brutality. It is Shiva, 
after all, who fights in the Indian army and becomes a war hero in the military intervention 
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against West Pakistan’s genocide. He represents a complicated indictment of militarism and its 
“world of startling uniformity” (250). Shiva murders easily but also kills killers. After that saving 
moment, however, Shiva aids tyranny, helping sterilize the poor, crack down on Communists 
and round up other Midnight’s Children under Indira Gandhi’s Emergency rule. The military 
forms a powerful conjunction of interests, a bulbous joint literalized in Shiva’s enormous knees 
(rather than bandy legs), an ongoing articulation of nationalism, capital and the international 
flow of weapons. 
 Far from disinterested solidarity, Shiva’s nationalism emphasizes material relations over 
imagined communion:  
money-and-poverty, and have-and-lack, and right-and-left, there is only 
me-against-the-world! The world is not ideas, rich boy; the world is no 
place for dreamers and their dreams; the world, little Snotnose, is things. 
Things and their makers rule the world…For things, the country is run. 
Not for people. For things, America and Russia send aid; but five 
hundred million stay hungry…Today, what people are is just another 
kind of thing. (293)  
Shiva highlights India’s entrenchment in the Cold War geo-politics between America, China and 
the Soviet Union. Moreover, his attention to class differences and nationalism’s material base is 
both necessary and accurate. “For what reason you’re rich and I’m poor? Where’s the reason in 
starving, man?” (252). Shiva offers a crude materialist analysis but does not take the Marxist 
reprieve of class solidarity as a solution or even a starting point to counter Saleem. Instead, 
atomistic individualism, “me-against-the-world,” is the first principle in a world that offers no 
larger narrative, no larger structure of meaning. This vision of the world reduces people to “just 
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another kind of thing” to be made, exchanged or destroyed as the strongest power dictates. For 
Saleem, humans reduced to mere materiality are dust particles, “anonymous, and necessarily 
oblivious”; they cannot make a nation (34). For Shiva, however, nationalism is unnecessary for 
military service. 
 To serve in West Pakistan’s army, Saleem required amnesia and the attendant inability to 
feel responsible for his actions granted him innocence and numb service; Shiva, on the other 
hand, already rejects larger narratives that may make him responsible to others; he fights for 
himself, to make himself a more powerful thing than the lesser things around him. Insofar as 
Shiva does not care to remember those strangers, his fellow citizens and East Bengalis, who 
benefit from his military service, he too is an amnesiac. That is, Shiva’s narrative begins and 
ends with himself as the atomistic individual whose material circumstances improve regardless 
of the cost to others. Shiva willingly takes credit for his murderous actions but unlike Saleem, he 
is on the right side of history in the 1971 war. The novel avoids easy solutions here because both 
Saleem’s amnesia and Shiva’s ruthless individualism disconnect soldiering from the fraternity of 
imagined communities; both forget the nation they serve, or worse, persecute their compatriots. 
Despite their antagonisms, the two actors overlap in their critiques of Cold War geopolitics.  
Warring Systems 
 Saleem contextualizes his amnesia and the atrocities that follow in the struggles of Cold 
War machinations and the subsequent trade in weapons. Such arms trafficking, Saleem hints, 
exonerates the individual soldier’s role in war crimes; after all, it is an air raid’s fire and bombs 
that “purifies” Saleem and begins his amnesiac stint in the army. He only survived the 1965 war 
“because nobody sold our would-be assassins the bombs bullets aircraft necessary for the 
completion of our destruction” (393). In Bangladesh, Saleem’s unit fights with “American guns, 
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American tanks and aircraft,” shielded by President Nixon who infamously tilted toward West 
Pakistan in a bid to bridge the diplomatic gap with China (431). Like Shiva, Saleem too is a thing, 
bought, sold and used as the greatest power sees fit.  
 The battle of superpowers creates for Shiva a world of basic binaries, “have-and-lack, 
left-and-right,” in which people as things are subordinate to thing makers. Shiva inadvertently 
voices the important critique that focusing on explosions of genocidal violence may obscure our 
attention to the systemic violence endemic to capitalism and statecraft. Saleem counters by 
attending to the dialectical entwinement of capitalism’s systemic injustices and eruptions of 
sweeping murder. While Shiva rejects “dreamers and their dreams,” Saleem argues that dreams 
too circulate like things, materializing as Mirages and Mystéres, the French fighter jets and 
bombers deployed against India’s Soviet MiG jets.  
 After Independence, the Soviet Union, China, France and United States all sold weapons 
to the partitioned neighbors, who in turn vied for superpower support. Indocentric perspectives 
on the 1971 war lambast America as an imperial hegemon, China as a militant hypocrite for their 
support of West Pakistan during the conflict, and praise the Soviet Union as India’s lone ally in 
the Security Council.12 This simplified version gets the basic coordinates right but neglects the 
nuances of geopolitical maneuvers. While the Soviet Union publicly sided with India during the 
war, it sold $30 million in military equipment to Pakistan in 1968, “including medium tanks, 
rocket launchers, artillery, and helicopters,” some of which West Pakistan used in Dacca so as to 
avoid using U.S equipment, thus frustrating its relationship with Washington (Sisson and Rose 
237, 258). Meanwhile, both the U.S. and China cut off new arms supplies to West Pakistan when 
the repression began in March, but continued to ship replacement parts and materials sold under 
contracts approved before their embargoes; the Soviets did the same. Sadly, India’s pioneering 
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non-alignment policy only meant keeping out of the “quarrel between the two power blocs. It 
was not neutrality or equidistance from the two super powers.” Most importantly, the policy 
never excluded “accepting defense equipment from one of the major powers” (Ayoob and 
Subrahmanyam, 194).  
 The novel both mocks such militarism and acknowledges its necessity in an 
independence struggle. When the West Pakistan General Tiger Niazi surrenders to the Indian 
General Sam Manekshaw, Saleem imagines the two friends converse in Britishisms—“I say, 
bloody fine to see you Tiger, you old devil!”—and sing “Auld Lang Syne” together; like Ayub 
Kahn, general cum premier, they are “not MADE AS ENGLAND” but “certainly Sandhurst trained” 
(437, 330). However, these students of the Royal Military Academy also train the Mukti 
Bahini—East Pakistani soldiers, police and other volunteers. These independence fighters sought 
temporary refuge in West Bengal, where the Indian military helps organize and supply them 
(Ayoob and Subrahmanyam, 156). The novel empathizes with the Bangladeshi independence 
fighters by pushing them offstage as they successfully escape capture by the invading army; 
“Soldiers came looking for Bahini and killed many many, also my son” (428). These sympathies 
stand in tension with the novel’s indictment of military service but align with a larger critique of 
individual guilt amidst global bellicosity. 
 Saleem’s evasion of personal guilt through a hyperbolic national allegory seems 
understandable given his entrenchment in the flow of weapons and geostrategic concerns; he 
combines Fredric Jameson’s infamous claim that “third-world literature” should be read as 
“national allegories” with the dictum “always historicize!”13 Any proper historical account 
deconstructs the always already international situation of national allegories, especially of the 
post-colonial South. However, the novel builds on Saleem’s failed account by pointing to the 
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limits of Jameson’s dictum and taking it too literally. Rather than enabling the prosecution of war 
crimes, Saleem’s allegory defends his soldiering by historicizing it as one episode in a larger 
narrative of belligerent nationalisms. Moreover, Saleem caricatures history through a self-
centered, strangely causal narrative to lampoon individual indictments in the international state 
system. Prosecutions of those who hold and use weapons never question the weapons 
suppliers—all permanent members of the UN Security Council in this case—or the global 
political dynamics that arm perpetrators. Saleem’s allegory troubles the dictum ‘always 
historicize’—how far back?—by making difficult what might be a sloganized version of David 
Harvey’s work, ‘always spatialize!’—how far abroad?  
 The war crimes Saleem commits require thinking space and time not merely as absolute 
(fixed) or relative (redefinable), but as relational. Harvey theorizes that a “relational view of 
space holds that there is no such thing as space or time outside of the processes that define 
them”; “Processes do not occur in space,” Harvey goes on, “but define their own spatial frame” 
(123). Saleem’s narrative defense of his war crimes takes the process of genocide seriously and 
acknowledges its ability to bend space-time, pulling global matter into its orbit: his amnesia, the 
Sundarbans episode, American guns and diplomatic support for Pakistan, its use of French 
fighter jets and close alliances with China, Soviet military equipment on both sides and 
diplomatic support for India. Entrenched in the global flow of weapons, capital and political 
pressure, the novel uses Saleem’s allegory to critique the atomized indictments of ICC tribunals 
as allegories of justice, hyperbolic prosecutions that make absurdly literal the metaphor of 
soldiering; to give one’s life for the nation. But this argument goes too far if it absolves ground 
level actors like Saleem and reduces regional players to puppets or client states without 
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acknowledging their own goals. Since Independence and Partition, India and West Pakistan have 
fought bitterly over Kashmir and sought weapons for the conflict.  
Kashmir 
 Even amidst superpower intrigues, the Kashmir conflict focuses regional anxieties 
between the partitioned neighbors whose concerns, paranoid or real, lead to the 1965 war in 
which Saleem achieves amnesia. This war affirmed East Pakistan’s suspicion that their 
“economic and political (and now defense) interests” mattered less to Rawalpindi than the 
struggle for Kashmir (Ayoob and Subrahmanyam, 65). Saleem’s uncle General Zulfikar orders 
mines placed along the border between West Pakistan and India leaving “those damn blackies” 
in East Pakistan to “look after themselves” (327). Indeed, Rahman’s popular six-point program 
asked explicitly for a regional military force, an ordinance factory and military academy. Given 
these ongoing tensions, Saleem makes the case for the historical overdetermination of his actions 
by beginning his narrative in Kashmir with Tai the boatman, who fights to exile the foreign 
influence of Aadam Aziz’s German medical training.  
 Aadam’s childhood mentor Tai rejects him and his “foreign” training, materialized in a 
“big bag full of foreign machines,” “that thing made of a pig’s skin that makes one unclean just 
by looking at it” (15). For Tai, “the bag represents Abroad; it is the alien thing, the invader, 
progress,” which, like Aadam, he wants exiled from the Kashmiri valley. Tai reads “Abroad” as 
those elsewheres with Great Wars and pigskin bags that invade Srinagar, provoking his 
combative language. Many things happen Abroad during the Kashmir chapters, but these events 
are peripheral no matter their significance elsewhere. As Doctor Aadam Aziz meets his future 
wife Naseem, “far away the Great War moved from crisis to crisis” (22). “On the day the World 
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War end[s],” Aadam finally sees Naseem’s face and finishes falling in love (23). In Saleem’s 
narration, World War I happens Abroad.  
 Such distancing glosses what Dipesh Chakrabarty terms “provincializing Europe” so that 
Europe is the Abroad, the periphery from which Aadam returns to the Kashmiri center. This 
spatial reorientation meshes with Chakrabarty’s, and the narrative’s, critique of enlightenment 
historiography and undoes what Johannes Fabian calls “the denial of coevalness”; the love story 
unfolding in Kashmir exists at the same temporal moment as those world-historical events; they 
belong to the same modernity. 14  Tai, however, understands the globe’s simultaneity and 
campaigns to exile Abroad’s influence on Kashmir.  
 He wants Aadam, “our foreign-returned doctor…that nakkoo, that German Aziz,” to 
leave lest a world war erupt in his home valley (24). Despite Aadam’s departure, however, 
Kashmir soon becomes a battleground for warring nations.15 When Tai demands “Kashmir for 
the Kashmiris,” he is shot by either Indian or Pakistani troops (35). Tai misunderstands the 
problem insofar as he locates Abroad only in Europe, forgetting the proximity of British 
colonialism and the partitions left in its wake. He succeeds in banishing the German trained 
Aadam Aziz but fails to survive Kashmir’s occupation by Indian and Pakistani armies. “In those 
days,” Saleem reminisces of his grandfather’s home, “there was no [Indian] army camp at the 
lakeside, no endless snakes of camouflaged trucks and jeeps” and “no soldiers” (5). These first 
mentions of military power in the Kashmir chapters foreshadow Saleem’s own soldiering. He 
begins his autobiography in this prelapsarian space because Kashmir hosts the subcontinent’s 
perpetual war between rival nations, for which Saleem claims responsibility.  
 Inheriting his grandfather’s hope of returning to Kashmir, Saleem circulates it to 
belligerent politicians by “dream[ing] Kashmir into the fantasies of our rulers,” and instigating 
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the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war (387). His dreams merge with the fantasies of Pakistan’s leadership 
in a perverse imagined communion, which—like print capitalism and telepathy—produces both 
national solidarity and military excursions abroad. Beyond amnesia and military conscription, 
Saleem claims that the “hidden purpose” of the 1965 war was “nothing more or less than the 
elimination of my benighted family from the face of the earth” (386). Saleem’s absurd claim to 
catalyze a war aimed at the systematic destruction of his family eerily displaces his role in the 
systematic destruction of dissenting Bangladeshis.  
 This parallel again evinces the hyperbolic logic of his appeal; Saleem is guilty of war 
crimes, for instigating the war (amnesiac secession from history), the previous war that 
successfully destroyed his family and the Kashmir conflict that burns steady in the post-colonial 
subcontinent. That is, Saleem’s entwinement with the subcontinent’s belligerent twentieth- 
century history makes his guilt both inevitable and excusable. To prosecute him is to indict the 
whole historical situation because he allegorizes—literally embodies—his nation. Such allegory 
writes national history hyperbolically to make legible the global determinations warring in the 
subcontinent and, conversely, to explicate the international stakes of regional conflicts. 16 Where 
Saleem’s defense by allegory fails, the novel succeeds in indicting both local war criminals and 
the Cold War weapons distributors who comprise the UN Security Council. The manufacture and 
export of weapons to regions of “strategic concern” subverts the ostensible antiimperialism 
claimed in nation state sovereignty and their professional armies. Midnight’s Children critiques 
the need for national standing armies even while empathizing with the militant struggle 
independence often requires.  
 Postcolonial studies, which focuses on imperial brutality and subaltern resistance, must 
frame these within a critical material account that rejects the necessity of professional armies 
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under the false name of antiimperialism. An ongoing decolonization project must question the 
belligerence of armed sovereign borders. This difficult conclusion sympathizes with the 
necessity of armed antiimperial struggle but begs for a conversation about military service 
without upholding it as the apex of citizenship, national or otherwise, by attending to systemic 
injustices, eruptions of violence and the revolutionary struggle against both. 
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Chapter 2: Against Indifference: International Weapons and Narratives in 
Rwanda 
 
[At the] root of it all, however, is the fundamental indifference of the 
world community to the plight of seven to eight million black Africans in 
a tiny country that had no strategic or resource value to any world power. 
(Dallaire 6) 
When discussing the 1994 Rwandan genocide, writers frequently blame international 
“indifference” without elaborating on what that might mean. At first glance, indifference seems 
to indicate that the international community did not care about the execution of approximately 
900,000 Rwandan Tutsis and moderate Hutus, and therefore provided no material aid to the 
country during the crisis.17 This banal version of indifference—nobody cared about Rwanda—
implies humanitarianism as its opposite. Indeed, the international community responded to the 
massive refugee exodus following the genocide with a massive humanitarian aid mission that 
attempted to appease both global conscience and Rwandan suffering. Unfortunately, the resulting 
refugee and aid camps helped genocidaires hide, reorganize, and refuel before launching more 
attacks.18 While most accounts of the Rwandan genocide critique the poor political analysis 
supporting the humanitarian response and its dire consequences, the story of global 
“indifference” and its relation to humanitarianism remains unexplored. I argue that the common 
accusation of global “indifference” helped animate the humanitarian response while also 
obscuring the deep investments in Rwanda of major global powers. That is, the problem was not 
that no one cared about Rwanda but that some Security Council powers, especially France, were 
overinvested—politically and militarily—in Rwanda and Central Africa. At stake here is a 
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reevaluation of a dominant narrative trope surrounding the Rwandan genocide as well as an 
immunization against the ruse of “indifference” for future “humanitarian” emergencies. 
In this chapter I advance a material critique of the narrative of indifference in Rwanda by 
demonstrating that the international community supplied weapons and peacekeeping missions 
both, simultaneously affecting a disinterested solidarity and promoting militant profiteering. 
These tensions complicate the story of indifference, which appears in texts from a variety of 
genres, including journalism, military memoir, and literary fiction.  
American reporter and New Yorker correspondent Philip Gourevitch’s We Wish to Inform 
You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families lists “the indifference of the outside 
world” as one ingredient in “an excellent recipe for a culture of genocide” (180).19 In Shake 
Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, Canadian Lt. Gen. Roméo Dallaire, 
the Force Commander of the UN Assistance Mission For Rwanda (UNAMIR) argues that the 
country’s story is one of “betrayal, failure, naïveté, indifference, hatred, genocide, war, 
inhumanity and evil,” in which “the developed world, impassive and apparently unperturbed, sat 
back and watched the unfolding apocalypse or simply changed channels” (xxiv). I read these 
texts against my primary text Murambi, The Book of Bones, a rare fictional account by 
Senegalese author Boubicar Boris Diop. The novel opens the day the murders begin when Tutsi 
shopkeeper Michel Serumundo laments that the Football World Cup would occupy the planet 
uninterested in “the same old story of blacks beating up on each other” (9). In her forward to the 
novel, Eileen Julien hopes that Diop’s work will help readers overcome “the numbed 
indifference or silent acquiescence of which we are all a part” (x).  While these texts belong to 
different genres, they overlap as travel accounts responding to a relatively brief stay in Rwanda. 
This broad categorization does not intend to skate over their formal differences but construct an 
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archive of texts to explore “indifference” as a trope. Reading these varied texts as kinds of travel 
literature, moreover, helps explain their concern with and use of “indifference”; these authors 
and texts initially know nothing about Rwanda and come to care deeply about the country. In 
other words, they journey on the narrative arc from ignorance—the ostensible root of 
indifference—to humanitarianism and want their readers to do the same. Diop and Gourevitch 
visit Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide, while Dallaire participates intimately in the failed 
peacekeeping mission and its attached political processes before returning to Canada stricken 
with PTSD. Even so, Dallaire remains hopeful; “After all I have witnessed, I too believe we can 
prevail” (548). Diop’s novel seems to endorse this progressive narrative from distance to 
intimacy and activism.  
In this chapter's first section I takes up one major narrative in Murambi—the novel 
deploys no less than nine focalizers—that appears to offer this affirmative lesson in the story of 
Cornelius Uvimana’s return to Rwanda after the genocide. Uvimana progresses from an exiled 
acquaintance with the genocide to a deep immersion in its machinations and concludes by 
affirming literature’s power to awaken readers. The novel’s disjunctive form interrupts this 
banal, if powerful, conclusion by framing it with alternate narratives and other more nefarious 
focalizers. An analysis of these formal ruptures provokes my turn to Dallaire’s memoir and an 
analysis of global overinvestments in Rwanda.  
Lt. Gen. Roméo Dallaire’s presence in the middle section of my analysis reflects his 
unfortunate placement as the fulcrum between the international communities of the global North 
and South. As the Force Commander for UNAMIR, Dallaire enacted the Security Council’s 
orders while negotiating—and quite literally translating—between the anglophone RPF 
(Rwandese Patriot Front) and the francophone RGF (Rwandese Government Forces). 
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Consequently, his formulation—“betrayal, failure, naïveté, indifference, hatred, genocide, war, 
inhumanity and evil”—places “indifference” between naïveté and hatred, failure and genocide, 
betrayal and war. This syntactic location suggests that "indifference" is not merely a non-space 
between naïve caring and brutal hatred, but the battleground between these contradictory and 
seemingly disconnected phenomena. Torn between failure and genocide, betrayal and war, the 
trope of “international indifference” only makes sense if we take it to mean the clash of such 
contradictory vectors. In other words, Dallaire's formulation suggests that indifference is 
produced.  
In the second section I attempt to displace the commonplace understanding of 
indifference as a synonym for apathy and argue for the production of indifference in 
bureaucracies (the UN) and, more largely, in situations of contradictory investments. In the last 
section I trace these material investments, specifically weapons shipments, which prompt a 
return to Murambi and attention to the text's indictment of France's neocolonial African policy 
while also gesturing towards the antiimperial potential of indifference.   
Writing Development 
Two major sections of Diop’s novel chronicle Cornelius Uvimana’s return to Rwanda 
after a twenty-five year exile in Djibouti. He fled Rwanda as a boy after a period of violence 
against Tutsis, in which he and his mother were targeted. Uvimana returns to Rwanda believing 
that his whole family perished in the genocide, only to learn something worse. Uvimana’s father, 
Dr. Joseph Karekezi, orchestrated the mass murder of fifty thousand people at Murambi 
Polytechnic Institute. Branded the “Butcher of Murambi,” Dr. Karekezi ordered the execution of 
his Tutsi wife and young children as well. When Uvimana learns that “he was the son of a 
monster,” his life and return from exile “could no longer have the same meaning” (78). “He had 
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suddenly discovered that he had become the perfect Rwandan: Both guilty and a victim” (78). 
This realization concludes the first section of Uvimana’s development as he enters the polity by 
coming to know what everyone else already knows (Slaughter 3). The second stage passes 
through open grave memorials. 
Uvimana must visit the Murambi memorial to confront the slaughter organized by his 
own father, who destroyed his mother and siblings. His response to the genocide uses words, 
even words as weapons of war. While the form these words will take changes over the course of 
Uvimana’s development, the basic affirmation of literature’s power remains intact. He abandons 
the idea of a play but does not give up on writing. 
He would tirelessly recount the horror. With machete words, club words, 
words studded with nails, naked words and…words covered with blood 
and shit. That he could do, because he saw in the genocide of Rwandan 
Tutsis a great lesson in simplicity. Every chronicler could at least learn—
something essential to his art—to call a monster by its name. (179) 
Uvimana sees in the genocide and its aftermath “a great lesson in simplicity,” which 
prods him into the “modest role” of “tirelessly recount[ing] the horror.” If the “essential” lesson 
seems clear—“to call a monster by its name”—the proper name of that monster remains unclear. 
At first glance, this Rumplestiltskin theory of writing names the monster of genocide and 
critiques the international community, especially Western nations, for obfuscating the situation 
lest they fulfill their obligations under the UN Genocide Convention. But recounting the horror, 
as Dallaire did in his daily reports, failed to move the international community. Even worse, 
these dispatches convinced the Security Council that an intervention force could do “little good” 
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(Barnett 560). Dallaire and Uvimana assume that such accounts fight against the monster of 
indifference whose defeat will allow their readers to confront tragedies.  
Learning to write the proper name of genocide and its executioners certainly seems an 
important lesson. Uvimana believes in a “duty to get as close as he could to all suffering” (181). 
By recording and sharing the horror and suffering of survivors, he will become a medium for 
Murambi’s dead whose “most ardent desire was for the resurrection of the living” (181).20 If 
Uvimana's narrative affirms literature's power to breathe life into half-dead affects, the novel’s 
formal disjunctures bespeak a more cautious lesson: the living need no resurrection because they 
are not dead, nor indifferent. Worse, some are too alive and invested in the horror of genocide. 
Uvimana should realize this when his survivor-guide takes him away to larger room and asks 
him to “touch a flagpole put up on top of a little pile of brown pebbles: This is where [the 
French] hoisted their flag” (149). The guide tells Uvimana that the French military built the 
garrisons for their humanitarian invasion, Operation Turquoise, atop the Murambi massacre 
grounds. To excavate the memorial and preserve the violation required digging beneath a 
military playground; the novel preserves these layers in its sedimented form.21 
Those cruel days were like nothing that had ever been seen. Woven from 
flashes, there were threaded with all manner of frenzy…he would never 
be able to tame this whirlwind, its bright colors, its howls and its furious 
twisting.  
Diop’s novel weaves together flashes of experience from nine different focalizers—
victims, perpetrators and a French Colonel—whose frenzy both precedes and breaks up 
Uvimana’s narrative. This formal strategy subverts an easy focus on Uvimana or an affirmative 
narrative of development. Although the novel does not employ the Bildungsroman’s formal 
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tautology—beginning at the end and narrating how one got there—Uvimana does develop into 
an ideal human rights subject affirming the basic right to life of both the victims and his own 
future vocation as a chronicler employing human rights literacy.22 But he is not the novel’s hero.  
The story of Uvimana’s return to Rwanda does not even begin until we have met a 
victim, a perpetrator, and a RPF-allied informant. These narratives precede and exceed 
Uvimana’s story, setting a stage that formally demonstrates the need for a polyvocality the novel 
bravely attempts.  After Uvimana’s first section, the novel breaks again into many other voices 
that speak while living through the horror of genocide. This section’s focalizers include 
perpetrators, victims, and most importantly a French Colonel tasked with evacuating Dr. 
Karekezi. While it is true that this formal strategy "encourage[s] the reader to view the genocide 
from a variety of different angles and to resist a reductive interpretation of the events," the novel 
does not simply advocate the recognition of genocide as such—rather than tribal or ethnic 
warfare—by those who paid "little attention" during the 1994 massacres (Hitchcott 53, 55).23 
Rather, these formal disruptions encode David Keen’s lesson that conflicts do not simply disrupt 
economies and interrupt benevolent progress but continue economics by other means and create 
“an alternative system of profit, power and even protection” (10-11). These alternate systems 
link local extortions with “international trading networks,” allowing Rwandan genocidaires 
access to South African arms and French military protection. That is, the human rights NGO’s 
desire for “a speedy transition from wartime relief to development” ignores the ways 
development processes both promote conflict and continue during these perilous times (10).  
The survivor-guide at Murambi Polytechnic Institute tells Uvimana, “the World Bank had 
given a grant” for the school’s construction, “but work had been interrupted by the events” (145). 
The genocide ostensibly interrupts a “Banking bildungsroman” meant to evince the “[World] 
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Bank’s extensive commitment to education” (Benjamin 162).24 Such funding inundated Rwanda 
and increased by “nearly 100 percent from 1989 to 1993”; this last year’s total foreign assistance 
of $334 million received an additional $130 million in “emergency aid” (Des Forges 94). Despite 
the spending regulations on aid money, “Rwandan officials diverted resources intended for 
civilian purposes to use by military or militia,” including purchasing arms (ibid. 94). This 
militarization depends on the Banking bildungsroman and siphons monies into the arms trade 
shot through with a parallel tautology of development—citizens begin as what they must 
become, armed soldiers. The UN peacekeeping mission led by Dallaire tried to interrupt the flow 
of arms in Rwanda. 
UNAMIR and the Bureaucratic Infrastructure of Indifference 
In early January 1994, a high-ranking member of the Hutu Power extremists turns 
informer and warns UNAMIR of arms caches in Kigali and militias training to systematically kill 
Tutsis. The informer, codenamed Jean-Pierre, discloses a mission to target Belgian soldiers—
UNAMIR’s military backbone—hoping that a few casualties will lead to the contingent’s 
withdrawal. Dallaire reads this buildup as a direct threat to UNAMIR and a violation of the 
Kigali Weapons Secure Area (KWSA) agreement; he sends a fax to UN’s Department of Peace 
Keeping Operations announcing his plans to raid the arms caches believing that his mandate 
allows this action. The reply from the head of Peacekeeping Operations, Kofi Annan, and his 
deputy, Iqbal Riza, scolds Dallaire for even thinking of such action and reminds him of the 
severe limitations of UNAMIR’s mandate. When Gourevitch later interviews Riza, the latter 
devalues the fax as one among many correspondences with Dallaire and the UN mission. Riza 
tells Gourevitch, “We get hyperbole in many reports” (106). 
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Riza invokes the literary figure of hyperbole to imply that Dallaire’s fax exaggerated 
reality and effectively canceled its own persuasive power. Riza’s comment on UN member state 
unwillingness to contribute troops in the wake of Somalia suggests that the hyperbole was not in 
the details of Dallaire’s fax but his assumption that the world community cared enough to enable 
action. Riza deploys the Realpolitik commonsense that no one would have offered “our boys for 
an offensive action in Rwanda” (Gourevitch 106). But Dallaire already had his “boys”—
Ghanaian and Tunisian troops lauded for their courage during the mission—and thought he was 
merely informing his superiors, not asking for permission of what he read as entirely within his 
mission’s mandate. Gourevitch cites a television interview Dallaire gives in which the latter 
mourns the “absolute detachment of the international community and particularly of the Western 
world.” “To be very candid and soldierly,” Dallaire continues, “who the hell cared about 
Rwanda?” (cited in Gourevitch, 168). Dallaire’s hyperbolic fax received a hyperbolic reply, a 
rejection sanctioned by an “absolute detachment” both from the situation in the Rwanda and 
UN’s genocide convention. The rhetorical question, “who the hell cared about Rwanda?” repeats 
across writing on the genocide because the answer—no one—is damningly commonsensical. 
However, Michael Barnett’s essay “The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in 
Rwanda” offers a more troubling reply to Dallaire’s question.25 Barnett served as an expert on 
Rwanda for US State Department staff at the UN. To answer Dallaire, he turns to the production 
of indifference in bureaucratized peacekeeping; everyone cared about Rwanda but they cared 
more about the bureaucracy that regulated and authorized that caring. 
Barnett works as a political science professor at the University of Wisconsin and uses 
Midwestern self-deprecation to mock his status as “a seasoned veteran of Rwanda for nearly four 
months,” when the genocide begins. Barnett argues that his standing as an expert derived not 
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from extensive knowledge of Rwanda “but rather the culture of the policy-making process in the 
U.S government and the UN” (554). Barnett expertise derives from bureaucratic tautology: “As a 
political officer I was, by definition, an expert. Rwanda was my account; I was its owner and 
hence a Rwanda expert” (554). The language of commerce subsidizes this bureaucratic position, 
underwriting Barnett’s claim to Rwanda as “my account,” “its owner,” which confers formal, if 
not entirely empty, expertise. And language is a currency indeed. Barnett’s earns expertise and 
fluency with a strong purchase on UN departments, acronyms and, most importantly, “the 
precise language of past mandates” (554-55). This bureaucratic insularity inhibits any substantial 
knowledge of Rwanda, while doubling one’s investments in sustaining and reproducing the 
bureaucracy. Following Jean Herzfeld, Barnett locates the production of indifference in this 
bureaucratic self-interest that undercuts investments in populations these organization ostensibly 
serve.  
This suggests that one function of the UN was to distribute 
accountability to the point that it becomes irretrievable. Who was to 
blame for the lack of response to Rwanda? Everyone. The mere presence 
of the UN allowed states (and the Secretariat) to shield themselves from 
responsibility, to point fingers in all directions, and to avoid 
responsibility or culpability. (575) 
Barnett seems to perform the argument of bureaucratic indifference by spreading the 
blame across principal actors such as the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as well as 
the culture of bureaucracies. The former suffers “indecision to the point of paralysis, if not 
complacency” and fails to provide guidance to the Security Council or transmit Dallaire’s 
recommendations (559). After President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on April 6, 1994 
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Barnett argued for withdrawing UNAMIR’s “5,000 lightly-armed peacekeepers scattered 
throughout Rwanda” (558). That number is greatly exaggerated, and is corrected in his book. But 
it evinces the distance, or delusions, separating Security Council debates from the reality Dallaire 
describes; there were “2,538 UNAMIR personnel on the ground on April 7” (231). This distance 
and lack of recommendations combines with bureaucratic self-preservation—coded as a moral 
obligation to preserve the UN’s reputation—so that daily reports of genocide convinced the 
Security Council that a “modest-sized” intervention would do “little good and much harm both to 
[the peacekeepers] and the UN’s reputation and future” (560).26 Indifference to Rwanda is 
produced passively out of an over-identification with both the UN bureaucracy and national self-
interest. In a “brutal” formulation, Barnett argues, “the UN had more to lose by taking action and 
being associated with another failure than it did by not taking action and allowing the genocide 
in Rwanda” (561). Identifying with the bureaucracy produces “an emotional and cognitive 
mechanism for producing exclusion and apathy": indifference (561).  
Similarly, active anti-intervention arguments appealed to the safety of UN peacekeepers 
as well as the organization’s reputation and ability to secure future resources if soldiers died.27 
As Barnett summarizes, “Moral oratory draped self-interested actions. Indifference was 
presentable through the appeal to the transcendental” (572). But there are problems with 
Barnett’s account.  
As already noted above, Barnett writes initially of over 5,000 peacekeeping troops 
already deployed in Rwanda when the genocide began; as we have seen, this is simply not true. 
Second, and more problematically, Barnett claims that “few, if any, member states had 
independent sources of information, and they therefore relied heavily on the Secretariat for 
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intelligence and policy recommendations regarding UNAMIR’s future” (559). 28  Dallaire 
disagrees.  
Disallowed from raiding the arms caches, Dallaire must instead brief ambassadors from 
France, Belgium, and the United States in Rwanda. “None them appeared to be surprised, which 
led me to conclude that our informant was merely confirming what they already knew” (148). 
The lack of surprise registers powerfully on Dallaire, who fears that everyone around him knows 
more about the situation than he does. Before Dallaire departs for Rwanda, the DPKO tells him 
repeatedly that no one has any “interest” in Rwanda besides its former colonial rulers, Belgium 
and France. However, Dallaire notes that the five permanent members of the Security Council—
France, England, China, Russia and the United States—“all had fully equipped and manned 
embassies in Rwanda, including both military and intelligence attachés” (90).29 None of these 
great powers, however, provide Dallaire and his staff with any intelligence. The grotesqueness of 
this situation worsens when Dallaire reveals that “the French, the Belgians and the Germans had 
military advisers numbering in the dozens at all levels of the military and gendarme command 
and training structures in Rwanda” (90).  
The French and Belgians permeate the military wings of the Rwandan government, 
advising both the RGF and the Gendarmerie “from their headquarters to their training institutions 
to their units in the field” (70). This network of advisers extends further and reaches deeper than 
“their ambassadors or military attachés let on” (70). Dallaire prods the embassies for more 
information, but they reveal nothing and leave him to wonder, “What was their actual mission in 
Rwanda?” France, meanwhile, stations an elite paratrooper battalion, which remains “close-
mouthed about its strength and true mission in Rwanda” (71). French military aid to Rwanda 
peaked twice, in October 1990 and February 1993, in the form of outright interventions to stop 
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the RPF. These military investments and extensive embassy networks challenge the common 
accusation of Western indifference. The situation was better and worse than that. The Security 
Council powers were already in Rwanda, especially France, Germany and Belgium; but they 
advised the wrong side of history and trained those government forces behind whose lines the 
genocidaires worked. 
French military investments in Francophone Rwanda extended to “military advisers, both 
in and out of uniform, to major units of the RGF.” “France was the only member on the UN 
Security Council,” Dallaire continues, “that had demonstrated a clear interest in Rwanda” (62). 
While France’s “clear interest” seems an advance on supposed Western indifference, Dallaire 
means to indict the ostensible neutrality of peacekeeping mandates as well as French backing and 
military training of a repressive regime. However, he notes a rift within French foreign policy 
and its multiple authors. When Dallaire visits the French embassy to debrief them on his 
preliminary recommendations for 2,500 UNAMIR troops, the military attaché leaps “into the 
fray.” Arguing against the need for so many troops, the attaché claims, “France had a battalion of 
only 325 personnel stationed in the country and the situation seemed to be well in hand.” 
Dallaire reads the “deliberately obstructive” attaché as evidence of an “outright split” that 
fractures the French foreign affairs department and ministry of defense (76). Rather than correct 
these failures, the French help rescue members of the Habyarimana regime, even those complicit 
in organizing and executing the genocide. Unfortunately, the French were anything but 
indifferent to Rwanda and they were not alone.  
Less than a week after the DPKO rejects Dallaire’s raid on arms caches, an unscheduled 
military cargo plane lands in Kigali airport. UNAMIR’s military observers 
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found the aircraft to be loaded with tons of artillery and mortar 
ammunition. The paperwork on the plane—registrations, ownership, 
insurance, manifest—mentioned companies in France, the United 
Kingdom, Belgium, Egypt and Ghana. Most of the nations on the list had 
troops in UNAMIR. [Major] Brent [Beardsley] asked a Belgian officer 
what it felt like to be risking his life in Rwanda while his nation dealt 
arms that could be used to kill him. The officer replied that peacekeeping 
was peacekeeping, and business was business, and the business of 
Belgium was arms. I cursed the double standard of the supposedly ex-
colonial powers. (156) 
Dallaire indicts the simultaneous arms trafficking of those nations that also contributed to 
a peacekeeping mission. Such militarism is not the remnant of colonialism but an active 
profiteering that jeopardizes his men and mission. The unnamed Belgian officer’s blasé response 
matches Dallaire’s incredulity, as if the General naïvely forgets that both peacekeeping and arms 
trafficking are just “business.” These multiple, contradictory businesses produce international 
indifference, tearing apart Dallaire and UNAMIR, reducing them to witnesses of a slaughter that 
the "international community" was overinvested in. Amidst these secret plots Dallaire suspects 
“that these powerful nations did not want to get involved because they had a firmer grasp on the 
threats to the success of the Arusha accords than the rest of us” (90). These threats undercut the 
peacekeeping mission but bolster economic investments as capital flowed into Rwanda in the 
shape of weapons.  
French Militarism 
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These formal, thematic and military concerns coalesce in Diop’s novel when a French 
Colonel arrives to help Dr. Karekezi escape. Colonel Étienne Perrin’s narrative of evacuating Dr. 
Karekezi precedes Uvimana’s final section and undercuts his affirmation of literature. Perrin’s 
chapter demonstrates that foreign powers were not indifferent, but all too invested by 
acknowledging the presence of French troops and their complicity with perpetrators. Secondly, 
Dr. Karekezi showcases the profits available to weapons smugglers.   
The heavy-handed dialogue between Colonel Étienne Perrin and Dr. Karekezi (“the 
Butcher of Murambi”) rehearses French complicity in genocide as the consequence of 
entrenched racism. Colonel Perrin laments those “crazy” men in charge of foreign affairs who 
operate with “one-track minds: ‘Africa is ours, we’re not going to let it go’.” These Parisian 
strategists “create African heads of state there in their offices” (121). Dr. Karekezi was merely a 
pawn amidst these strategy games, serving as a useful backup to President Habyarimana, whose 
concessions to the RPF during the Arusha peace accords loomed darkly over his fate. These 
African strategists knew of Dr. Karekezi’s “dubious trafficking” flowing through his “tea 
factory” (120). If Perrin’s indictment of French complicity and racist geo-strategies 
overdetermine Dr. Karekezi, this brief allusion to weapons trafficking through a tea plantation 
both bolsters and undercuts his claims.  
The French foreign affairs officers know of Dr. Karekezi’s weapons smuggling because 
the French national bank, Credit Lyonnais, provided a $6 million bank guarantee for Rwandan 
arms purchases from Egypt in 1992. The Rwandan government paid $1 million in cash and 
another $1 million in the form of 615 tons of tea; future tea harvests were pledged as collateral to 
Credit Lyonnais for the balance.30 Diop’s novel condenses this history into a brief allusion of Dr. 
Karekezi’s “dubious trafficking,” which his French patrons endorse because it allowed “the man 
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[to] advance concealed for a long time” (120). Dr. Karekezi’s “sensational return to politics” at 
Murambi exceeds French strategists who find his “planned liquidation” “rather embarrassing” 
(120-21). Still, they wonder if Dr. Karekezi can be forced into a leadership position to broker 
power with the victorious RPF.  
In Perrin’s account, the French foreign affairs officers still believe in Dr. Karekezi 
despite his brutality because “in Africa political questions get resolved everywhere with extreme 
cruelty”; and besides, “the survivors of this alleged genocide were soon going to forget the entire 
episode” (121). Perrin attributes the French nonplussed response to racist ideologies that see in 
Africa a continent devoid of political process save those of “extreme cruelty”; even the victims 
will surely soon forget these predictable practices. Dr. Karekezi argues that this braggadocios 
racism hated the anglophone RPF, the first “Blacks who don’t kowtow to you” (126).31  
Dr. Karekezi retorts that the French hated the RPF as much as his fellow Hutu Power 
comrades. The anglophone RPF register as “shady characters from other places,” who “look 
down on” the French and militantly refuse to play their docile parts.32 Dr. Karekezi summarizes, 
“Hatred, you can handle that, but this indifference, no. That’s worth killing several hundred 
thousand Tutsis” (126). French military investments, interventions and evacuations fight against 
Black anglophone usurpers indifferent to the colonial power. This indifference is worse than 
hatred because it rejects the other as worthy of hate; the RPF simply cease to “kowtow” before 
French military power. The RPF’s indifference to France’s “Great Power act” allows them to 
successfully immobilize a French convoy on the contested road to Butare (128-29). This military 
victory doubles as a racial performance that defeats French colonial expectations. Perrin 
concedes the incident was a “kind of humiliation” that would “weigh heavily on our politicians’ 
decisions” (119).  
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Two RPF companies ambushed a French convoy exceeding the bounds of the French 
controlled Zone Turquoise and making their way to Butare. They order the French forces to 
submit to an inspection. As RPF military leader Paul Kagame recounts to Gourevitch,  
Our interest was to make sure none of these people they were taking 
were FAR [RGF] or militias. The French refused. Their jeeps were 
mounted with machine guns, so they turned them on our troops as a sign 
of hostility. When the soldiers in the ambush realized there was going to 
be a confrontation, they came out, and a few fellows who had rocket-
propelled grenade launchers targeted the jeeps. When the French soldiers 
saw that, they were all instructed to point their guns upward. And they 
did (159).  
The RPF find two Rwandan government soldiers in this convoy and execute them. After this 
incident “the French softened their tone” and began speaking of the RPF with “grudging respect” 
(158). This militant arrogance forgets the RPF’s previous successes, in which, to Dallaire’s mind, 
they “proved capable of engaging and defeating the French-backed Rwandese Government 
forces” (47). Dallaire senses colonial angst in the Butare ambush and another defeat. No French 
troops are killed, “but French pride suffered a blow,” because both “patrols had been outwitted 
by the RPF and shamed in the process” (444-45). Unfortunately, Dallaire notes that these 
victories “did nothing to dissuade the French from wanting to support their former colleagues 
and put the RPF in their place” (445). Dr. Karekezi argues that the RPF’s victory marks “the 
beginning of the end” because France will “leave Africa by the back door” (129).33  
This fictional dialogue labors to balance French colonial racism and the agency of 
Rwandan genocidaires. Diop’s account of racism entrenched in French foreign policy rhymes 
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with those offered by philosophers Alain Badiou and Georgio Agamben, both vociferous critics 
of European right-wing jingoism that hates North African immigration, francophone or 
otherwise. However, Colonel Perrin reflects that French complicity does not absolve the 
“enormous bloodstain” on Rwandan hands; “To say otherwise would be to think of them as 
irresponsible children.” The rejection of paternal responsibility conflicts with Perrin’s 
acknowledgement that “we did nothing to prevent the massacres. We were the only ones in the 
world who could have done it” (124). This self-indictment rings hyperbolic given the 
international scope of weapons shipments, the presence of Security Council power embassies 
and intelligence capabilities, as well as the neutered UNAMIR mission. Only decrying French 
indifference would sound more absurd.  
Although the novel's disjunctive form "challenges any reading to be the final version of 
events," Perrin's chapter eagerly indicts the French and helps that nation's reading public, as well 
as those of England and the US, to recognize their governments’ part in “aiding and abetting 
genocide” (Hitchcott 54, 57). But this analysis stops short insofar as it assigns Diop's novel, or 
aesthetic responses to the genocide, a merely revelatory function, awakening readers out of their 
ignorance. I believe Diop's novel begs readers to investigate the genocide and their place in a 
gruesome world. This requires, first, rejecting the narrative indifference and attending carefully 
to the pervasive linkages already in place. As I have tried to demonstrate, finally, one crucial 
linkage that requires special attention is the international arms trade enabling both neocolonial 
suppression and humanitarian relief of the global South as well as its humanitarian armature.    
Let us return to the mass graves and the rage they produce. 
Angry Lessons 
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Uvimana prepares himself for the worst but when he sees the first skeletons, he 
“immediately want[s] to turn around and go back” (144). He has already visited several mass 
graves but encountered a different type of remains. In the cities of Nyamata and Ntarama, “the 
skulls, arms, and legs had become detached from their torsos”; in Murambi, however, the bodies 
are almost all intact (144). Uvimana “took fright…started pacing up and down the hallway, 
glancing indecisively in every direction, as if looking for a place to flee. Saliva was collecting in 
his throat and he swallowed it to conceal his disgust. Even from the outside the stench of the 
cadavers was intolerable” (144). Seeing whole bodies affects his whole body. Taste, smell, sight 
and movement explode into each other, proving to him that “genocide had taken place only four 
years ago and not in ancient times” (147). Despite the “nauseating stench of decomposing 
bodies,” Uvimana tells his companion that he wants to “see everything.” His companion replies 
that there are sixty-four more rooms like the one they are in and that Uvimana will “see the same 
bodies everywhere” (146-47). “No,” Uvimana snaps, amazed at the “sudden bout of rage” he 
experiences. 
The cacophony of sensations harmonizes into rage. Uvimana’s grows “furious” with the 
guide who apologizes for the crass remark, which ignores the particularity of victims and lumps 
them into “the same bodies everywhere” (146-7). Violating this particularity produces rage and 
reveals to Uvimana “his own suffering, much more profound than he had thought” (147). This 
fury born of suffering is the real lesson of the Murambi memorial. And the education justifies the 
open graves because they challenge “every Rwandan” to “look reality in the eye” (147). In this 
reality, “the victims had shouted out” but “no one wanted to hear them.” The memorial preserves 
the “echo of those cries,” whose continued reverberations scold global indifference to Rwandan 
screams (147). Uvimana’s rage and endorsement of the open grave memorials constitute the final 
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stages of his development. He becomes “the perfect Rwandan: Both guilty and a victim” (78). 
Uvimana is also the perfect visitor by learning from the memorials, which drive him to write 
about the genocide. The horror of the memorials meshes with an outrage at the world’s 
indifference—“No one wanted to hear them”— and makes the affirmative power of literature an 
inevitable and powerful, if banal, conclusion. Philip Gourevitch also visits a mass grave turned 
memorial and, like Uvimana, experiences an educative rage.  
In his opening chapter, Gourevitch visits a mass open grave at a church in Kibungo 
province and reflects on the desire to look more closely, to know by walking among the dead. He 
arrives on the scene aboard a UN helicopter accompanied by two Canadian military officers with 
the proper paperwork. A Kalashnikov-wielding guard accepts the paperwork and grants them 
entrance to the memorial.  
“The dead looked like pictures of the dead” (15). Open, decomposing and strewn about in 
agonizing chaos, the bodies “did not smell” nor did they “buzz with flies” (15). The remaining 
tissues, clothes and bones clearly evince violence—“Macheted skulls had rolled here and 
there”—but do not provoke a visceral reaction from Gourevitch. He finds the genocide “still 
strangely unimaginable,” meaning “one still had to imagine it” (16). Looking does not provoke a 
meaningful response despite the range of affects he experiences: “revulsion, alarm, sorrow, grief, 
shame, incomprehension, sure but nothing truly meaningful” (19). After touring more rooms, 
Gourevitch walks outside and hears “a crunch.”  
The old Canadian colonel stumbled in front of me, and I saw, though he 
did not notice, that his foot had rolled on a skull and broken it. For the 
first time at Nyarubuye my feelings focused, and what I felt was a small 
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but keen anger at this man. Then I hear another crunch, and felt a 
vibration underfoot. I had stepped on one too. (19-20) 
Gourevitch’s range of meaningless emotions narrow to a “small keen anger” focused on 
the Canadian colonel. This anger is the real moment of insight. Gourevitch describes his anger as 
“keen” not merely to emphasize the sharpness of his emotional focus, but because the adjective 
suggests a clarity otherwise absent during his visit to the memorial. The moment’s visceral 
lucidity instantly clouds when Gourevitch also missteps on a skull; he does not elaborate on his 
anger or follow its insight when discussing the lessons of such memorials specifically, and the 
Rwandan genocide more generally. The scene contrasts sharply with Uvimana’s experience, in 
which the stench of decomposing flesh overwhelms the narrator.34 Gourevitch smells nothing 
and the graphic sights incite an apparently meaningless confusion of emotions. The dead remain 
pictures that represent nothing but their own death, their powerlessness rendered mere visual 
datum. Only when the colonel missteps does Gourevitch glimpse the affective foundations of 
mass violence.  
His “small but keen anger” fixates on the colonel and a trespass that, in the larger context, 
seems to matter little. Regardless, for the first time Gourevitch feels clearly in a momentary burst 
of emotion and its ready target. He glimpses the keen anger necessary for mass violence, and 
understands how a murderous drive for a “new order” feels both “compelling” and “absolute” 
(17). In this light, Gourevitch’s accidental trespass—stepping on a skull—reads as a self-
indictment that acknowledges his and our own potential as an agent of violence. This is not to 
conflate small angers with the systematic murder but to caution against the misuse of such 
righteous anger to energize the will to intervene. 
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Chapter 3: Accumulating Safety: Asian Shylocks and The In-Between World of 
Vikram Lall 
 
Total corruption, I’ve been told, occurs in inches and proceeds through 
veils of ambiguity. (Vassanji 271) 
 Critics such as Nalini Iyer have read M.G. Vassnaji's The In-Between World of Vikram 
Lall as demonstrating that "the diasporic Indian community in East Africa manages to stay 
influential through corruption and by pandering to the needs of the ruling elite” (Iyer 211). At its 
best, studying the Asians of East Africa complicates a simpler story of empire—colonizers and 
colonized—by attending to the "sites of colonial contest" themselves "marked many times over 
by various forms of “subjects” and power brokers (Desai 159). The value of these arguments lies 
in their attention to empire's unevenness, its creation of and reliance on local racial tensions to 
advance the larger project of subjugation. Vassanji's novel, however, further complicates this 
story by teasing out a strange logic of capital accumulation. The title character of The In-Between 
World of Vikram Lall weaponizes capital accumulation as a form of self-defense ostensibly 
justified by the marginality of the Asians in East Africa who live in constant fear after Kenya's 
political independence. 
  Idi Amin’s expulsion of Asians from Uganda in 1972 merely took the logic of 
marginality to one conclusion. The foreign, imperial collaborators were asked to leave a country 
to which they never belonged; the Asians are not merely a comprador class but a people under 
threat from all sides; they are not hybrid but stranded. These charges are not entirely untrue, 
which mutes polemics against racism and marginality, and begs for a more sophisticated 
strategy. The complicated history of the South Asian diaspora in East Africa requires nothing 
less than an acknowledgement of its historical role and a simultaneous refutation of racist 
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caricatures that forget their place in Kenya's radical political history. 
 Vassanji’s novel builds precisely this nuanced critique, I argue, by caricaturing the 
caricature of the "Asian Shylock," offering as the principal focalizer a Kenyan Asian man who 
embezzles a huge fortune for himself and his partners among the new political elite. Vassanji's 
critique of capital accumulation and the Asian Shylock inheres in Lall's strategic self-defense, 
especially when it veers hyperbolic at crucial moments. Despite the hyperbole, however, the 
novel's argument is not an obvious one. Vassanji's literary strategy pushes readers to 
"counterfocalize" against Lall and produce a parallel alternative narrative to the one he offers. 
This strategy both avoids the polemical while also strengthening our critical reading muscles.  
 For Gayatri Spivak to counterfocalize is to “shuttle between focalization and the making 
of an alternate narrative as the reader’s running commentary” (22). This “effortful and active” 
practice grounds the “‘political’ in political fiction” because it activates the “readerly 
imagination”; “Literature advocates in this special way” and such literary reading “has to be 
learned” (22). Counterfocalization may offer a one-word summary of postcolonial literary 
criticism; one generates the parallel alternative text precisely by reading a given text closely (22). 
The reward of this labor is ultimately an understanding of both the structures of domination and 
possibilities of resistance. Vikram Lall offers a bit of both by critiquing a particular logic of 
postcolonial capital accumulation. Vassanji's text, I argue, produces structural critiques through 
tiny fissures in a single focalizer's narration. Lall's financial schemes, for instance, demonstrate 
the fusion of the formal and informal economies whose transnational circuit siphons wealth to 
the corrupt elite. His claim to be an overdetermined participant of such schemes—the Asian 
Shylock has no other position—seems to reveal another intersection of race and capital. A 
counterfocalized reading, however, reveals as well the radical political opposition always 
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countering such overdeterminations; Asians actively aligned with the Mau Mau rebels, launched 
trade unions, and engaged in other decolonizing efforts. Vassanji's literary strategy cannot list 
these possibilities out in great detail but prods readers to explore alternatives that found historical 
realization or remain energetically speculative. Lall avoids the struggles for independence and 
the delicate postcolonial period by claiming to be apolitical, but his search for moneyed safety at 
the intersection of finance and transport puts the lie to his ostensible apoliticism. 
Gilded Communalism 
Lall first discovers the link between wealth and safety purely by chance. He and his sister 
Deepa are rescued by a wealthy businessman in Dar es Salaam from communal attackers who 
want to punish them for deviating from their sexual communities. At that time, the Hindu Lall 
has a platonic affair with a Shamsi Muslim girl; they share an emotional intimacy but nothing 
more, which Lall blames on his cowardice to invest fully in a woman. Meanwhile, Deepa visits 
Lall in Dar to escape her mother’s watchful eye and spend time with Njoroge, their childhood 
friend and her current African lover; they dance together at nightclubs and openly demonstrate 
their love. They broach "the most sensitive topic in East African sexual politics: relationships 
between Asian women and African men" (Jones 172).35 In this way, Deepa and Lall earn the 
wrath of self-appointed communal warriors who attack them in a dark street.  
“Out leapt before us six youths, howling like wild dogs, gesturing like demons, mouthing 
all manner of obscenities; they surrounded us” (208). They block all escape routes and ready for 
an attack when a white Mercedes appears and turns towards them. The attackers disperse “like 
cockroaches” (208). Out of the car steps a local millionaire, Mr. Bapu, whose nondescript name 
(Mr. Father) only adds to his benevolent ghostliness. He saves their lives, insists they spend the 
night at his mansion, shows them his beautiful garden, plucks a rose for Deepa and drops them 
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off the next morning at the university where Lall studies; he never appears or is mentioned again. 
Lall remembers this episode in Manichean terms as the fortunate rescue from provincialism by a 
wealthy benefactor. He remembers not the contingency of the rescue but the gleaming white 
Mercedes and its saving headlights. A closer look at this scene yields worthwhile results.  
First, the attack takes place in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, rather than Kenya, the novel’s 
principal setting. This parallel location, where Lall studies and Deepa comes to visit and openly 
be with Njoroge, suggests that such communal policing is a regional issue in East Africa and not 
simply isolated to Kenya. Vassanji’s oeuvre negotiates these issues across East Africa and offers 
novelistic depth to the abstracted historical record. Secondly, Lall admits that he remembers 
these attackers with a great deal of contempt and has “called them names” (209). One of those 
names, however, is particularly telling. Lall describes one of their attackers as a “half-caste 
chotara,” deployed here as a pejorative name for the child of mixed parentage. Vassanji places 
this insult in the context of breaking communal (sexual) borders to undercut the attacker’s 
authority to purity, contemptuously belittling these communal policemen. Taken together, the 
scene suggests that the communalism plaguing East Africa inherits a miscegenated history rather 
than the ills of postcolonial independence.36   
This all seems fairly positive until we address again the saving “white Mercedes” and its 
anonymous millionaire owner. The car’s color and manufacturer reads as a kitschy metaphor that 
repeats twice on the page in a short span; a white luxury chariot arrives just in time to extricate 
them from militant provincialism. Lall barely acknowledges the contingency of its arrival at that 
moment, on that street, but instead focuses on the attackers’ lowness and the white Benz. Wealth 
saves. That it is the German Mercedes, rather than a British Rolls Royce, for example, 
foreshadows something of the transnationalism required by capital accumulation, and the supra-
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communal position one may occupy given enough capital to buy the protection of an estate 
behind security gates. Such wealth ensures safety even in hostile East Africa's self-policing 
sexual communities. Although he does not explicitly say so, Lall remembers this episode as the 
first instance when wealth saved him and his family. The lesson sticks. He describes the efforts 
of his career merely as an extension of this lesson; wealth in the form of accumulated capital—
reified in a commodity or not—protects people in precarious circumstances. As an Asian in East 
Africa, Lall contends, he is born into a vilified community, stranded in-between colonizer and 
colonized. This position began, in Lall's narration, when his ancestors worked as laborers on 
constructing the Ugandan Railway. 
Iron Lines: Family, Railroads, and Colonial Infrastructure 
The Lall family feels connected to Kenya through the railroad their grandfather worked 
on. The rail just before the station box, Anand Lal tells his son and grandson, bears his name 
inscribed on the metal line with acid and a steel wire. Lal’s fellow laborers had done the same on 
previous lines. These signatures in Punjabi letters are “our claim to the land” (16). The “our” of 
this claim refers to “our people,” Asian laborers who “had sweated on it, had died on it: they had 
been carried away in their weary sleep or even wide awake by man-eating lions." Lall’s claim to 
belong by dint of historical labors mirrors that made by prominent East African Asian 
businessman Nanji Kalidas Mehta in his memoir Dream Half-Expressed. Asian labor on the 
Ugandan Railway, Mehta argues, was an “enormous human sacrifice at the alter of civilization 
[that] bears testimony to the fact that no nation can stay alone and flourish in isolation…It also 
teaches us that the debts of the past must be recognized and should bear a just relation to the 
future” (cited in Desai, 154 with emphasis). Mehta attempts to universalize Asian labor on the 
railway as a contribution to all, or at least to East Africa, by restraining its political contexts: 
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indenture and settlement strategy. Simultaneously, Mehta deposits Asian "sacrifice" in a 
historical bank—"debts of the past"—so that its value appreciates over time. Vassanji's Lall 
furthers this argument by using these historical "debts" to stake a "claim to the land."   
Vassanji drives Lall's claim too far because it aligns railroad laborers with the desires of 
their colonial masters who pushed the Asian laborers to settle the land. This reading does not 
require an untenable equivalence between the British and their subjects, but acknowledges the 
strong sense of Imperial subjectivity developed by the South Asian diaspora who sought to take 
advantage of the Empire’s offerings. The Asian presence in East Africa predates the arrival of 
Europeans and comprised primarily of merchants and traders. At the height of empire, however, 
these merchants, as well as the laborers and bureaucrats who arrived with the British, sought to 
bring East Africa under Indian control as a province of its imperial hub (Metcalf, 182). Mehta 
figures Asian commercial history as a romance and savors its intimate exchange of “mutual 
gain” (as practiced by the Asian traders) rather than the “unequal power” used by the British 
(cited in Desai, 153). Lall, meanwhile, advances the settler strategy by using Asian work on the 
railway as a payment for their share of East Africa. Vassanji critiques Lall's settler claims by 
aligning his focalizer's family history with the British Empire and its epistemologies.  
Narrating the story of his grandfather’s decision to stay “in the new colony after his 
indenture-ship,” Vikram Lall imagines his Dadaji (Grandfather), Anand Lal, and a few others at 
an almost complete railroad station. During a peak period for the Empire, 1897, Anand Lal 
completes his second contract with the British helping finish the Ugandan railways. Lall 
imagines his grandfather  
contemplating the vast flat grassy plains of the Rift Valley, the pointed 
Mount Longonot, its sides grey with volcanic ash, rising up like the 
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nipple on the breast of some reclining African god, two escarpments in 
the distance, along whose steep slopes they had lain the railway in the 
direst of wet muddy conditions….(17)  
Filled with tropes from imperial travel writing, Lall connects his grandfather’s 
contemplations too closely with British Imperial epistemology. Lall’s surveying eye sexualizes 
the Rift Valley, transforming it into a bare-chested, reposing African deity. The deity’s breasts, 
distant escarpments with a dormant nipple, are conquered by the railway lines, “lain” there in 
“wet muddy conditions” (17). The trope of a sexualized landscape impregnated by European 
modernity has a long, well-studied history. 37  Vassanji critiques such imperial visions by 
embedding them within Lall's imagination of his grandfather's conquest. At first glance, there 
does not seem to be anything critical in Lall's fantasies. Indeed, they might be read as Vassanji's 
acknowledgement that British Indian subjects, indentured colonials or not, sought to bring East 
Africa under British Indian control (Metcalf, 188). Vassanji goes beyond mere acknowledgement 
and toward critique by ventriloquizing Lall's reading strategy.   
Anand Lal does not speak for himself; rather, his grandson, Vikram, imagines these 
contemplations and weaves them into a claim to belonging in Kenya. If Vikram Lall aims to 
prove that he and his family belong in Kenya on the merit of their history with the land, he also 
imagines his grandfather as an imperial warrior. Lall recognizes the tense position his 
grandfather and fellow indentured laborers were caught in when he asserts that the Asian 
workers were “speared and macheted as proxies of the whites by angry Kamba, Kikuyu, and 
Nandi warriors” (17). These historical conflicts form a part of the historical background for 
understanding why Asians are vilified in East Africa; they were and continue to be understood as 
proxies for imperial powers, or as a self-interested and enclosed community that sails the 
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prevailing wind. Vassanji resists such caricatures, however, through Lall's juxtaposition of his 
grandfather's story with the completion of the railroad; Lall takes us from the indentured 
laborer's too imperial thoughts to Lake Victoria where “the last key had been driven home” by an 
“English lady” (17). The railway’s completion and Anand Lal’s survey appear sequentially in 
one paragraph, highlighting the drastic power asymmetry between the two. By grading these two 
perspectives against each other, Vassanji acknowledges that the Asian laborers worked as 
"proxies of the whites" but underlines the fact that they were the proxy labor to an imperial 
command that still retained the "last key" (17). This juxtaposition points to the asymmetry of 
power between imperialists and their laboring subjects, who faced an indigenous resistance they 
should have aided. In this way, Vassanji hints at the broad Afro-Asian solidarity required to 
confront imperial power. Such hints leak through the cracks of Lall's focalization, prodding 
readers to counterfocalize against Lall and investigate further. 
We see immediately that Lall's version of the family history fails to produce the kind of 
belonging that would defeat anti-Asian racism. While Anand Lal may not have participated in 
the imperial pageantry at Lake Victoria, he helped build the empire's infrastructure. After 
working on the railway, he sets up a small shop and joins the scores of merchants that help 
penetrate and establish trade in the East African interior. Although Asian traders historically 
precede the British, new crops arrive with the imperialists. Lall narrative frames the decision to 
stay in Kenya and operate a business within a family story rather than the broad settler strategy 
to which it belongs. By remaining in Kenya, however, Anand Lal takes part in the colonizing 
mission Colonial Administrator Frederick Lugard advocated for Indians in East Africa and the 
Indians advocated for themselves. Indeed, the Indian community's "self-perception [was] 
founded on the notion that they had as much right to the lands as British colonists—rights based 
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on community contributions that were tangible and appeared self evident in addition to less overt 
yet profound notion of “civilizational worth”" (Nair, 90, her emphasis).38 Vassanji critiques such 
notions—of land rights and civilizational superiority—within Lall's narrative. 
If his grandfather and father worked on empire's material infrastructure, Lall practices the 
epistemology sponsoring these colonial projects. Reading the African landscape as a naked 
goddess poised for penetration exemplifies such imperial epistemology. This mode of seeing 
strategically blinds itself to those already inhabiting the land or renders them impediments to be 
overcome as modernity progresses rail by rail. 39  Such imperial epistemology forms the 
infrastructure for Lall's own writing, moreover, as he omits the settler mission given to Indian 
laborers and merchants. Lall's participation in and practice of such imperial infrastructures leaves 
readers unsympathetic to his claim to belonging in Kenya. He sounds too much like a well-
established settler defending bloodied inheritances. I am arguing, however, that Vassanji sets up 
his narrator to fail, for Lall's narration to contradict its own intentions; in so doing, Vassanji 
challenges readers to suspend Lall's narration, disbelieve its historical framing and 
counterfocalize.  
When Lall narrates the atomized story of his grandfather as a young man who merely 
seizes an opportunity for himself in Kenya, Vassanji leaves clues that readers ought not to agree 
with Lall's story. Continuing the trope of sexual conquest, Lall wonders if his grandfather had 
not slept with a Masai woman during his youth and borne “cousins in some of the manyattas of 
the plains” (59). If laying lines began as a literal description of building railways and doubled as 
an imperial metaphor for subjugating space, it returns now as a fantasy of impregnation. Lall 
admits that this “fantasy has partly to do with [the] desperate need to belong to the land I was 
born in” (59). The fantasy is “not impossible,” moreover, because the railway workers were 
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promiscuous according to “reports of their British overseers, quoted in histories of the railway” 
(59). Lall’s fantasies of his grandfather are overseen by an imperial archive that takes 
bureaucratic reports for histories. These reports represent their laborers without giving voice to 
those licentious coolies who lay the foundations of Lall's Kenyan citizenship. In sum, Lall's 
fantasies repeat three imperial tropes: first, the masterful survey of virgin landscapes awaiting 
modernity's penetration; second, sexually conquering the natives; third, use the former two as 
grounds on which to claim a home as a settler.  
Dan Odhiambo Ojwang critiques these tropes of exoticism and sexual conquest in 
Vassanji and other East African Asian writers as "window[s] into the historical context about 
which the writers reflect" (Ojwang 44). Wherever Vassanji's writes about African independence, 
his Asians experience only "menacing darkness mitigated by little islands of safety" (Ojwang 
51). The In-Between World of Vikram Lall seems to repeat this trope and confirm Ojwang's 
analysis, but the text ventures toward a different end. In Vikram Lall Vassanji does not only 
reflect on the continuities, tensions and contradictions of the South Asian diaspora in East Africa 
but actively critiques colonial alignments. This argument does not aim to recruit Vassanji's text 
toward an antiimperial politics but to open up the critical reading strategy advanced by the novel.    
Vassanji redeploys these imperialist tropes through the corrupt Lall precisely to make 
readers suspicious both of the narrator and his claims. That is, Lall's early admissions render the 
imperial tropes pieces of a worldview that supports embezzlement. Meanwhile, those who 
recognize the colonial epistemology underwriting these tropes can map Lall's imperial 
inheritances riding on colonial railways. Vassanji then links these tropes of imperial travel 
writing with Lall's rise in newly independent Kenya's government bureaucracy. In so doing, 
Vassanji pushes readers to critique Lall's careerist vision, which sees his arrival in the Ministry 
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of Transport as the continuation of an upward mobility begun by his grandfather. If his family 
once labored under the burning sun, they have advanced to shady middle management now. 
Vassanji uses this continuity to critique the liberation promised by political independence from 
colonial powers.  
Vassanji's critique inheres precisely in what Lall sees an enabling continuity between 
empire and independence. Where Peter Simatei argues that Vassanji's fiction mourns the loss of 
African nationalism's "reterritorialization of the British Empire," Lall aligns too closely with the 
latter project (Simatei 59). Simatei argues that East African Asians see "African nationalism as 
an assault on the Asian spaces of freedom guaranteed under colonialism," which is why they 
might be lured by "a more hegemonic form of nationalism, I.e. British imperialism" rather than 
the emergent African nationalism (Simatei, 59).40 Lall's too imperial allegiance to the railroad 
does suggest a longing for the good old days of the formal Empire; however, he also aligns with 
the new African nationalism and tries to carve out a protected space within its reterritorializing 
project.      
 With help from his childhood friend Njoroge, Lall becomes an “assistant auditor and 
inspector” for the railways in the Ministry of Transport. Lall’s family believes the job completes 
his destiny—from manual laborer to middle management—as well as his childhood dream of 
riding the lines “to appraise the world flying before me” (239). When Lall begins his career he 
takes his grandfather along on the final voyage of a Manchester built engine. The retirement of 
the "5607 'Sir George'" steam locomotive occasions Lall's invitation to Anand Lal. A new diesel 
engine will replace the colonial machinery even while it travels on imperial infrastructure. Lall is 
tasked with taking inventory of this infrastructure so that the new government can field 
contractors for new engines. During this voyage, however, he also takes stock of his 
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grandfather's labor and thought, folding them into the larger project of bringing colonial material 
under the control of an ostensibly independent regime.  
When the engine carrying the two generations of Lall reaches a crest and the Great Rift 
Valley appears, "stretching vastly before us in the mist down below, virgin as God created it, 
endless and endless until the Red Sea" (233). The masterful survey returns to look upon a (still) 
"virgin" and "endless" land. This time, however, Lall attributes this description to his father, who 
used it to entertain Vikram's "childhood wonderment" (233). Meanwhile, Lall's grandfather, 
"Dadaji," stands "shaky on his feet, clutching my arm" and looks down at the valley, "his eyes 
glazed with grim nostalgia" (233). This account differs greatly from the one Lall projected on his 
grandfather or the mythical descriptions inherited from his father. Lall thinks that his Dadaji 
remembers hard labor, losing the tip of his pinky finger, and witnessing his close friend's 
marriage to a Masai woman. Although these elements do not disagree with earlier imaginings, 
they are recollected "with grim nostalgia"; grim befits indentureship and loss (the tip of a pinky 
finger) while nostalgia fondly remembers new and unexpected connections (marriage).  
In sharp contrast, Lall feels a "true sense of pride and accomplishment" for treating his 
grandfather to this trip using his new government position (234). The parallel sentences allow 
Lall's pride to usurp his grandfather's grimness and his accomplishment to supplant nostalgia. 
Through this juxtaposition Vassanji attempts to make clear that Lall’s narrative coopts his 
grandfather’s experiences as the groundwork for his own career. Dadaji's "shaky" foundations as 
an indentured laborer for the imperial project become the iron rails for Lall's upward mobility as 
a bureaucrat in Kenya's newly independent government. By repeating the trope of a masterful 
survey, moreover, Vassanji suggests the troubling continuity of colonial exploitation in 
postcolonial governance, a continuity embodied in Lall’s position as an auditor asked to 
 !  
72 
“appraise the world flying before me” (239). Such appraisal takes inventory of imperial 
infrastructure without necessarily redistributing its fruits.   
Independence had brought an abundance of opportunities, the British and 
Europeans vacating lucrative farms and businesses and well-paying jobs, 
foreign aid and loans promising contracts and kickbacks; this was a time 
to make it, once and for all, as a family, as a clan, as a tribe—the stakes 
were mountain-high. And this in the tinderbox Cold War climate of the 
period, foreign governments peddling influence, bribes, arms. (235)  
This cynical summary contextualizes Lall’s strategic cooptation of his grandfather's labor and the 
railway itself. Neither are properly owned any longer, finally abandoned by their former colonial 
overseers and therefore up for grabs. Both coexist as different orders of vacancies. Lall sees in 
political independence the local ownership of exploitative structures and not necessarily social 
justice and economic equality. This vision remains blind to other hopes of independence because 
it myopically focuses on the narrow allegiance to “family, clan and tribe” (235). For Lall, this 
sense of community seems to encompass, at most, the marginalized but economically powerful 
Asians in East Africa. Such communalism both produces, and responds to, the very 
marginalization it seeks to protect against, safe within a gilded fortress.  
Nairobi’s Asian communities, Lall argues, suffered “devastation” after Kenyan 
independence. When Britain passes its infamous immigration law in 1968 “to curb the flow of 
British Asians from Kenya," an “Asian Exodus” follows as people flee to England before they no 
longer can. Many friends and family depart and “property values in Asian Eastleigh” collapse 
(236). This neighborhood and others like it were planned specifically to use the Asian 
community as "a buffer zone between the very few whites and the densely populated indigenous 
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Africans” (Siundu 263). Against the metonomy of the city as "the cosmopolitan ideal of the 
nation," Nairobi's segregationist policies tried to minimize African migration into the city 
(Siundu 265). This migration "constituted a risk to [the] wealth, health and power" of both 
Whites and Asians who fought to retain their homogenous spaces (Siundu 264).41 Recounting 
this troubled history seems to push against Vassanji's tendency "to portray Asians as victims of 
malice and envy at their business astuteness" (Siundu 269).  
Such a reading, however, conflates Vassanji's argument with that of his focalizers. One 
does not need to swallow whole Lall's bathetic account of the Indian diaspora's uprooting in this 
historical moment just as one should not endorse racist British immigration policy. Shaping 
critiques from "the vantage point of global immigrancy and Asian diasporic communities the 
world over" ignores the relative privilege of the Asians in Nairobi and removes "from sight [the] 
particular pasts and futures that would impact on social interactions with Non-Asians” (Siundu 
267). Such myopia inheres in Lall's perspective—not Vassanji's—precisely because Lall fixates 
on the racism facing Asians in communal isolation.  
Lall offers this communal context just after describing the trip with his grandfather and 
the “abundance of opportunities” brought by political independence in order to demonstrate the 
unevenness of such abundance and justify the communalism of his own response (235). In other 
words, Lall’s hope that his family, clan and tribe will “make it, once and for all” announces the 
desire to accumulate enough capital, and through it political power, to protect and sustain 
themselves. This is accumulation under duress rather than for its own sake.  
If we do not dismiss Lall’s claim as merely a Machiavellian ruse for a total alignment 
with global capital, then we might see evidence of a particular order of postcolonial capital 
accumulation driven by the need for personal and communal security. This strategy seems 
 !  
74 
relatively unthinkable given Marxist analyses of race and capitalism that understand the former 
as a tool with which to divide laborers, suppress wages and drive capitalist accumulation 
forward. This framework allows us to see how racial constructions enabled the British Empire to 
use Indian merchants as settlers to buffer their rule in East Africa and facilitate unencumbered 
exploitation and extraction of wealth. If we dismiss Lall’s drive as merely parroting imperial 
capitalist ideology, little remains to be said. To consider Lall’s context in the relatively marginal 
Asian diaspora might inspire capital accumulation as a defensive measure, however, remains 
more difficult and interesting. Taking Lall's claim seriously does not require endorsing Lall's 
drive to accumulation for self-defense as a strategy or a twisted mode of resistance. Rather, the 
point is to understand the political contexts that reinforce the centrality of capital accumulation.  
Perhaps most riskily, I also suggest that we see a parallel between Lall's strategy and the 
economic policy of former Non-Aligned Movement nations, which seek to shore up their 
independence on the strength of economic power. This policy too is a self-defense strategy 
against global capital and holds together a contradictory symmetry: one only defeats capital by 
becoming a better capitalist, which is of course how capital conquers you. Obviously, such a 
strategy deliberately omits (Kenya), or grandly defers (China), alternative economic and social 
possibilities that might do more than accumulate better or faster than the imperialists.  
When Lall imagines trains “traveling west from Nairobi to Lagos and Accra, south to 
Cape Town, north to Khartoum and Cairo, uniting all Africa,” he hints at the lost opportunity 
during decolonization (240, emphasis mine). For a moment, Lall breaks through communalism 
or the relatively narrow claims to Kenyan belonging and advocates a pan-African solidarity. This 
lost project would reclaim colonial infrastructure (railroads) to advance postcolonial 
independence and transnational allegiances (“uniting all Africa”). Such a utopic horizon appears 
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in a paragraph where Lall’s family declares his new career to be “pure destiny” and the “just 
reward” of his grandfather’s work. At its best, Lall’s juxtaposition of an unrealized African unity 
and his own upward mobility posits the Asians in Africa as fellow Africans who would both 
belong to and participate in a larger antiimperial solidarity. Such a gesture would reject the 
political and racial antagonisms that culminated in the post-Independence “Asian exodus” he 
described earlier (237). 
Vassanji forecloses these alternate possibilities, however, by reintroducing the 
possessive, commodifying mode of Lall’s focalization. “The country was mine to explore, on 
this mysterious metal highway stretching from the coast into the interior, its iron rails reaching to 
diverse, far-flung and strange places” (240). Exoticism spices Lall’s enthusiasm—“mysterious,” 
“far-flung,” “strange”—even while he attends to the railroad’s primary function as an instrument 
of trade that penetrated from “the coast into the interior” (240). These tropes of exoticism and 
trade collude in a kind of orientalist hermeneutics through which Lall reads the railroad as the 
“Thousand and More Miles of Fantastic Lives and Ghost Stories” (240). The possibility of 
advancing the Non-Alignment project or even an abstract postcolonial solidarity no longer holds. 
Rather, Lall reads the railway as a storybook filled with adventure and treasure, benevolently 
haunted by his grandfather’s indentured labor.42 This fantastic reading, in part, allows him to 
later found the “Aladdin Financial Company” and invent schemes to create money out of thin air. 
Vassanji discloses the possibility of a postcolonial transnational solidarity, at least a pan-African 
unity, within Lall’s careerism and exoticizing tropes in order to disclose the political projects 
Lall must remain blind to. In this way, Vassanji pushes readers to suspend Lall’s version of 
postcolonial independence and investigate other modes of political life attempted in that period.  
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As other scholars have noted, Njoroge, Deepa and Uncle Mahesh give voice to such 
alternate modes of party, sexual, and radical politics respectively. I am arguing, however, that 
Vassanji advances his main argument by weavings suspicion and critique into the fabric of Lall’s 
narration. Rather than merely choosing one among the possibilities each of these characters 
represent, Vassanji’s formal strategy pushes readers to more critical responses to every given 
narrative. Such counterfocalization develops the critical capacities necessary for political 
practice.   
One historical realization of such radical political practice is Mankhan Singh, whose 
absence haunts Lall's narration. The openly communist Singh formed the first trade union, the 
Labour Trade Union of Kenya, and demanded immediate independence for the East African 
territories. Other examples include lawyers who defended the Mau Mau in court, doctors who 
treated the fighters, pro-African journalists and printers, as well as a lumberman who provided 
the Mau Mau with food (Gregory 267). Vassanji takes special note of the lumberman, Yacood 
Deen, and incorporates him into the novel; Lall's uncle Mahesh lives shortly as a lumberman 
who supplies the forest fighters. 
Lall, however, associates such practice with the murder of his childhood friends, the 
wealthy European Bruce family. They are killed by the gun Mahesh supplies the Mau Mau. The 
Bruce children's murder traumatizes Lall and ostensibly turns him away from politics. In truth, 
Lall shuns only radical left politics in favor of rampant capital accumulation.   
Asian Shylock: Corruption and/or Banking 
Lall's entry into the new government’s bureaucracy comes on the strength of his friend 
Njoroge’s recommendation letter. Without that, Lall argues, he would have floundered. 
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with neither the prestige of whiteness or Europeanness behind me, nor 
the influence and numbers of a local tribe to back me, but carrying 
instead the stigma from a generalized recent memory of an exclusive 
race of brown “Shylocks” who had collaborated with the 
colonizers…Black chauvinism and reverse racism were the order of the 
day against Asians. (238-39)  
While Mankahn Singh and other radicals put the lie to the "generalized recent memory," 
exclusivity and collaboration remain dominant accusations. Historian Robert Gregory's work 
pushes against such a reductive view by detailing the political activity of "Asians," an awkward 
term for a fractured constituency. Hindus, Muslims, Parsees, Sikhs—such as Singh and Lall— 
and Goans broke their united front in the years after World War II and the subcontinent's 
partition (Gregory 262). Agitation for separate electorates in government by the many new 
communal organizations led to different degrees of "collaboration" with the colonizers (Gregory 
259, 1981). Divide and rule succeeded in some moments and anticolonial antagonism in others. 
This complicated history has no place in Lall's narration because it subverts his principal 
argument; as an Asian, he had little choice to become something other than an shadow banking 
financier; he merely took advantage of these racist assumptions and the opportunities they 
brought.  
Lall's rise actually begins with a moment of naive honesty. Charged with evaluating 
offers for new rail coaches, Lall fails to recognize an Italian woman named Sofia for the bribe 
she is and rejects the Italian firm's offering of luxury rail coaches; he judges them to be 
financially unsound and not designed with East Africa’s uneven landscape in mind. When the 
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Ministry of Transport rejects the firm’s bid, Sofia disappears. Despite Lall's heartbreak his 
integrity in the matter earns him praise and a promotion to be Paul Nderi’s personal assistant. 
Njoroge warns Lall not to take the position among the “top brass” because “it’s 
dangerous and murky up there.” Lall replies that he is “the least political person” Njoroge 
knows. They laugh and Njoroge tells him to “stick to railways. And finance. Stay away from 
politics” (251). Lall notes the irony of that advice because his future career as a shadow financier 
places him in contact with the highest echelons of political power. Despite Njoroge’s admirable 
politics—he backs the Mau Mau struggle and their abandoned veterans, turns away from 
Kenyatta after the failed promises of independence and joins the "people's hero" J.M Kariuki —
he remains stunningly blind to political economy, not recognizing railroads and finance as the 
battlegrounds they are. Indeed, Lall only comes to understand the connection between railroads 
and finance when he is introduced to informal economy.   
Lall’s shadow banking career begins with a briefcase full of American dollars. His new 
boss, Paul Nderi assures him that the briefcase consists merely of donations from well-wishers 
who want to help safeguard Kenya against the communists lurking in Tanzania. Nderi tells Lall 
that “arms have been discovered now and then in the hands of” the communist opposition and 
“money flows constantly into their coffers, from Moscow and Peking” (256). He uses Tanzania’s 
socialist government to scare Lall, arguing, “they have nationalised the banks and the private 
properties of your Asian brothers” (256). Nderi privatizes geopolitical battles by tugging on 
Lall's transnational ethnic solidarity—"your Asian brothers" of East Africa—to capture his 
attention and motivate him to become a bank, or at least facilitate informal banking services. Lall 
initially responds to these regional battles and Cold War alignments by claiming ignorance, 
doubling down on his ostensible apoliticism. Lall argues, “This was totally beyond me. Like any 
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ordinary citizen I had read the news reports he mentioned and assumed that, if correct, they 
would be acted upon by the government” (256). That a government bureaucrat with hopes of 
becoming a “PS” (permanent secretary) would regard ‘the government’ with such studied 
distance seems suspicious (251). More understandable is his inability to understand how these 
geopolitical issues “concerned him, specifically” (256). Nderi demonstrates to Lall the precise 
links between these different scales of political action, ranging from the Cold War to regional 
communalism. Specifically, Nderi narrates a fantastic link between the fight to stave off 
communism and Asian capitalist prowess.  
As Lall sits awestruck before “the open briefcase of stacked US dollars,” which appears 
as “a foreign and very potent object with their dull green colour,” Paul Nderi offers a two-part 
map to help situate Lall (257). Nderi acknowledges that his party's political opposition would 
read the cash stuffed briefcases as “bribes,” “foreign interference,” and “American imperialism” 
(257). He assures Lall, however, that no larger forces are at play; this money is simply the sum 
donations of “private individuals” who want to see Kenya remain capitalist and the ruling party 
to stay in power. (257). In this way, Nderi acknowledges the geopolitical forces shaping capital; 
however, he atomizes them as the voluntary relation between private individuals and electoral 
parties. This is the first part of Nderi’s mapping. The second part zooms into Kenya’s particular 
racial politics and the assumptions behind them.   
Nderi asks Lall to “find your Indian contacts and have them change this money [into 
local currency] and stash it; like in a bank” (257). Then some flattery: “You with your brilliant 
mind will keep track of the account,” so that when “our different constituencies need money for 
their operations, they will be paid by those Indians” (257). “Those Indians” become money-
laundering banks. Nderi assumes the Asian Shylock will handle the large sum of money and 
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Lall, despite his initial shock, delivers. Nderi’s strategy bets on the Indian community at large 
rather than Lall particularly, as evinced in Nderi’s initial request that Lall seek out his “Indian 
contacts” to make the magic possible. Lall turns to his father who in turn calls another 
acquaintance who “immediately understood what was required,” and guides them to Narandas 
Hansraj, a local “dealer in curious” (257). Through his shop, Hansraj “came into frequent contact 
with tourists” and becomes the laundering banker. Lall characterizes him as a caricature—“a 
typical banyani of modest habits, shrewd mind, and accumulating wealth” for whom laundering 
dollars is “only a shade out of the ordinary” (258). Hansraj specifically, and Asians generally, 
bridge the formal and informal economies, which here need the racial Other as an intermediary 
to grease their coupling. For Lall, Kenya can only imagine the racially marginal Asians in an 
absolute relation to capital, no matter its legal status.   
Although Lall enables this transaction he denigrates Hansraj as a “typical banyani” (258). 
This is not internalized racism or self-hatred but Lall’s twisted attempt to ground Nderi’s racist 
assumptions by summoning a figure who embodies the caricatures of Asians. This gesture 
absolves Lall of having to push back against such racism, prove its caricatures wrong or draw on 
the radical political history of Asians in East Africa; instead, he rides instead the tide of racism's 
enablements. That is, rather than rejecting this introduction to the informal economy, Lall comes 
to embrace these profitable enterprises even if they require him to be an "Asian Shylock." Here, 
the difference between Lall’s narrative strategy and Vassanji’s becomes even more apparent.  
Lall consistently foregrounds the racist stereotypes he faces as an Asian in independent 
Kenya. However, Lall’s career and narrative capitalizes on the enablements of racism. For 
example, Lall wants to distance himself from the “typical” Hansraj but nevertheless works with 
him. Even more, he springboards from this success to a deeper immersion in the grey zone 
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between informal and formal capital transfers; he becomes an expert money launderer. He 
capitalizes on the racism facing the Asian community by justifying his accumulation as a mode 
of self-defense. Meanwhile, Vassanji undercuts Lall’s narrative by making explicit the larger 
consequences of its worldview. These consequences include a reiteration of colonial narratives 
and blindness to the other possibilities of postcolonial life. 
 Following that thread of suspicion, readers can see Lall’s acceptance of Asian 
stereotypes for the strategic excuses they are. For instance, Lall clearly admires Hansraj’s 
“shrewd mind,” and admits to being slightly amazed that the “dealer in tourist gewgaws could so 
easily muster the equivalent sum [of two hundred thousand US dollars] in shillings” (261). He 
remains critical, however, of Hansraj’s typically “modest habits,” which contrast sharply with 
the tailored suits, vacation homes and imported English teas Lall comes to enjoy. In other words, 
Lall merely rejects Hansraj's style of accumulation but endorses its necessity and informal 
methods. In this way, Vassanji produces a hyperbole of the Asian Shylock bent on rampant 
accumulation.  
If Lall builds on a career by following the enablements of racist caricatures, then Vassanji 
constructs him as the caricature of caricatures, a parody on steroids, “the King of Shylocks” 
(346). Vassanji’s critical strategy, however, does not allow readers to simply reject Lall’s 
narrative and ignore the very real problems Asians face. Indeed, Lall continually juxtaposes his 
hyperbolic accumulation with its strategic value as a tool of self-defense.   
Lall ascends the ladder of government bureaucracy and befriends the politically powerful 
principally on the strength of his ability to launder American dollars. He is even summoned to a 
direct meeting with President Jomo Kenyatta, who remarks that Lall’s work serves the nation. 
The meeting ordains Lall as a “higher initiate,” conditionally “admitted into the abode of power” 
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(274). The “power latent in my new status,” Lall writes, “was brought home to me in the most 
amazing fashion”; he defends his father’s business from being taken over by a petty local 
politician (280). In contrast to later episodes of triumph, which he announces with the swagger of 
one opening his palatial gates, Lall here tries to capture something of the genuine surprise and 
newness of political power. It is worth reiterating that these political connections are attached to 
his usefulness in the informal banking sector. For these temporary connections legality is beside 
the point.  
   An unnamed local politician threatens to take over Lall’s father’s business. Lall 
telephones the politician to say that his father’s business is legal, that they are “citizens of this 
country,” and their businesses cannot simply be taken over (281). “By what authority?” Lall 
asks. The politician screams, "You cannot talk to me like this, you Indian! I will have you 
deported tomorrow!” (281). Lall’s interlocutor deploys “Indian” as a pejorative reminder of 
abject powerlessness, underlined in the threat of deportation; even crossing a petty politician is 
an offense worthy of expulsion. Lall reads this threat as “simple blackmail” and, seemingly 
unfazed, replies that he has “recourse to the courts of law and the constitution, to defend my 
father’s business and his rights” (281). These apparatuses rely on Lall’s claim to be lawful 
citizens of a country that, in this scene, seems to acknowledge neither the rule of law nor their 
citizenship in any meaningful way. The man replies “brashly” that Lall and his family will not 
come within “a hundred feet” of the court (281). Once the unnamed politician acknowledges the 
takeover is extralegal, and unapologetically so, Lall takes recourse to the highest authority in 
Kenya. “In that case I will speak to Mzee himself” (281). Lall’s claim to a personal connection 
with President Kenyatta defeats his interlocutor and shocks his own father. Neither know the 
circumstances of this powerful connection, which, precisely because it is built on informal 
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economic dealings, is strong enough to protect his father’s work in the formal economy. A 
stunned silence follows, then the man hangs up. This successful self-defense leaves Lall 
“profoundly affected” and pushes him to ask, rhetorically, if such connections were “the only 
way to get justice for a minority?” (282).  
The answer precedes Lall’s rhetorical question. No, there is no other avenue of justice for 
the Asian minority, Lall argues, by carefully demonstrating that they have no recourse to the 
legal system. Lall and his father could theoretically take the hostile politician to court but would 
either be killed or deported beforehand. Either way, they will remain “a hundred feet” from the 
courts, merely glimpsing the edifices (281). Instead, Lall must invoke his connection to President 
Kenyatta. “Can such power reside in one man?” Lall asks, again rhetorically, after the invocation 
defeats his interlocutor (282). The question, however, allows Lall to underline the oligarchic 
structure of political power in newly independent Kenya. In so doing, his second question—
“Was this the only way to get justice for a minority?”—answers itself because it forecloses all 
other possibilities of justice (282). 
 A preview of Lall’s final conclusion that minorities had no chance in Kenya’s turbulent 
post-independence political climate comes when he encounters Njoroge’s failing idealism. 
Between meeting with Kenyatta and defending his father’s business, Lall joins Njoroge in a cafe. 
A short distance away from them, university student protestors face “tear-gas” and “a zing or two 
of rifle bullets” from the General Service Unit (GSU), the police’s paramilitary wing (278). 
Watching the violent repression outside, Njoroge mourns that he does not “know what to believe 
any longer” (279). “The world’s too much beyond our control; we thought we could make a 
difference to it, we could make Kenya great, make Africa great—and it’s all slipped away, the 
ideals and the hope” (279). Violent state repression destroys Njoroge’s pan-African ambitions. 
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Njoroge flounders because he has turned away from Kenyatta and the failed promises of 
independence. He cautions Lall on building a relationship with the President, “you need a long 
spoon if you sup with the devil” (279). Although surprised that Kenyatta has transformed from 
Moses to the devil for Njoroge, Lall says nothing further. While Njoroge flounders because of 
his political hopes, Lall seems to thrive on an ostensibly apolitical acceptance of the given order. 
This scene combines Njoroge’s despondency with the violent repression of student protests to 
offer a bleak glimpse of the political climate. Rather than acknowledging the various modes of 
resistance on display, Lall focuses on their bloody defeats. In sum, the scene contextualizes his 
money-laundering career within a violent oligarchic state that suppresses its most hopeful and 
dynamic citizens. The same paragraph announces the jailing of Ngugi wa Thiong'o. When Lall 
asks his questions about the possibility of justice in the next scene, they serve as rhetorical 
exercises meant to solidify the answers bluntly suggested here. Vassanji, however, pushes 
against such an overdetermined logic by foregrounding its blind spots and hyperbolic structure. 
Such hyperbole need not be obvious. It does not necessarily rely on the absurd but can simply 
strips some nuance away. The line between satire and hyperbole seems thin here because satire 
often requires taking existing logic to hyperbolic ends. In Vassanji's strategic use of 
counterfocalization, however, hyperbole is a literary strategy.  
 Despite having provided ample answers in his narrative, Lall cannot help but reply to his 
own rhetorical questions. Through these answers, Vassanji critiques Lall’s worldview. Minorities 
could only get justice, Lall argues, if they were among the “well-positioned”; his own access to 
the politically powerful demonstrates this to be true (282). However, Lall continues “even 
penniless” Africans were “protected and favoured” by their access to “family or communal 
allegiances” (282). Lall seems to have forgotten about the tear-gassed students he witnessed only 
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a few pages earlier. He also forgets the collection of former Mau Mau fighters Njoroge had 
introduced him to. These rebels were abandoned by the newly independent regime despite, or 
precisely because of, their “communal allegiances.”43 Lall admits, “suspicion and intimidation 
could make a victim of anyone,” like a “costal man” in Nakuru or a Luo seeking a job in Nyeri. 
(282). These communal antagonisms, however, paled in comparison to the “few and frightened 
and caricatured” Asians who “could be threatened with deportation as aliens even if we had been 
in the country since the time of Vasco de Gama and before some of the African people had 
arrived in the land” (282). Just as Lall overlooks the class hierarchies in African communities, he 
omits the multiple migrations that brought Asians to East Africa and their troubling political and 
economic history. Instead, they are made passive victims, “frightened and caricatured” (282). 
That his own economic rise depends on these caricatures slips to the background because Lall 
wants to follow the logic of marginalization to its ultimate conclusion.  
This abhorring of a people, holding them in utter contempt, blaming 
them for your misfortunes—trying to get rid of them en masse—could 
and did have other manifestations on our continent. Idi Amin cleansed 
Uganda of its entire Asian population by deporting them, and many 
African leaders applauded him. Little did they know what a slippery 
slope it was from that move toward genocide in Rwanda, and then 
elsewhere. (282) 
Lall invokes the Rwandan genocide as the ultimate end of all such communal 
antagonisms, using Idi Amin’s expulsion of Asians to ground his argument in regional political 
history. This argument is hyperbolic, the East African equivalent of breaking Godwin’s law by 
raising the specter of genocide to win an argument. Parsing this critique requires some care. Lall 
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is not wrong to note the continuum between discriminatory policies, marginalization, and the 
search for genocidal solutions to communal problems. Mahmood Mamdani also articulates a link 
between the Rwandan genocide and East African Asians, framing them both as part of his larger 
analysis of how the construction of “natives” and “settlers” helps produce such (genocidal) 
antagonisms (Mamdani 28). However, Lall builds a “slippery slope” across Uganda, Kenya, and 
Rwanda that slides over too many historical and political differences. Simply, Kenyan Asians 
were never in the position the Tutsi of Rwanda commanded. The former never ruled, massacred 
their enemies, were in turn periodically massacred, or engaged in a protracted rebellion from 
exile. Although both the Asians and Tutsi were used to advance English and French imperial 
ambitions respectively, the comparisons must remain very broad and generally ignore historical 
specificities.44 
But such generalizing comparisons are precisely what Lall relies on and Vassanji 
critiques. When Lall ignores the inequalities among African communities and the economic 
power of Asians, he pushes those blind spots to their hyperbolic end, sliding too smoothly from 
social marginalization to genocides. In these strategic omissions and hyperboles, Vassanji 
imbeds his critique in the very form and logic of his focalizer’s narration. In doing so, Vassanji 
pushes his readers to suspend Lall's logic even while attending closely to the text. This writing 
strategy has two consequences. First, it asks readers to do more than choose among the various 
characters' world-views and challenges them to produce another one entirely. Secondly, it 
disallows readers the comfort of reading the text as the voice of a native informant speaking from 
the margins. If readers had not caught on to these clues, the remainder of Lall's narrative builds 
on these hyperboles in order to become a premier money launderer and earn his name as the 
"King of Shylocks" (346). 
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In a simpler version of this novel, Lall might have experienced a moral and political 
transformation after defending his father’s business. After all, he drew a connection between the 
“abhorring” of Asians in Africa and the Rwandan genocide (282). In that more banal, didactic 
novel Lall would begin engaging progressive politics and perhaps join his friend Njoroge in the 
fight with “the radical politician J.M. Kariuki, champion of the poor and a critic of the 
government” (284). Instead, Vassanji's Lall learns the opposite lesson; “To me the world was 
what it was, a far from perfect and tangled manifold” (285). Attempting to “change this world” 
yields only unintended harm, as he learned from Uncle Mahesh’s solidarity with the Mau Mau 
and the radical Oginga Odinga (named Okello Okello in the novel). As an Asian, Lall prefers 
rather to stay in his “natural place,” the middle, and “watch events run their course” (285). "The 
secret to my success," he argues, was the lack of "moral judgments" (285). This superficially 
apolitical position barely conceals Lall's allegiance to the dominant political powers and their 
ravenous economic exploitation. In other words, Lall's stake in "the middle" veils his extreme 
turn toward the informal economy in order to become a "neutral facilitator" for transnational 
capital flows (318). 
The Neutral Facilitator 
The Kenyan government severs formal ties with Lall when news of his meeting with 
Rhodesian representatives gets out. Although Nderi set up the meeting in London, Lall serves as 
the scapegoat because he remains "the disposable outsider" (301). Jomo Kenyatta confirms the 
dismissal but offers Lall continued protection. Once these formal ties are severed, the informal 
connections multiply.  
Lall partners with his in-laws to become their "facilitator" in business by using his 
political connections (309). When the National Bank calls Lall for help to transfer foreign aid 
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money into local shillings, Lall and his in-laws found the Aladdin Financial Company. They 
accomplish this sudden request by "scouring the shops of Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru, and 
Kisumu"; they turn, in other words, to the Asian business community (313). Later, the bank 
needs to buy some of the dollars back and the company facilitates this transaction as well, 
charging exorbitant prices for both transactions. Despite the fact that they deal with aid money 
for drought victims, Lall argues that their fees simply represent "the morality of the marketplace" 
(313). He previously argued that his lack of moral judgments catalyzed his success; that ruse 
falls away here and Lall's alignment with the exploitative logic of the "marketplace" lays bare. 
The company name, Aladdin, also signals such an alignment, even while playing with the trope 
of Oriental wealth. Fittingly, Lall does not see himself as Aladdin but rather as the "genie of the 
fabled lamp" (318). He enables wishes, but slavishly, without judgment. He may be able to grant 
any wish but is enslaved by every new wisher. These strained allusions attempt to represent the 
larger constraints of his position and allow Lall to arrive, tangentially, at a structural critique of 
capitalism.    
[W]ould it have made a difference if I had declined the fortuitous role 
that happened my way? Surely there would have been another to fill my 
place. The game of money requires the presence of someone such as me, 
the neutral facilitator. (318)  
Lall argues that although he lucked into his position, there is nothing contingent about the 
position itself or about the "game of money" (318). Capitalism, especially transnational capital 
flows, requires "the neutral facilitator," the one who knows how to rig the game (318). The 
"neutral facilitator" serves a structural function in capital circulation, one that disguises its 
absolute allegiance as neutrality. “Does a bank need to be moral? Or a croupier?" (318). Lall 
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uses these rhetorical questions to absolve his corrupt dealings because he facilitated these 
transactions in the same way a bank does. These analogies are useful in so far as Lall avoids 
ethics for the sake of discussing capital’s systems and structures. Lall’s language, however, bears 
cracks through which Vassanji reveals just how deeply Lall aligns with capitalism and its 
(informal) institutions.  
Banks and croupiers, after all, never merely facilitate the game of money; they play it, rig 
it and always want to keep the game going. There is nothing “neutral” about these roles or their 
interests. Lall admits that he made hundreds of millions—the currency changes of course—
amidst war, famine, and drought. Readers cannot accept that Lall's serves merely a structural role 
as the “genie” of embezzling aid money. Rejecting Lall’s version of a structural explanation, 
however, does not mean a return to individualism and discourses of morality. Rather, Vassanji 
pushes reader to examine carefully the connection between Lall's two arguments.  
On the one hand, Lall claims that he merely fumbled into this role as the "neutral 
facilitator" for capital flows. On the other, he also claims that he was particularly suited to this 
position as an Asian in East Africa. Lall defends himself, in other words, by claiming that he 
merely capitalized on the racist assumptions of his boss and others who reintroduced the Asian 
Lall to the world of money laundering. This argument traces an awkward circle to conclude that 
the Asian Shylocks of East Africa are uniquely placed to play the “neutral” role in financial 
circuits because they are outcasts banned from finally belonging to Africa nor willing to return to 
India; they are a tribe set apart, the “Wahindi,” the Asian Shylocks, whose allegiance is to capital 
itself (267). 
The derogative "Asian Shylock" obviously picks up on the anti-Semitic notions of a 
people uniquely fixated on law and money but not attached to a nation state. Shakespeare's 
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Shylock, however, offers a more sophisticated lesson. As Ken Jackson suggests, Shylock aligns 
imperfectly as a Kierkegaardian Knight of Faith, who must heed the call of an absolute Other 
without believing that he will receive anything in return. Like Abraham, Shylock is called to kill 
whether he wants to or not, to offer "the gift of death." This reading of Shylock's predicament 
aligns, again imperfectly, with Lall's argument; as an Asian Shylock, Lall claims that he 
participates in the informal economy whether he wants to or not. For Kierkegaard, the Knight of 
Faith acts on faith, the "strength of the absurd," to form an uneconomic relation and transgress 
his obligation to the universal—Hegel's nation state—for an "absolute relation with the 
Absolute" (Kierkegaard 71). In a strange way, the Asian Shylock is accused of performing this 
movement away form the nation state toward an absolute relation with something 
incomprehensible, something outside and above the nation.   
Lall argues the he too must seek an absolute relation to an absolute, global capital, and he 
must do so despite his own interests. Ostensibly, his chief aim is to belong in Kenya and 
acknowledged as a fellow citizen. Lall must act against this desire by becoming the very 
caricature that pushes Asians to the margins of Kenyan society. Being the Asian Shylock means 
being exiled from the national community; Lall seeks instead an absolute relation to global 
capital, which demands him to act against both his best interests and Kenya's.  
There is nothing uneconomic in Lall's actions, however, because unlike the Knight of 
Faith Lall believes that this absolute relation will grant him security within the nation. Where the 
Knight of Faith's act gains nothing for his position within the nation—it rather aligns him with 
the Absolute—and therefore requires "the strength of the absurd," Lall acquires wealth, influence 
and a measure of security. Lall gains quite a bit within Kenya despite embezzling public money.   
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I have taken this detour to Kierkegaard through Shylock in order to better conceptualize 
the slander of the "Asian Shylock" and its relation to global capital, the circuits of which 
entangle but exceed any given nation state. More than a low-minded insult, the Asian Shylock is 
both called to and accused of seeking an anchor outside of the nation state, a relation. Lall claims 
that such racism precedes and exceeds his career, determines it despite his own desires to the 
contrary. In other words, Lall, like the Knight of Faith and Shylock, acts against his obligations 
to Kenya and his best interests. Instead he goes in "fear and trembling" toward an absolute 
relation to an absolute beyond the nation. Lall departs from those Kierkegaardian heroes, 
however, by engaging in an economic relationship with that absolute, capital. He receives a great 
deal in return. Moreover, he acquires an imperfect safety within the structure of the nation state. 
Lall aligns with Shylock, insofar as both the universal—Venice and Kenya respectively—and the 
absolute Other—the Law and capital—demands that he trespass his obligation. Denied full 
citizenship, he must seek his salvation elsewhere.   
While classic Marxist critique understands deformed creatures such as Lall as a product 
of capitalism’s regime of subjectivization, one also needs to understand the particular 
postcolonial conditions that produce such subjects. Although it is broadly true that capital’s 
financial flows rely on middlemen such as the Asians merchants of East Africa, it leaves open 
the question why particular populations, especially minority peoples, come to embrace this role. 
Lall argues that the Asians take on this function as a self-defense strategy. This argument tries to 
coopt Spivak’s notion of strategic essentialism—retooling the very epistemic categories used to 
oppress you—in the service of capital accumulation. Lall does not care to work against such 
essentialism but merely launder it, turn white markets brown.   
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He reframes the racist trope of the Asian Shylock as an “enabling violation,” but not in 
the way Spivak intends (Spivak 524, 2004). Lall argues that the prejudices enforcing the social 
marginalization of Asians also enable their capital accumulation for self-defense. Such 
accumulation both guarantees their marginality—‘proving’ that Asians are interested only in 
money and without allegiance—and allows them some protection from the consequences of such 
economic power relative to their small population. The argument reads less like strategic 
essentialism than a convenient tautology. To bolster these arguments, however, Lall juxtaposes 
them with episodes in which his ill-gotten access to political power helps defend his family’s 
businesses. 
Another informal economic giant, Mother Dottie, threatens his sister's husband, Dillip. 
Mother Dottie deals primarily in the illegal ivory trade, among other things, while Dillip owns a 
burgeoning chemical business. Her henchmen lay before him a contract to sell his enterprise for 
ten percent of its value. They threaten Dillip with "information regarding his family, who had 
bribed officials on several occasions, and one of whom (Mahesh Uncle) had collaborated with 
communist enemies of the state” (310). These weak and common premises barely conceal the 
extortionists’ threat. Dillip immediately refuses but grows “extremely frightened by the chill that 
[meets] his answer,” and offers to consider the offer (310). The “chill” he feels is the threat of 
death. Dillip and Dottie’s lawyers sit a large library with “two ceiling-high elephant tusks on 
either side of the antique desk, and bookends and numerous other knick-knacks of carved ivory” 
(310). There is nothing subtle about this setting, which discloses an artful ability to bring 
immense violence to bear outside of the law. As “the principal dealer in the country’s illegal 
ivory trade,” Mother Dottie and her henchmen are well practiced in these arts. These threats 
advance on the previous episode of hostile takeover insofar as Mother Dottie formally recognizes 
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Dillip’s legal powers. Such recognition remains merely formal, however, because between their 
equal rights within the legal structure (a sale contract), “force decides” (cited in Miéville 120). 
Dillip calls Lall who turns once again to Kenyatta.          
The President likely benefits from some of Dottie's businesses but offers to help Lall. 
Kenyatta calls Dottie's lawyer and tells him, "You have no shame" (311). “They," Asians, "are an 
asset to our country; they export to Uganda, to Tanzania, to Ethiopia" (311). “They” refers here 
to Dillip’s company Mermaid Chemicals, which is a synecdoche for all Asians. Like the 
representative company, the Asians too export to other East African nations and consolidate 
economic power for Kenyatta and his regime. For the help, Dillip offers Kenyatta a ten percent 
share in the company; “Just like the British manufacturers say, By appointment of Her Majesty 
the Queen, et cetera” (312). This pageantry amuses Kenyatta and slyly reminds readers of the 
failed promise of independence, which exchanged ruling oligarchies rather than abolished them. 
Only those ensconced within this exploitative elite may enjoy safety from extortion, deportation 
and death. Lall remains in this elite precisely because of his ability to shore up their position. 
Kenyatta tells Lall that his informal financial work is "an important service to the nation" (276). 
His national service consists in abstracting value and making it available for global financial 
flows.  
Lall is ‘in-between’ in this sense too, not merely of identity but in-between labor and 
finance. Both modes of in-betweenness coalesce in the slander of the Asian Shylock, which 
signifies placelessness (neither Africa nor India) and "wily" financiers whose absolute 
relationship to capital denies their allegiance to any given country (267). To reiterate, Lall argues 
that such racist tropes enabled his entry into the informal economy and, more broadly, that the 
Asian community's self-preservation lay in excellent capital accumulation. Meanwhile, Lall also 
 !  
94 
claims that his position—and that of fellow Asian Shylocks—is a structural one within the game 
of money; it just happens to be brown in Kenya’s racial political history. In sum, economic 
structure and racial political history overdetermine Kenya’s elite Asians. These arguments 
present a self-enclosed logic by which Lall and his colleagues cannot escape their fate as money 
launderers.  
While his uncle Mahesh and sister Deepa represent obvious counterpoints to these claims 
of overdetermination, I am arguing that Vassanji encloses his critique within Lall’s narrative 
logic and its tendency toward hyperbole. Rather than merely choosing one among the few 
perspectives on offer, Vassanji's critical strategy develops our ability to counterfocalize against 
any given narrative and produce an alternate narrative. For instance, when Lall attempts to 
retrieve a little elbowroom from his own arguments by demonstrating his power to accumulate 
capital, the demonstration also contains Vassanji’s critique.  
My prestige round about town was large though somewhat shadowy. I 
was the famous facilitator, with access to the powerful and the 
immeasurably wealthy. I was not in any business for myself, yet I gained 
a stake in many enterprises that I had helped to make a success. (312)  
While Lall’s swaggering self-description attempts to stake out his ostensible power, 
Vassanji uses it to return to a structural critique of financial capitalism. Lall claims prestige from 
his “access” to political and economic power. That is, he does not actually have such power but 
merely enjoys a shadowy contact with it. This claim meshes well with his supplemental 
argument that he was not “in any business” but gains “stakes” in those enterprises he helps (312, 
emphasis added). Lall’s arguments try to elide the very political and economic power he 
demonstrated a paragraph earlier by defending his brother-in-law’s business. In other words, Lall 
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does not need to be in a business because he is a business: the neutral facilitator. And on the page 
following, Lall provides the proper name for his business, the Aladdin Finance Company. The 
separation between Lall’s self-description and the proper name marks the critical distance 
readers must cross. This space barely spans a page but allows Vassanji to categorize Lall’s 
financial work in the broader economy. That is, Lall’s self-description cannot take on its proper 
name because it doubles as Vassanji’s critique of informal banking, or even banking in 
capitalism more generally.  
Like Lall, banks too enjoy a shadowy prestige and immense power as facilitators with 
stakes in many enterprises without ownership or productive expertise in any, save capital itself. 
Vassanji's critique requires taking Lall's braggadocio seriously but unpacking it as the 
personification of a structural position. Lall’s arguments on the shadowy prestige of neutral 
facilitators in the game of money provide the framework and vocabulary for this reading. 
Vassanji, however, does not engage in polemic but rather challenges readers to produce a 
critique with the given tools. Vassanji’s critique, it should be noted, centers on capitalist banking 
specifically, which supplants the state as the primary sponsor and coordinator of productive 
activities. He makes this clear by mapping the privatization of financial networks and 
dramatizing their excesses. 
Lall founds the Aladdin Finance Company when Kenya’s National Bank needs help 
transferring aid dollars into local schillings. Once the national financial infrastructure leans on 
private companies such as Aladdin hyperbolic exploitation follows. Lall extends his 
identification with the fable’s genie and fancies himself a powerful agent who “could make 
monies vanish and produce gold out of thin air” (335). He remains the “banker of choice,” for 
the country’s “perpetually upwardly mobile businessmen and politicians” (335). Lall extends the 
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fairly pedestrian function of bankers into the realm of fable (the genie) and megalomaniacal 
fantasy, describing himself as the “alchemist who could transmute currencies” (335). These 
strained metaphors, however, capture something of the singular interest in capital Lall and his 
business partners’ share, an interest that certainly exceeds the self-defense arguments he makes 
throughout. Like alchemists, they want to create capital out of rocks. As bankers they invest in 
generating capital out of capital, no matter how fantastic the process. The "Gemstone Scandal," 
which earns Lall the title "King of Shylocks," perfectly dramatizes the financial sorcery 
necessary to generate capital merely by circulating capital, without investing in any productive 
ventures (346). 
Lall and his partners buy a Tanzanite mine they know to be fake and start a company 
called Solomon Mines (345). The name refers less to the Biblical King than to H.R Haggard’s 
famous imperial adventure novel King Solomon's Mines; this intertextual reference echoes 
backward to demonstrate the genealogy of Lall's imperial fantasies on the railroad; the reference 
also echoes forward to sound out Lall's financial schemes as treasure raids. Lall and his partners 
engage in self-referential financial deconstruction, with the added proviso that the remainders are 
deposited in “British and Swiss banks” (345). Said less cryptically, Lall and his partners take 
advantage of the government's offer of “handsome commissions to exporters or exporters selling 
local commodities abroad and brining into the country precious foreign exchange” (345). They 
ship out “nonexistent or worthless gems” at inflated values to their own subsidiary in London 
and deposit the Kenyan government's commissions in British and Swiss banks “on behalf of 
some of our elites, into their secret accounts” (345). These deposits are financial transactions on 
which Aladdin Finance earns commissions in local currency, which is sold back to the National 
Bank at premium prices during “cash-flow crises” (345). To complete the financial tautology, 
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their own Aladdin Finance handles all of these transactions as well; money circulates from and to 
the National Bank, flowing through various subsidiaries of the same financial institution, 
Aladdin Finance Company.  
  This closed circuit requires false (or non-existent) gems merely to catalyze the process. 
The purpose of this circulation lies in “earning immense sums in commissions in foreign 
currency,” whose transfer also earns commissions and, after circulating as local Kenyan 
currency, siphons more wealth from the National Bank, the institution from which the initial 
commissions first flowed out. This is capital generated from the circulation of capital, yielding 
enormous wealth for well-placed elites. Since this circulation is not connected to material 
production, schools or electrical grids say, it leaves the great majority of people untouched and 
their country poorer. Lall argues that these financial circuits and their hyper-accumulation were 
driven by self-defense.  
When Patrick Iba Madola (I.e. Daniel arap Moi) comes to office after Kenyatta’s death, 
Lall fears for his life. “Without my almighty protector,” Lall realizes, “I was naked” (332, 
emphasis mine). The religious language captures something of the existential terror Lall feels 
when returning to the world of absolute capital, which offers a “price” of his life and regards him 
as “an easily disposable commodity” (332). Devoid of Kenyatta’s protection, Lall must again 
face the threat of death by any number of enemies he made along the way. He collects important 
documents and stores them in an abandoned railway station; in his absence, his house is broken 
into and some jewelry and cash stolen. Lall is not surprised by the bullet holes in the walls and 
actually left the valuables open on purpose. “This was as I expected” (333). Lall responds to this 
threat by leveraging his relationship to capital circuits and letting his clients know that his death 
would mean the release of incriminating documents. That is, he reasserts his place in the 
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informal economy as an important node, connected enough to bring down other nodes in the 
network. The threat on Lall's life and his response bolsters his argument that he merely occupies 
a structural position in the game of money and is all too replaceable. For the moment, however, 
he uses his position to remind the hunters that killing him would not be very profitable to 
anyone.  
His network assures him that Lall was merely “imagining [his] terrors,” because he is a 
“fearful Asian” (333). The response confirms the circuitous racial logic that enabled his 
accumulation in the first place. They dismiss his fear as imaginary and a consequence of his 
being Asian. That such fear has a basis in bullet holes and expulsion policies matters less than 
Lall’s place as an “important and valued member of the business community” (333). Lall’s 
ability to enable accumulation buys his safety, because the “the wheels grind on as before” and 
“business is business is still paramount” (333). In order to alleviate some of the tension, Lall is 
invited to join a delegation to meet with the new President.  
“So many prominent yet nervous Asian businessmen desired to contribute to my 
briefcase…that to accommodate all it had to be filled with notes of twenty-pounds sterling 
instead of the local currency” (334). By this point, Lall deems it unnecessary to explain how he 
acquired such a vast amount of money in British currency; no one is surprised. The president’s 
representative accepts the large “donation” briskly and puts it in “a golf trolley that collected all 
the briefcases” received that day; rather than Kenyatta’s patronage, Lall realizes that the new 
president “would simply tolerate me” (335). The briefcase full of pounds sterling is not much 
different from the cash and jewelry Lall leaves for the would-be assassins to steal; both 
donations are simply the price of avoiding bullets. The transition to Moi’s presidency does not 
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signal the shift to a new precarity for Lall but rather the return to open violence from which 
Kenyatta's patronage shielded him.  
 Despite the new president's lack of patronage, Lall remains safe because of his structural 
placement in the informal economy. For the "perpetually upwardly mobile businessmen" aligned 
with the new regime Lall remains the "banker of choice," reveling in his status as the "alchemist 
who could transmute currencies, the genie who could make monies vanish and produce gold out 
of thin air" (335). Lall mutes his braggadocio when discussing his crimes with Seema—his lover 
during his exile in Canada—and instead thinks of himself as a "simpleton" whose "crimes of 
circumstance" were the results of "simply going along with the way of the world" (344). Seema 
replies, "That's what many of the killers in Rwanda would also say." Lall cannot identify himself 
as a potential murderer but receives an appropriate reply. "There are different ways of killing, 
Mr. Lall" (344).  
 Lall's earlier comparison between the marginalization of Asians in Kenya and the 
massacred Tutsi of Rwanda returns to haunt him. This time, however, Lall plays the perpetrator, 
killing at a distance through financial systems. Confirming Seema's response, he discloses the 
machinations of the Gemstone Scandal, which siphoned the country's wealth to an elite class. 
Lall goes on, moreover, to describe his involvement in more direct modes of killing. He never 
picks up a gun but makes sure they too circulate to the appropriate places. These "varied" 
financial projects "offered me comfort, prestige, and the friendship of the powerful," while also 
making his name "legend outside of the country" (346).  For instance, Lall accepts cheap gold 
and diamonds from a "company in Uganda that is obviously a front." In exchange he arranges  
to facilitate the arrival of certain metal goods in Mombasa port and their 
transportation in covered trucks back to Uganda, from where presumably 
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they will go on farther north and west, where the civil wars are fought. 
Nothing could be easier to arrange. (344) 
North of Uganda lies Sudan and West is the Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire at 
the time of the civil war. Lall provides weapons—"certain metal goods"—to these conflict zones 
knowing full well the murderous political import of his services.45 Nevertheless, he frames these 
transactions as "financial involvements," abstracting their deathly powers into a question of 
logistics and capital flows. A scarier link between Lall's gun running and claim to apolitical 
"going along" lurks in Rwanda, which abuts Uganda's southern border. 
 The word "presumably" sneaks into Lall's story of transmuting cheap diamonds into 
weapons shipments; "presumably they will go on farther north and west."  He uses the qualifier 
to rupture the link between his facilitation of weapons and their use; he can only assume where 
and how they move on from Uganda. Although Lall's familiarity with Central African political 
wars gives the lie to his ostensible apoliticism, he maintains a strategic distance to any particular 
position within these wars. However, "presumably" also forwards Vassanji's critique of Lall's 
worldview by indicting the icy indifference that reduces bloody conflicts to logistics without 
context. That is, Vassanji's critique inheres in Lall use of "presumably" to distance himself from 
the consequences of arms transfers. If Lall remains uncertain about the final locations of those 
weapons, then the possibility of their use in Rwanda remains. Since these weapons flowed out of 
Uganda, however, they would have aided the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) whose invasion 
into Rwanda finally stopped the genocide. Lall's gun running takes place a few years before the 
Rwandan genocide during a time when the RPF launched unsuccessful invasions.  
 Despite the possibility that Lall unintentionally aided the RPF, Vassanji critiques the 
broader structural overlaps between weapons and capital—indeed, weapons as capital. That Lall 
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might have found himself on the right side of history is an ambiguous, perhaps dubious, 
prospect, which retrieves gun-running from the brink. Vassanji acknowledges such a 
possibility—that arms can help 'good' rebellions—but only within a frame that equates arms, 
capital and "unwanted flotsam" such as "generals, prime minsters, politicians, widow, orphans" 
awash with illegal monies (346). Such residue includes diamonds, guns and people as a part of 
the "financial involvements" Lall sets out to describe. Gems are exchanged for guns, which are 
used to dispose of or exile people who may also have gems to exchange for the "assistance of a 
finance company such as Aladdin to see them safely to their new homes" (346). Vassanji sets his 
critique within this chain of equivalences made possible by Lall's worldview. The paragraph 
opens and closes with the all encompassing "financial involvements" conducted by a "finance 
company," which frames those equivalences as the exchange of capital. Through this framing, 
Vassanji critiques Lall and provides his readers with a strong clue with which to produce their 
own critical narrative. That is, readers ought not only to disagree with Lall's finance based 
worldview but in doing so must produce a different relation between guns, gems and people. 
Although Vassanji does not offer any direct guidance on a new relationship, he does explore two 
popular options.  
 The "chummy bazaar of discreet telephone class and the party circuit" ends with the Cold 
War when the West begins calling into account loans ostensibly supplied to fight off 
international communism. This broad historical context does not allow for simple indictments 
because it calls attention to entrenched circuits of power and capital. When the reinvigorated 
press learns about Lall's gemstone charade, they make him a "symbol of corruption" and christen 
him the "King of Shylocks" (346). Such individual indictments evince a strategic myopia that 
disables a broader focus on the geopolitical forces entwined with capital flows. Isolating Lall 
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does little to halt corruption and, as a symbol, misrepresents the scale of the problem. Rather 
than thinking historically and systemically about a wide range of actors ranging from nation 
states to mine laborers, Lall becomes the racial surrogate whose essential corruption reveals the 
dark underbelly of human greed. Such banalities obscure far more than they reveal.  
 I am arguing that Vassanji advocates for the systemic, historical view rather than the 
banal individualism that seeks out "a bad guy" even while allowing Lall to hide in the shadows 
of those systems. That is, Vassanji's attention to the impact of Cold War geopolitical economy 
seems to mitigate Lall's guilt in gun running and shadow capital accumulation. 
 Indeed, Lall's individual life becomes "cheap" and its value only recovers when he 
reestablishes himself as one actor in a network that will be disrupted if anything happens to him. 
A few days after the press names Lall the "King of Shylocks" assassins arrive at his home and, 
unable to find him, angrily fire their machine guns. A few bullets hit the undiscovered safe in 
which Lall hides with his wife, deep in their bedroom closet. He invites the press to “look at the 
unlawful attack and destruction of [his] property,” then baldly states that his lawyer will publish 
his business documents if he dies. That is, he threatens to disclose the identity of his business 
partners, many of whom rank among the post-Independence Kenyan elite (348). “I possessed 
information that could help indict a platoon of politicians and a hive of senior bureaucrats” (349). 
Soon afterwards, Kenya's new president Daniel Arap Moi delivers a speech reminding everyone 
that "attacks on private individuals would not be tolerated" (348). Given the briefcase full of 
pounds sterling donated to the president by Lall and his fellow Asian businessmen, Arap Moi's 
speech seems intended not to defend Lall's safety but rather his own, or even warn against the 
futility of attacking "private individuals" given the entanglements of business and state in the 
embezzling racket. The president uses the futility of individual indictments in an attempt to 
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placate both the public as well as Western donors; the government sets up an independent "Anti-
Corruption Commission," which in turn publishes the "List of Shame"; "Vikram Lall's name was 
first" and he is "invited to testify about my questionable business dealings" (349). "But if Vikram 
Lall spoke, as everybody knew, a lot of prominent people would get skewered" (349). His place 
in the network protected him briefly but sufficient pressure turns those connections hostile and 
he, a lone node, comes under threat. Lall flees to Canada and writes the confessional 
autobiography we read. 
 The "List of Shame" and its sponsor, the Anti-Corruption Commission represent 
Vassanji's most generous articulation of the disinfecting power of sunshine. Challenging both 
world-weary cynicism as well as the overly optimistic hopes of "transparency," Vassanji 
demonstrates that public pressure on a few nodes within a network puts that network on the 
defensive without necessarily disrupting it. Lall is publically ostracized for his corruption even 
while "everybody knew" that those shadowy dealings involved other major players. To prevent 
him from disclosing other players, hired hitmen prowl. When he returns to Nairobi intending to 
testify to the Anti-Corruption Commission, Lall fears for his life and hides but is ultimately 
found and killed; Lall tosses his autobiography to a friend before flames engulf him.  
 While Vassanji acknowledges the efficacy of public pressure he does not allow it more 
worth than the self-preservation tools of informal capital networks. Lall's shadowy allegiances, 
in other words, will not tolerate any threat and readily sacrifice a person they dare disrupt the 
great "game" of accumulation. Sunshine, "transparency," does not disinfect but rather reveals 
people like Lall, the racial other who serves as a "perfect scapegoat" because he is "an Indian 
without a constituency," "the crafty alien corruptor of our country" (365). Removing him by trial 
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or execution will not hinder the continuing function of those shadowy networks. This is the dark 
reality of capital's claimed self-regulatory powers.  
 Lall tells his lawyer to feel out the Commission and gauge their interest in his plea 
bargain. Lall admits only to engaging in "unethical but not illegal" activities "done with the 
approval of public servants" (364). He offers "as a goodwill gesture" to liquidate most of his 
wealth and answer questions about the Gemstone Scandal. The Commission will "declare 
publicly that it has no case against" Lall, who can live on with a clean slate (364, emphasis 
added). Even offering these limited admissions endangers Lall's life. Consequently, he asks his 
lawyer to also reach out to Nairobi's businessmen such as Paul Nderi, Lall's first boss, who are 
afraid of becoming scapegoats "for a condition that's rampant"; the lawyer assures these 
businessmen that Lall will only focus on the Gemstone Scandal. In a disquieting if unsurprising 
move, the Commission accepts Lall's offer; he must admit to the Gemstone Scandal but "need 
not name names," nor speak about other dealings. "The Donors and the World Bank will be 
pleased," his lawyer summarizes, "all they want is some admission, after all, some 
accountability" (367). The Commission hopes others will follow Lall's example and perhaps 
usher in a genuine truth and reconciliation movement.  
 Vassanji's cynicism shapes Lall's hopes. The stunted form of "accountability" Lall offers 
and the Commission accepts reduces complex long running systems to a banal individual 
moralism, pardoning sinners if they properly repent. Lall's book length defense, which doubles 
as Vassanji's indictment, culminates in the Commission's myopia. What better deal could Lall 
hope for than limited personal guilt for one scheme of many, some monetary compensation and a 
blind eye to the informal economic structures that dictate the country's present and future. To 
Lall's surprise, however, even this meager admittance threatens too much.  
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 After accepting Lall's offer the Commission is declared illegal and promptly disbanded. 
Open and vulnerable, Lall admits that he was "naïve in my expectations" (368). Vassanji's 
cynicism runs beyond his focalizer. Lall's lawyer is arrested, possibly tortured, leaving behind a 
"dangling" client. "It's clear that powerful people close to the government prefer to keep my 
mouth shut" (368). Neither Lall nor Vassanji remain quiet.  
 I have been arguing that Vassanji speaks through and against Lall. When Vassanji's 
focalizer first attempts to articulate the infrastructure upholding his claim to belong to Kenya— 
the Lal family's labor on the East African railroad—Vassanji critiques this history through Lall's 
imperial tropes—the conquest of empty and sexualized landscapes—to acknowledge the imperial 
projects emanating from India into East Africa. Asians were not merely coolies but settlers. Lall 
also claims to be overdetermined by the racism against Asians in East Africa, who are a 
frightened minority are prevented from any other positions in society than Shylockian 
middlemen. Lall argues that his career could not have been otherwise due to these factors and 
that he, like other Asian Shylocks with their superlative power to accumulate capital, find safety 
in these moneyed shadows. Vassanji's most obvious critiques to these claims are Lall's sister 
Deepa and radical Uncle Mahesh. Less obvious, and perhaps more important, is the critique 
embedded in Lall's narrative and its use of hyperbole.   
 I have been arguing that Vassanji builds Lall as the caricature of a caricature, an 
overblown Asian Shylock. To understand this hyperbole, however, readers must also take 
seriously the marginality of Asians in East Africa, acknowledge both their role in settler 
colonialism as well as the racism of expulsion policies. Lall focuses on the latter in order to 
justify what he claims to be capital accumulation for safety's sake. Lall's strategic myopia 
misuses Spivak's strategic essentialism. Vassanji, however, urges readers to take a more global 
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view and read against Lall, to counterfocalize and produce alternate narratives. Doing so does 
not merely yield a more complex understanding of East African history but also a structural 
critique of capitalism and its use of racial others to facilitate capital circuits. Like Lall, these 
racial others are condemned to seek an absolute relation to global capital against some their own 
interests and the interests of the universal they marginally belong to. Despite Lall's hyperbolic 
accumulation, however, Vassanji proffers a subtle argument about the racial and political 
circumstances that might energize capital accumulation. 
 My most speculative argument links Lall's claims to the quest for economic power among 
postcolonial nations. I have in mind India and China particularly. While the latter may be 
developing a "proto-post-capitalist" society, the former now happily embraces neoliberal 
economic policy. Both have prioritized economic development over human rights because it is 
only economic power that can protect against neocolonial advances. Neither, however, offer a 
narrative one can entirely agree with.  
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Chapter 4: 'The door was always open': Caste and Neoliberalism in The White 
Tiger 
 
When Aravind Adiga's novel The White Tiger won the Booker Prize in 2008, some were 
embarrassed and frustrated that they again had to discuss poverty in India. Expressed in a 
Telegraph article, these critics argued that the "book took us back three decades" to a time when 
"the BBC showed nothing but cows on the roads”; Adiga focuses on "everything that is bad and 
disgusting" (Dhillon). For them, the novel's critiques of uneven and combined development and 
the 'India Shinning' slogan promoted by the government returns the discussion to an 
impoverished India denied coevalness with Britain or other Western powers. Literary critics on 
the other hand largely celebrated the novel's focus on injustice, with the simultaneity of booming 
technology centers and the rural poverty seemingly unaffected by this new wealth. Neither the 
embarrassed nor the ebullient, however, discuss the novel's representation of caste and its 
complex relationship to the growing wealth divide. I redress this gap by foregrounding caste, its 
relation to occupation and wealth as well as its potential annihilation within neoliberalism. This 
last point will be the most contentious and joins an ongoing debate between anticapitalist and 
anticaste Dalit activists.  
I build my reading of the novel primarily in conversation with two critics: Betty Joseph, 
whose article "Neoliberalism and Allegory" offers the most astute reading of the novel available 
to date, and Gopal Guru's article "Rise of the Dalit Millionaire," which attempts to critique 
subaltern accumulation and, I argue, subsume anticaste work within anticapitalism. Along the 
way, I also turn to Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (Babasaheb), the primary theorist of and for the 
lower castes, author of The Annihilation of Caste and the Indian Constitution, as well a fierce 
critic of Mohandas Gandhi and his fight to retain and reform the caste system.  
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Betty Joseph's "Neoliberalism and Allegory" reads The White Tiger as a satire of 
neoliberal rhetoric and an allegory of India as an "individual emerging finally from long-term 
postcolonial economic woes and ready to take its rightful place on the international stage" (69). 
Adiga's novel satirizes this figure by focalizing through an "an illegitimate spokesman" of 
neoliberalism, Balram Halwai, an "uneducated rural migrant and murderer who self-identifies as 
a successful “entrepreneur"" (72). However, it is unclear why Joseph considers Halwai an 
illegitimate spokesperson for neoliberalism; his rise from poverty to wealth ostensibly proves the 
power of individual initiative—personal and political entrepreneurship—to transform the rural 
and uneducated subject in to an urban businessman in the global information technology sector. 
Indeed, India's new Prime Minster Narendra Modi, a neoliberal to the core, touts his rise from 
being a tea server. Joseph rightly critiques neoliberalism's mythology that erases social and 
historical contexts, an erasure that helps drive the evisceration of the social welfare state. 
However, the strong social ties binding the welfare state in India also manifest as strict caste 
hierarchies that imprison people in degradation. And the escape from the latter constitutes an 
important part of Halwai's narrative, if not Adiga's critique.    
Halwai is born into a poor family of the sweetmaker's caste. His father does not work in 
this prescribed occupation but rather slaves as a rickshaw driver to support his family. When he 
dies amid the bloody spasms of tuberculosis, Halwai must help his brother earn money for the 
family. He eventually becomes the driver for a wealthy, upper-caste family that bribes politicians 
to secure an export deal to China for their coal business. The local extraction of coal is, of 
course, built on labor held subservient in part by caste, which disallows social mobility of any 
sort. Halwai kills his employer and takes a bag of bribe money—which he considers back pay for 
years of exploitative wages—as the starting capital for a new business.  
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His opens a taxi business in Bangalore, India's Silicon Valley, operating a fleet of cars 
that drive technology workers to and from their offices in the middle of the night. This work 
allows global companies to operate 24/7 and live up to the "customer care" slogans promised by 
otherwise anonymous corporations. These workers make up the "off-shore resources" that 
continue the working day so that the global North may ostensibly go home for an evening of 
leisure after eight hours. In this way, Halwai's labor continues to support international capital, 
but as an owner sunning himself beneath his prized chandelier rather than the blotted trenches of 
a coal mine. That is, Halwai's escape does not necessarily position him differently relative to 
global capital but does transform his relation to caste and its hegemonic space, the village.   
This transformation, however, requires violence. First, and most obviously, Balram 
Halwai must murder his employer to reappropriate the wealth extracted from his labor. Second, 
Halwai's entire family will be murdered for this transgression. Both murders speak to the 
violence—physical, not discursive—structuring the caste system.46 This violence answers two 
questions Joseph believes Adiga is asking:  "What if this last bastion of imagined collectivity 
also falls to neoliberalism? What if even the poor villager is now in the pores of global 
capitalism?" (87). The answer may be "let it fall" because it—neoliberalism—may aid the 
annihilation of caste. If this imagined collectivity also includes the nation state then its 
exploitative presence in rural areas can be done away with too; such evisceration of the state, 
however, also means the destruction of the welfare state or, at best, recasting it as the 
infrastructure-building agent it is meant to be. If the neoliberalisation of the rural should be 
resisted, it cannot be on the grounds of preserving the current order and its violent relations. I 
agree that one should not look nostalgically "onto the rural as a site of essential values" but as a 
hostile space, the essential caste values of which must be fought.  
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I agree with Joseph's contention that Adiga encodes these questions within a literary 
strategy that privileges satire. This strategy undoes the usual allegorical method of establishing 
metonymic relations so that Balram Halwai stands in for a collectivity. Instead, he is 
ventriloquized by Adiga to voice the "appropriation of the neoliberal virtue of entrepreneurship 
as primitive accumulation, extortion, bribery, and criminality" (Joseph 91). Halwai does not 
speak for or represent a collective; he boasts his own exceptionality too often for that. For 
Joseph, moreover, ventriloquization only aides Adiga's satire, the thrust of which comes from the 
principal focalizer, who is an "illegitimate interceptor" of the neoliberal dream (Joseph 89).  
Interception and appropriation accurately describe Halwai's strategies. He absconds with 
a mythology never intended to include him despite its claims otherwise. Moreover, such 
interception seeks not to end a clash but to open a new battlefront, expose new wounds to the 
astonishment of the established combatants, village caste violence and international 
neoliberalism. Interceptors must always be illegitimate. This is different from saying that Halwai 
is an "illegitimate spokesman" for neoliberalism because he does not parody its ethos, as Joseph 
argues, but rather embodies its grandest myth—advancement through individual initiative.   
Balram's initiative may indeed be a part of Adiga's "fiction of agency" but it comes at a 
price, "namely that the poor, once they stand out as individuals, may be quite different from what 
most audiences know or imagine about them" (Korte 298, emphasis mine). Such individualism 
goes to the heart of neoliberalism and its socially bankrupt ethos that sees in collective struggle a 
hindrance to the kind of "indigent agency" necessary to create a "tiger economy" (Korte 296). 
Indeed, Balram idly dreams of establishing a school that would produce classes "full of White 
Tigers unleashed" on the world (Adiga 319). Tigers are, of course, solitary animals that do not 
form collectives. If such individualized agency "disturb[s] preconceptions which their [cultural 
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elite] readers might have about poor people," it does so by proselytizing an atomic relation to the 
world and reaffirming the possibility of upward mobility for "determined individuals" (Korte 
297, 296).  
Such platitudes ignore the collective efforts raging simultaneously as the novel is being 
read. Benedict Anderson long ago identified "meanwhile" as the novelistic vocabulary for 
articulating the simultaneity of plots, of pressing readers to imagine the multiple lives lived in 
parallel without necessarily intersecting; such an awareness constitutes "imagined communities" 
(8). Formal or informal collectives that push against the limitations within such communities 
constitute an important part of thinking simultaneity. Such collectives are, however, absent from 
Adiga's novel; they do not show as absent presences, hinted at through hyperbole and satire. If 
the novel "endows the indigent with conspicuous agency and powers of enunciation," it does so 
by ignoring all the enunciations already in flight, choirs of resistance that do not seek permission 
or endowment from others. Adiga' s indigent agency must remain trapped between the lines, 
ignorant of the struggles it does not even care to parrot.  
Even in this otherwise bankrupt reading that fixates on individual agency, however, a 
utopic potential lingers. The height of Balram's agency is not his becoming a business owner but 
rather in his "audacity to address" the Chinese premier directly (Korte 303). Such individual 
audacity is less interesting than the form it takes. 
Built on his claim that "the future of the world lies with the yellow man and the brown 
man," Balram addresses the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, though letters. As Elizabeth Hewitt 
has argued, the epistolary form both assumes and engages complex systems and networks of 
exchange.47 Although Balram knows about email, owns a computer and works in an information 
technology hub—the web is no longer a metaphor or description but an emerging sentience—he 
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continues to write paper letters. Balram's attempt to engage the premier recalls the all but 
forgotten project of Non-Alignment, a postcolonial solidarity built on transnational 
communication networks and their postal transmissions. This is not to say that Balram, or Adiga, 
want to harken back to a pre-electronic age; rather this epistolary mode points to the long history 
of such engagements between China and India even while pausing to note the wars that have 
punctuated that history.  
  Halwai wants to tell Premier Wen the true story of India through his life story, but 
fixating on individualism or even critiquing its atomized logics misses a key feature of his 
narrative, namely caste. Not discussing caste, indeed not foregrounding it as a driving force in 
the novel and Indian society at large, succumbs to the ideology of "castelessness" whose 
American counterpart may be "postracial." That is, Balram's caste—Halwai, sweetmakers—is 
marked in the novel, while the caste of others, especially his masters, is not. Critics have paid 
insufficient attention to this point and Balram's caste gets mentioned often only in passing or 
conflated with his class position. In doing so, we may fail to understand how the novel represents 
the relationship between caste and class as well as the limitations of this representational 
strategy. 
In contemporary Indian society, caste is a marked term imperfectly analogous to woman 
or black. Castelessness, like male and white, assumes the natural, universal reference point, 
invisibly commanding subalterns to identify themselves as deviant relations. Caste now means 
lower caste (Deshpande 37). The upper castes generally, and Brahmins specifically, are the 
"unmarked universal citizen" for whom no articulation of caste is necessary; indeed, they may 
claim castelessness, which paradoxically proves their high caste (37). The higher castes could 
disrobe in this way because their caste remained invisible and unrecognized as a "source of 
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privilege or advantage" (37). In contrast, lower castes acquire a "hypervisibilty," marked legally 
and socially as the subject of reservations—quotas ostensibly aimed to alleviate social injustices 
(37). The newest legal category—after "Scheduled Castes" (SC) and "Scheduled Tribes" (ST)—
"Other Backward Classes" (OBC) recalls a colonial insult and strategy of subjugation; subalterns 
as backward people always need to be brought forward into modernity, willingly or not. More 
importantly, through the addition of OBCs to the reservation system, "the general category had 
now become a euphemism for the upper castes" (38).  
Within this social matrix, Balram's caste matters a great deal. That he alone announces 
his caste in the novel is as significant as the fact that he does not need to enunciate the (high) 
castes of all those whom he serves. However, Balram need not announce precisely to which legal 
category he belongs because "everyone in the Darkness who hears that name knows all about me 
at once" (Adiga 63, emphasis mine). In the Darkness, Halwai's counter-figure to the ubiquitous 
cliché "India Shining"—the Indian government's marketing campaign—one's surname indicates 
their caste and through it their destinies. Halwai actually complicates this version of caste by 
offering this reduction: "These days, there are just two castes: Men with Big Bellies, and Men 
with Small Bellies. And only two destinies: eat - or get eaten up" (64).  
Caste and class thus intersect without subsuming each other: high-caste wealth (Big 
Bellies) and low-caste poverty (Small Bellies) align all too well. Balram contends, however, that 
the lower castes too can have wealth as long as they are willing to eat and not get eaten up any 
longer: "anyone with a belly could rise up" (64). His own murderous rise attests to that. 
Moreover, Balram's binary demystifies the relation between caste and "destiny" by disjoining the 
latter from occupation or vocation. As a Halwai, Balram belongs to the caste of sweetmakers, but 
his father became a rickshaw puller because, he speculates, "a member of some other caste must 
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have stolen [the sweets shop] from him with the help of the police" (64). Balram disarticulates 
the relationship between caste and occupation because another illegally appropriated that 
relationship. He does not seek to return to this 'true' caste vocation but rather uses this "enabling 
violation" to break away from caste limits  (Spivak 524, 2004). 
An important debate between Ambedkar and Gandhi concerned precisely this split 
between caste and vocation. In 1937, Ambedkar published the second edition of The 
Annihilation of Caste and rebutted Gandhi's conservative critique of his work in an article 
entitled "A Vindication of Caste" (1944).48 Ambedkar cares little for the sacrosanct Mahatma 
who is "so great that when he opens his lips it is expected that the argument must close and no 
dog must bark" (1944). Specifically, Ambedkar refutes Gandhi's claim that  
the law of Varna teaches us that we have each one of us to earn our bread 
by following the ancestral calling. It defines not our rights but our duties. 
It necessarily has reference to callings that are conducive to the welfare 
of humanity and to no other. It also follows that there is no calling too 
low and none too high. All are good, lawful and absolutely equal in 
status. (1944). 
Ambedkar's rejects Gandhi's arguments as reducible to the "the dogma of predestination."49 Such 
a societal principal would forbid one from changing occupations even if it "would be impossible 
for him to gain his livelihood through the ancestral calling" (1944). Moreover, Ambedkar notes, 
the Mahatma and his family have long ignored their calling as traders—they are Banias by 
caste—and have chosen instead to becomes ministers (the lot of Brahmins), lawyers, politicians, 
and newspaper magnates (1944). The second critique listed here speaks to a central injustice 
within Gandhi's claims. Specifically, the higher castes may ignore their "ancestral calling" and 
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move freely into another occupation and its place in society even while they prohibit lower 
castes from doing the same.  
For Balram, Gandhi's prescription would mean a life as a sweetmaker even if the family 
shop were stolen a generation ago. This ancestral calling has little to do with his family's lived 
reality or the clear hierarchies within which it takes place. Before Balram learns how to drive he 
works at the local teashop, "the one with the big photo of Gandhi in it" (Adiga 61). Even if the 
novel does not mention Gandhi's fiercest critic, pieces of Ambedkar's arguments certainly creep 
in as the former's visage overlooks a scene he helped create. The shop's workers are  
crushed humans in crushed uniforms, sluggish, unshaven, in their thirties 
or forties of fifties but still 'boys'. But that is your fate if you do your job 
well — with honesty, dedication, and sincerity, the way Gandhi would 
have done it, no doubt. (51)  
Predestined to be "human spiders," these workers, and Balram with them, are consigned to life- 
long servitude no matter their aptitude. While neoliberalism proffers false hopes of social 
mobility based on industriousness, the caste system vanquishes such hopes. If this rigidity seems 
perversely more honest, it does not allow for the possibility that capital will profane this sacred 
system.  
When Balram first tries to learn how to drive a car and change his vocation, his future 
teacher dismisses him because he is a sweetmaker and driving is "like taming a wild stallion - 
only a boy from the warrior castes can manage that" (56). Like Gandhi, Balram's teacher 
conflates Varna and caste, which Ambedkar differentiates: "Varna is based on the principle of 
each according to his worth, while Caste is based on the principle of each according to his birth" 
(1944). Balram's birth, however, determines his worth, his abilities to tame cars or advance his 
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occupation. The old driver capitulates because "three hundred rupees, plus a bonus, will do that," 
as will working as a free mechanic for the local taxis (Adiga 56).  
The interruption of caste by capital here does not hail a new development in their 
relations or the overturning of the former by the latter. Rather, this moment presents an already 
ongoing and dynamic relationship between these overdetermining forces. The landlords of 
Laxmangarh, Balram's village, own large coalmines they hope to contract to Chinese firms. The 
wealth produced from these mines, moreover, allows their son Ashok to live and study abroad 
before returning to India. Joseph contends that these landlords "use the rural as a sort of 
interdiction of the global and the local" so that the movement of their son and his tuition partly 
tell "the story of multinational capital" (79).50 She uses interdiction here in Spivak's Derridian 
sense: "a practice that does not take sides, but uses what is strategically important" (77). These 
"old residual power structures" depend on the local caste hierarchies, which may be residual but 
are no less powerful for that (79). If the novel does indeed ask, "What if this last bastion of 
imagined collectivity also falls to neoliberalism?" it is less concerned about villages than caste 
communities (87). The question, then, is not "What if even the poor villager is now in the pores 
of global capitalism?," but rather, how does this casted indigent live in these spaces? The novel's 
representation of rural life in India cannot be "an authentic description of the hardships endured 
by the rural populations of many India villages" because the aesthetic strategy centers on satire 
and caricature (Suneetha 168).   
The buffalo Balram's family owns, for instance, serves as "a parodic allusion to 
microcredit: a fattened animal remains the hope of all members of the family, yet the entire 
family seems to be working for it rather than the other way around" (Joseph 87). This reading 
shifts the time and place of neoliberalism; it is no longer arriving here soon (What if?) but 
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already living with you and masticating your labor (how does?). Given this micro-penetration of 
neoliberal capital it is unclear how Balram must be a "monstrous gangster-like" figure (87). Two 
strands of argument join here. One, as I argued earlier, Balram does not represent an illegitimate 
spokesman for neoliberalism but rather an instance of its greatest myth. This means that, 
secondly, Balram cannot be anymore monstrous or gangsterish than his surroundings. This is not 
to say that his behavior merely "mirrors" that of the landlord class, nor do we hear in his speech 
only "entrepreneurial shibboleths as criminality" (Joseph 87, 72, emphasis in original). I am 
arguing instead that Balram appropriates and intercepts the logics around him—discursive, 
entrepreneurial, and violent.  
The shift away from mirroring to appropriation matters a great deal. Returning to the 
scene of microcredit, Balram's family must do everything to sustain the buffalo because "if she 
gave enough milk, the women could sell some of it and there might be a little more money at the 
end of the day" (Adiga 20). They pull Balram out of school to help produce more income and 
remove their husbands' earnings when they return from their migrant city work. He only ensnares 
himself more deeply into these bonds when he tries to break free. For instance, Balram's 
grandmother sponsors his driving lessons with the caveat that he must send his entire pay back to 
the family; secondly, he becomes the driver for one the village landlords. Such desperation does 
not evince a "cannibalistic urge" that "mirrors the landlord class's predatory brutality toward the 
villagers" (88). Rather, Balram and his family live and die within the confines of the latter.  
Caste relations frame these brutal confines more rigidly than critics have acknowledged. 
While Balram may appropriate the language of entrepreneurship—as a driver he is already an 
independent contractor of sorts—he cannot appropriate anything of caste. Even after Balram 
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learns how to drive, the fortuitously lands an audition to be a driver and impresses the Stork (the 
villagers' name for this landlord), he must answer a final, all determining question:  
What's your last name again? 
'Halwai' 
'Halwai…' He turned to the small dark man. 'What caste is that, top or 
bottom?' 
And I knew that my future depended on the answer to this question. (63)  
No matter his education or proficiency a final blockade remains. This scene occasions Balram's 
digression into the dynamics of caste and his argument that only two castes remain: "Men with 
Big Bellies, and Men with Small Bellies" (64). That analysis strangely ignores caste's 
overdetermining power in the scene it interrupts and perhaps contributes to the critical silence on 
this issue. The "small dark man," one of the landowner's sons, does not know the answer, so 
Balram must answer himself. He replies "Bottom, sir," arguing that he could "have made a good 
case either way" (65). In the landowner's reply, the novel parodies the affirmative action of the 
reservation system and its patronizing benevolence: "All our employees are top caste. It won't 
hurt to have one or two bottom castes working for us" (65). One is granted the permission to 
serve and only earns that magnanimity after proving one's proficiency at the task. Balram cannot 
appropriate such caste logic or power. He can, however, learn its violence.  
 They hire Balram only after ensuring that his family does not support the Naxalites 
(Maoist revolutionaries) and remain in that village; "We know exactly where they are" (66, 
emphasis in original). Balram explains that the Stork killed a previous servant who failed to 
guard his infant son from a Naxalite kidnapping. Although the servant claimed innocence and 
was executed, the Stork has the servant's entire family killed and their family house burned 
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down. Balram assumes that the same has happened to his family after he kills the Stork's son, 
Mr. Ashok, and absconds with the bribe money. One critic finds fault with Balram's actions, 
arguing that "if the injustice of the master class was immoral, Halwai's methods of redressing the 
injustice seems equally so" (Khor 44). Debating the morality of Balram's violence obfuscates its 
context, a battlefield strewn with the victims of caste and poverty. His is a retaliatory violence 
that, to my mind, cannot be unjustified.51  
In a surprising argument, Ambedkar argues that the Buddha was "in favor of justice and 
where justice required he permitted the use of force" (Buddha). More provocatively:  
If a soldier can be killed in war because he belongs to a hostile nation 
why cannot a property owner be killed if his ownership leads to misery 
for the rest of humanity? There is no reason to make an exception in 
favour of the property owner, why one should regard private property as 
sacrosanct. (Buddha) 
Theological accuracy matters less for my purposes than Ambedkar's tactical reading of 
Buddhism, and the Buddha's teachings more specifically, to bolster an argument for the use of 
retaliatory force. (Ambedkar argues that the Buddha and Marx agree on this point.) Although 
force does not necessarily mean violence, Ambedkar’s phrasing suggests that they become 
synonymous under the right conditions. The parallelism between a soldier at war and property 
owners intimates that the latter too operate on a battlefield and should be treated as belonging to 
a "hostile nation" bent on producing "misery for the rest of humanity" (Buddha). In this reading 
nothing about property or the property owner remains "sacrosanct" (Buddha). Balram must be 
understood in this context, guided by the invisible hand of these lessons even as he intercepts 
neoliberal ideology.  
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Ambedkar appears nowhere in the novel. Balram does not mention him, nor does he 
come across the statues of him in Delhi even though he drives around the Gandhi statue a few 
times. This omission is purposeful if not entirely desirable. The novel's literary strategies—
allegory, satire, counterfocalization—disallow a sincere treatment of Ambedkar. That is the 
generous reading. A less generous reading may accuse the novel, and "the Brahmin Adiga" 
specifically, of failing "to mention the term Dalit in the whole of the novel" (Dalit Nation). As 
even that hostile reviewer notes, however, "there is [a] mention of Gandhi in a disparaging way" 
(Dalit Nation). Given Balram's irreverence for such political gods, however, Dr. Ambedkar must 
remain outside the novel lest he suffer the same fate. He can only appear in the guise of the 
Buddha.  
The Buddha first appears in the novel only to demonstrate how desolate Balram's home 
village is. Laxmangarh is located in the Gaya district, home to Bodh Gaya where the Buddha 
achieves (or re-achieves) enlightenment. Did the Buddha walk through Laxmangarh? "My own 
feeling is that he ran through it — as fast as he could—and got to the other side —and never 
looked back!" (18). The moment indicts Laxmangarh more than it does the Buddha, whose 
enlightenment it seems would drown in the village's Darkness. The next paragraph destroys the 
idols of Hinduism worshiped there: the Ganga river for its filth and Hanuman ("half man half 
monkey") for being "a shinning example of how to serve your masters with absolute fidelity, 
love, and devotion" (19). Such exemplary servitude only helps Balram underscore "how hard it is 
for a man to win his freedom in India" (19). In this flow of indictments his earlier commentary 
on the Buddha's foot speed then cannot be a critique but an admiring glance at an ideal of 
freedom to which he aspires.  
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At the novel's conclusion, Balram again returns to the Buddha to explain why he should 
not be considered a "cold-blooded monster" (315). In reply to a "cunning Brahmin" who was 
"trying to trick the Buddha" into claiming that he was a god, the Buddha says that he is neither 
man nor god: "I am just one who has woken up while the rest of you are sleeping" (315). Balram 
argues that he too is neither man nor "demon" but only one who has woken up, "and that is the 
only difference between us" (315). This claim seems blasphemous on its own but it approximates 
Ambedkar's reading of the Buddha discussed earlier. Balram has awoken to injustice and uses 
force to rectify the situation; according to Ambedkar, with whom I concur, Balram has the 
Buddha's blessing. Balram's second claim, that his awakening alone differentiates him from the 
rest of us, suggests the possibility of an enlightened collective that fights back.  
One night, will they all join together — will they destroy the Rooster 
Coop?  
Ha! 
Maybe once in a hundred years there is a revolution that frees the poor. 
(303)         
Balram follows his mocking "Ha!" with a more concrete analysis.  
People in this country are waiting for the war of their freedom to come 
from somewhere else — from the jungles, from the mountains, from 
China, from Pakistan. That will never happen. Every man must make his 
own Benares. (304) 
Balram's relative optimism of individual "revolution," however, matches his pessimism about 
collective struggles that are either deferred or dislocated (304). Instead, he admonishes, "The 
book of your revolution sits in the pit of your belly, young Indian. Crap it out, and read" (304). 
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Although the scatological remark alludes to the work of "Untouchables" with feces, it also marks 
the passage between internal and external as an effort, a verb ("crap") that must be followed by 
another ("read"). If a driver only reads fantasy stories about servants killing their masters, 
Balram argues, the master has nothing to worry about because these stories begin with a 
deranged servant and end with a dead one; these penny novels reinforce the inescapability, even 
sanity, of servitude. "It's when your driver starts to read about Gandhi and the Buddha that it's 
time to wet your pants, Mr. Jiabao" (126). Reading these luminaries reverses the verb order for 
the masters so that seeing produces liquefied fear; like the young Indian who must excrete his 
wisdom to make it legible, the masters will see the terror inherent in their position soiling their 
underwear.  
The Buddha helps both actors—servant and master—understand what is inside them. I 
am arguing that he must be the surrogate for Dr. Ambedkar. If that's true, then coupling Gandhi 
alongside Ambedkar as enlightening thinkers seems incongruous. Given his earlier critiques of 
Gandhi, however, Ambedkar (the Buddha) foils the former; the driver does not read Gandhi for 
inspiration to revolt but as the paragon of a conservatism that must be fought. Reading Gandhi 
alone does not suffice. Reading about him "and the Buddha" (Ambedkar), their debates against 
each other, endangers the masters (126, emphasis mine). Indeed, his final escape consolidates a 
few lines of Ambedkar's thought: the annihilation of caste (Balram works above and outside his, 
then takes a high caste name), property owners are enemy combatants (Balram kills Ashok), 
private property is not sacrosanct (he steals—expropriates—a huge sum of money).  
Critiques of Balram's arguments note their individualism and therefore alignment with a 
neoliberal ethos. Indeed, as I argued earlier, Balram's claims and life trajectory does not make 
him an illegitimate spokesman for neoliberalism but offers the best kind of rags to riches story it 
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promises will be available to all if only we unleash free market forces. I have also argued that 
Balram does not merely mirror the landowner's logic but appropriates it and that such 
appropriation should not be understood only as a caricature, a hyperbolic representation that 
reveals the grotesqueness of its referent. Rather, Balram's interception of neoliberal 
entrepreneurship exploits the utopic potential within this system. The criteria that ostensibly 
make him illegitimate—"an uneducated rural migrant and murderer" —demonstrate their 
irrelevance to neoliberalism's final analysis; does it generate profit? (Joseph 72).  
I am not arguing that the novel demonstrates the efficacy of neoliberalism nor am I 
personally endorsing the latter. Rather, I am following Fredric Jameson's method of locating the 
utopian horizon within the otherwise repellent. He notes, for instance, that Walmart's production, 
transportation, and distribution systems provide the "anticipatory prototype of some new form of 
socialism for which the reproach of centralization now proves historically misplaced and 
irrelevant" (Jameson 153). If Walmart provides an "anticipatory prototype" of a future to be won, 
then the call centers and Balram's shuttle business glimpses an India where caste relations 
succumb to capital's indifference.  
Both Walmart and the technology companies in Bangalore (and the multinationals that 
contract them) rely on global circuits of communication and trade that, while exploiting local 
hierarchies to lower labor costs and prevent organization, otherwise care little of the local 
prejudices and supremacies. Lower cost trumps concerns over the laborer's lower caste. Ignoring 
this feature of capital blinds one to its enticements and makes the popularity of neoliberal 
reforms, if not their success, incomprehensible. In such a failed analysis, one might mistakenly 
charge the lower castes with the task of anticapitalist revolution without understanding why they 
do not occupy that role.  
 !  
124 
Gopal Guru, editor of Humiliation: Claims and Context, a volume that focuses in large 
part on caste generally and untouchability specifically, falls into the traps I have just described. 
Guru's punching bag is the "Dalit millionaire" who receives applause and a condescending 
handshake from established (high-caste) industrialists. This scene "uniformly designate[s]" the 
"triumphalism" of neoliberal ideology because it affirms, and answers in the affirmative, the 
question: "Can the subaltern accumulate?" (Guru 41). The Dalit millionaire constitutes a 
"spectacle," in Guy Debord's sense, "which, as false consciousness, necessarily forges a fake 
association between a person or a social collectivity, and the spectacle" (41). He qualifies that the 
Dalit millionaire is a "low intensity spectacle," a kind of sub-spectacle that promotes the 
corporate class's ideology (42). This spectacle "induce[s] in common Dalits a feeling of 
pacification, which in effect will neutralize their anti-corporate stance" (42). He goes on to argue 
that corporations promote various cash transfers to the "toiling Dalit in rural India" in order to 
neutralize any burgeoning radical consciousness and, to recall his earlier argument, promote 
"false consciousness" (42).  
Guru's analysis limits radical consciousness to anticapitalism. This is a strangely 
provincial version of radical politics. While anticapitalism and anticaste politics would ideally 
intersect and aid each other, Guru fails to mention the latter at all, let alone as a revolutionary 
consciousness. He understands the Dalit millionaire's relation to caste in two ways: first, they 
require the "ragpickers and scavengers in the withered down jhuggis [shanty slums]" to mark 
them as a spectacle, economically and socially forward relative to their backward brethren. 
These millionaires must "remain in touch with the wretched, howsoever "embarrassing" the latter 
may be" (43). Guru seems to suggest that Dalits cannot escape their relation to the "wretched" 
among them despite their desire to. However, he goes on to chide them because "they prefer to 
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remain chained to their identity" (43). That caste identity is not a preference one can simply 
disavow does not occur to Guru here. This means that Dalit millionaires, as Guru's nomenclature 
indicates, must remain Dalit millionaires. More importantly, nowhere in these contradictory 
relationships can one locate an anticaste politics that might use imposed caste markings—that 
they "prefer" to retain—to upset its brutal hierarchies.  
Balram both abandons his caste identity and describes its decisive role in his life. After 
arriving in Bangalore, Balram renames himself Ashok Sharma, a high-caste name that does not 
impose limits on upward mobility; we might call it caste-passing. As described earlier, the high 
caste no longer carry a marker, acquiring the more universal category of citizen. However, in 
recounting his story to the Chinese premier, Balram emphasizes how being a Halwai affects his 
destiny by limiting the occupations he may take up. For Balram, a low caste identity is not a 
voluntary choice but a shackle to be broken, never discarded. A high caste or unmarked identity 
must be stolen, absconded with like a bag full of money, with which he must live in 
apprehension, as a thief must.   
Secondly, Guru understands the Dalit millionaire's relation to caste in terms of their use 
of "state and political patronage" (43). Such patronage, rather than the "free and competitive" 
market, combined with affirmative action measures, allowed the "political freedom that seems to 
have helped Dalits gain economic freedom" (44). While it is true that the reservation and quota 
systems are in place (ostensibly) to provide aid to the "Backward Classes," Balram's narrative 
discloses a darker secret. Such state-sponsored balms are unnecessary if we move directly to the 
guillotine. In cutting his master's throat, walking away with an attaché case of cash and even 
taking his master's first name, Balram circumvents the kind of state and political patronage Guru 
describes. That is, Balram provides an example, if an atomized one, of a revolutionary politics 
 !  
126 
Guru cannot envision for Dalits or their millionaires: a direct attack that may not seek solidarity 
with anticapitalists or the socialist parties that house them.   
Indeed, the novel satirizes the socialist leaders in India. While it is generally true that the 
novel represents "both the crisis of the nationalist-socialist state of the 1950s and the emergence 
of the neoliberal globalizing state in the 1990s," the specific critiques of the former need 
elaboration (Joseph 82). Specifically, the novel's allegorical structure marks the derangement of 
Nehruvian socialism's ideals in the figure of the Great Socialist. This state leader displays all the 
features of a corrupt autocrat conspiring with the landowners, whom he occasionally humiliates, 
to siphon "one billion rupees form the Darkness and [transfer] that money into a bank account in 
a small, beautiful country in Europe of white people and black money" (Adiga 98). Accused of 
"murder, rape, grand larceny, gun-smuggling, pimping and many other such minor offences," the 
Great Socialist nevertheless continues to remain in power through election rigging and false 
promises to the poor. Balram reveals that the local unconstructed hospital ranks chief among 
these broken pledges, leaving only "three different foundation stones for a hospital, laid there by 
three different politicians before three different elections" (47). Balram's father dies in a hospital 
too far away, without a doctor in attendance, and of a disease for which a vaccine is available, 
tuberculosis. This triple tragedy underscores the Great Socialist's already capitalized name, 
marking him as the abstract ideal of a gap between name and deed, a historic project deformed to 
become unrecognizable.    
The novel certainly critiques the narratives of  
national progress and economic development, where infrastructure 
development is now in the service of electronic capitalism and high-end 
consumer goods, rather than the older socialist-welfare agendas of 
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poverty alleviation, rural literacy, women’s welfare, and healthcare. 
(Joseph 76)  
In the figure of the Great Socialist, however, the novel argues that the difference between these 
agendas has eroded. Joseph's "rather than" separates two projects that have now aligned so that 
the "older socialist agendas" disguise servitude to "electronic capitalism" (Joseph 76, emphasis 
mine). Laxmangarh's landlords push against the Great Socialist’s power by forming a party of 
their own, the All India Social Progressive Front (Leninist Faction). If the name parodies the 
divisions between the various Communist parties in India—CPI, CPI (Marxist), CPI (Marxist-
Leninist), CPI (Maoist) to name a few—its foundation by the masters as a challenge to power 
offers a stronger critique. "Social Progressive" and "Leninist" no longer refer to leftist politics, 
let alone left radical politics, but rather serve the landlords' interests under slogans that champion 
the poor. To be clear, the novel does not seem to critique communism, socialism, or Marxism per 
se, but parodies the Indian political parties that ostensibly fight under those flags. Even if these 
critiques cannot be endorsed they cannot be ignored as they have been by otherwise astute 
critics.  
 More troublingly, I want to suggest a link between the novel's critiques and Guru. I 
suggested earlier that Guru seems unable to understand a radical emancipatory politics outside of 
an anticapitalist frame. That is, Guru wants Dalits to either join the Marxist (party?) struggle or, 
in the vein of Subaltern Studies, take up the mantle of revolutionary subjectivity. The term Dalit 
itself, Guru argues, "symbolizes struggle as it is produced by the struggling masses in opposition 
to both the state and state-driven capitalism, and the free market" (48). Taking something true—
that Dalit names and enables a collective struggle—Guru arrives at something false—the brown 
washing of the term to represent abstract "masses" whose anticaste struggle is subsumed into 
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Marxist terms. Worse, the term takes on an "autonomous ontological status" as an agential term 
that rejects "the idea of victimhood" (48). Ontology is precisely the framework Dalit avoids 
because its basic premise rejects the givenness of caste and the heirarchy of being it structures; 
the term aims to marshal SCs, STs, and OBCs under one flag. Moreover, articulating an agential 
term does not ignore victimhood—which is different than refusing to be victims only—nor the 
explicitly caste-based violence under which it suffers.  
Dalit as a struggle concept has been sociologically constituted, 
historically arrived at and politically articulated. This, by definition, 
would avoid any association with capitalism and the coercive state, and 
other patronizing vocabulary produced by Gandhi or by the welfare state. 
Dalit is not a caste term at all. (48, my emphasis) 
If Guru only hinted at subsuming Dalit as a "struggle concept" earlier, the closing line of 
this paragraph swallows it whole. Abstracting Dalit from its roots in anticaste struggle in order to 
"avoid any association with capitalism" reads like a landowner claiming that the toil of his coal 
miners benefits all equally without noting that he and his ilk are more equal than others. If this 
comparison seems ungenerous or the muddling of entirely different agendas, then it captures 
something of exasperation felt when reading Guru's perverse annihilation of caste. Again, this is 
not to say that anticaste activism cannot and should not intersect with anticapitalism; rather, it is 
to note that subsuming the former in the name of latter does little to cultivate such alliances.   
The novel's Great Socialist inspires this ungenerous comparison because he operates 
under the party symbol, "a pair of hands breaking through handcuffs — symbolizing the poor 
shaking off the rich," which is "imprinted in black stencils on the walls of every government 
office in the Darkness" (Adiga 97). Although these once powerful stencils on government offices 
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mean to advertise the state as the saving force, they become caricatures in the novel, hyperbolic 
parodies of a state that shackles the poor to the landlords and through them to capitalist 
exploitation. After coming to a detente with the landowners, the Great Socialist visits them to 
collect his extortion fee of one and a half million rupees. He knows they have the money, 
"You've got a good scam going here — taking coal for free from the government mines. You're 
got it going because I let it happen" (104). He did not merely enable the landowners but 
produced them: "I brought you here — I made you what you are today" (105). This caricature of 
a corrupt politician and the long scams they create nevertheless ruptures Joseph's critique of 
current development narratives' fixation on electronic capitalism "rather than" the old socialist 
agendas (Joseph 76, my emphasis). In the novel's logic those old socialist agendas now devour 
the poor with the rhetoric of liberation and the exploitation of capitalism. 
One more frightening symmetry: Guru writes that the emergence of the Dalit millionaire 
forces the latter to "treat the ideology of neo-liberalism with liberatory potential" (49). Worse 
still, they must "collaborate with the Indian corporate class with the purpose to create a unified 
ideological impact on socially discreet groups" (49). Certainly, a crucial part of this ideological 
assault directed at the poor holds that anyone can become a millionaire given, as the American 
version might say, enough pluck and bootstraps. Indeed, I argued earlier that Balram embodies 
this myth, making him the ideal representative for neoliberalism. However, the novel pushes 
back, arguing that neoliberalism alone does not offer false promises to the poor; the Great 
Socialist and his ilk do the same. For instance, a government agent visits Balram's school and 
asks him to identify a photo:  
Who is this man, who is the most important man in all our lives?  
"He's the Great Socialist"  
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What is his message for children? 
"Any boy in any village can grow up to become the prime minister of 
India. That is his message to little children all over this land." (35)   
In the next moment, however, the agent names Balram the white tiger, "the creature that 
comes along only once in a generation" (35). The equality promised earlier quickly proves an 
abnormality, a rare genetic trait that has little to do with the vegetation around it. The agent 
promises to send over a scholarship and transfer Balram to a new school. Those plans quickly 
fall away, however, when he must go to work in order to pay off his family's debt to the landlord. 
If Guru rightly critiques the structural limits of neoliberal capitalism—its promised upward 
mobility depends on the indentured stasis of many—the novel critiques the Great Socialist's 
version of a similar promise that cannot overcome generational poverty, or worse, perpetuates it 
in collusion with the landlords. 
Unpacking the novel's critique of the symmetry between neoliberalism’s promise of 
wealth for all and the Great Socialist's promise of upward mobility does not require agreement or 
endorsement. Most critics find Balram repulsive for various reasons and clearly the state minister 
is not a likable character either. If the novel suggests a fearful symmetry between the two, it also 
rejects both even while, as I argued earlier, noting the utopian potential within them.  
The novel also gives both neoliberal capitalism and Great Socialism—I am retaining the 
novel's caricature to avoid conflating it with existing or future instantiations—a figure of upward 
mobility. While Balram represents an ideal of the neoliberal promise, Vijay represents the 
obverse, Great Socialism's embodiment of a rise from poverty to party official. Balram 
encounters Vijay throughout his life, including in Delhi when the latter slides into the car next to 
another politician.  
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The man on the right was my childhood hero - Vijay, the pigherd's son 
turned bus conductor turned politician from Laxmangarh. He had 
changed uniforms again: now he was wearing the polished suit and tie of 
a modern Indian businessman. (270)  
This trajectory corresponds to Balrams's own — the rickshaw puller's son turned driver turned 
entrepreneur from Laxmangarh. If the novel's parallel between socialist politician and 
entrepreneur becomes even more evident here, Vijay's new business suit melds the two 
occupations together. He works with the other politician in the car to extort Ashok: "I told him if 
he didn't pay, we'd screw him and his father and his brother and the whole coal-pilfering and tax-
evading racket they have" (271). Vijay and his Comrade—note the caricature—belong to the 
national branch of the state-level Great Socialist. That is, they do not hope to end the corrupt 
extraction of natural resources, labor, and wealth from Laxmangarh but exploit their awareness 
and enablement of this "tax-evading racket" to benefit themselves. What was once a cold war 
between two opposed world building methods—socialism and capitalism—collapses into the 
banal collusion of corrupt politicians and landlords.  
In another version of this novel, Balram might have killed a politician and landowners in 
order to expropriate the money necessary to begin his new life. This would be a bloody justice 
but not an entirely unwarranted one and one, as I argued above, that neither Ambedkar nor his 
reading of the Buddha disallow. Instead, Balram kills the landowner. This plot trajectory may 
keep the novel's world intact—Balram cannot become an anticorruption hero—but it also 
advances the utopic horizon of neoliberal capital I discussed earlier, a horizon apparently 
unavailable to the state. Specifically, Balram vanishes into the anonymity of global capital where 
his past and caste matter less than the wealth he circulates; Vijay demonstrates that a similar 
 !  
132 
upward mobility, but not anonymity, may be available within the party and state bureaucracy but 
only if it is treated as a capitalist enterprise.    
As with the novel itself there are crucial limits to these developmental trajectories. 
Gender constitutes the most important of these outcast elements. The novel concerns a male's 
rise from poverty, in servitude to predominantly male employers, and the transmission of this 
story to the male Chinese premier. The other upwardly mobile figure identified above, Vijay, is 
also male as are his Comrades, including the Great Socialist, whose agent once conveyed an 
inspirational message to Balram at his school: "Any boy in any village can grow up to become 
the prime minister of India. That is his message to little children all over this land" (Adiga 35, 
emphasis mine). Even as this message presents a mirage, it genders access to that false oasis of 
upward mobility for all. Indira Gandhi's time as prime minister never happened in this India, and 
not because she imposed draconian measures against the poor, but because she does not exist as 
a woman. After naming him the White Tiger, the government agent gives Balram a book, 
"Lessons for Young Boys from the Life of Mahatma Gandhi" (25). The erasure of Ambedkar and 
the gendering of education converge here in the form of the parting gift the government agent 
has on hand. Gandhi had no lessons for young girls apparently and Ambedkar offers nothing for 
children of either gender despite the centrality of education to his activism. Moreover, there seem 
to be no girls in Balram's school, or at least none that he speaks of. The only correspondence 
between women and education in Balram's narrative involves his sister's marriage, the 
celebration and dowry of which required Balram to work to pay off the family debt rather than 
attend school. No mention is made of his sisters' schooling.  
Balram's decrepit school offered no books or other supplies but an indifferent teacher 
who steals supplies and food to compensate a half a year's lack of pay. The novel mockingly 
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describes the teacher as practicing a "Gandhian protest to retrieve his missing wages — he was 
going to do nothing in class until his pay cheque arrived in the mail" (33). In this context, 
emancipation through education rings as hollow as its attendant promise of upward mobility for 
all. Even the educators suffer under the misallocation of resources, including the lack of training 
or a training that emphasizes "rote learning" such that "the technique of emphasizing meaning is 
not what s/he would understand by teaching" (Spivak 26). This constitutes the "real disgrace of 
rural primary education," which defeats "even the good teacher with the best will in the world" 
(26, emphasis in original). In the novel's terms, the subjects produced from this sort of education 
are "half-baked" (Adiga 10). "He can read and write," laments Ashok, "but he doesn't get what 
he's read. He's half-baked" (10). Balram concurs: 
All these ideas, half formed and half digested and half correct, mix up 
with the other half-cooked ideas in your head, and I guess these half-
formed ideas bugger into one another, and make more half-formed ideas, 
and this what you act on and live with. The story of my upbringing is the 
story of how a half-baked fellow is produced. (11)  
It is generally true that this passage tells the story of "Indian illiteracy and infrastructural 
development" through Balram's "flawed and fragmentary perspective" (Joseph 89). And this is 
not a bad thing. Indeed, Balram promises that any school that he starts would not "corrupt 
anyone's head with prayers and stories about God or Gandhi," the fully formed but ossified 
shibboleths of conservatism (Adiga 319). While being half-baked in this way does not lend itself 
to achievements on standardized exams, it does encourage invention and deviation, processes far 
more amenable to revolt. I would describe these processes as an aesthetic practice, the making of 
something entirely new. In Balram's case such aesthetics breaks from given modes of 
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instrumentality—his own servitude—for the sake of a neoliberal form—entrepreneurship. 
Balram's education comes through poetry; he knows "by heart the works of the four greatest 
poets of all time — Rumi, Iqbal, Mirza Ghalib, and a fourth fellow," Kabir perhaps, who remains 
unnamed but whose ideas of equality have been memorized.  
"'They remain slaves because they can't see what is beautiful in this world.' That is the 
truest thing anyone ever said" (Adiga 40). Balram quotes Iqbal as the foundation of his 
explanation of why masses remain impoverished even while they constitute the majority. In a 
Marxian vein, Balram argues that the "history of the world is the history of a ten-thousand-year 
war of brains between the rich and the poor," and "Poetry…when understood correctly spills out 
secrets that allow the poorest man on earth to conclude the ten-thousand-year-old-war on terms 
favourable to himself" (254). He goes to a street-side bookseller who reads a bit of poetry to him: 
"You were looking for the key for years/ But the door was always open!" Balram repeats the 
couplet feverishly, changing the poem's "You were" to "I was," as he comes to see the bag of 
money and his master's death as the open door through which he must walk out. This fragment of 
Iqbal's poetry, learned without its ecstatic context or historical explication, may be "half-formed" 
but Balram makes it an affirmation of freedom. While some definitions of aesthetics claim it to 
be in excess of instrumentality, Balram's understands aesthetics as that which ruptures the 
existing instrumentality of caste and class hierarchies. For him, seeing what is beautiful in the 
world means glimpsing freedom, the door to which is always open even if it leads to neoliberal 
capitalism. 
The equation of freedom and neoliberalism makes little sense without understanding the 
local bondages from which one may seek escape. The allure of this trajectory into the anonymity 
of capital—"[Bangalore] was full of outsiders. No one would notice me here"—comes in its 
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liberty from caste (296). The novel, I have argued, both satirizes neoliberal entrepreneurship and 
explores its utopian potential to profane sacred hierarchies. Attending to this tension allows us to 
understand why anticaste and anticapital activism does not necessarily coincide despite our 
desires; and subsuming the former within the latter does not help forge alliances. Through the 
Great Socialist and his agents, the novel satirizes the liberation ostensibly promised by ruling 
leftist parties, which either do not provide adequate infrastructures (hospitals) or use existing 
systems (schools) to reproduce caste subservience (Gandhi). Only by intercepting bits of skill, 
neoliberal ideology, and violence, the novel argues, does one break away from servitude, if not 
achieve anything like freedom. For Balram "it was all worthwhile to know, just for a day, just for 
an hour, just for a minute, what it means not to be a servant" (321). 
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Conclusion 
 
The twenty-first century's proliferation of South-South relations requires the critical 
capacities, historical knowledge, and ability to read across disjunctive scales, offered by 
Postcolonial studies. These South-South relations are both collaborative and domineering, 
reflecting external the solidarities of national liberation movements as well as witnesses to the 
eruption of internal antagonisms that destroy these hopes. This focus on the global South, 
however, does not require denying the continued dominance of the North or fixing its place as 
the fount of all power. In the course of this dissertation, I explore a range of issues that, taken 
together, demonstrate the ways postcolonial literary studies enrich our understanding of 
contemporary politics and aesthetics. 
In chapters 1 and 2, I demonstrate that local violence—genocides in Bangladesh and 
Rwanda—depends on Northern political support, weapons supplies as well as the humanitarian 
aid that follows. Understanding such violence requires attention both to the historical colonial 
relationships that ground these North-South relationships—the French in Rwanda for example—
as well as to the local actors who turn from victims to killers. In these chapters, I aim to 
demonstrate that the supply of arms remains a key mode through which the North still shapes the 
South. In chapter 1, for example, the protagonist of Salman Rushdie's Midnight's Children uses 
these Northern weapons as one set of material evidence to absolve himself of war crimes 
committed in Bangladesh. This hyperbolic strategy—look at all these overdetermining forces!—
caricatures one version of postcolonialism in which all crimes can be traced back to the global 
North. The insufficiencies of this narrative challenge us to create the alternate narrative strategies 
necessary for justice in the present.  
I carry these concerns into chapter 2 by locating in the trope of “indifference” an obfuscation 
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of the international community's many investments in Rwanda. The banal narrative that no one 
cared about the genocide in Rwanda mystifies the involvement of old colonial powers France 
and Belgium, as well as Uganda and South Africa, all of who supply weapons to the warring 
parties. This arms supply is not equal, of course, as the Francophone powers equipped the 
genocidaires while also providing peacekeepers to the UN and humanitarian aid in the 
genocide’s aftermath. Boubicar Boris Diop's Murambi, The Book of Bones underlines these 
grotesque connections that evince the continued influence of Northern powers without, however, 
absolving the Rwandan genocidaires of their crimes. The critique of “indifference” aims to 
inoculate us against its mystifying force and turn our attention instead to the existing networks of 
political influence, arms, and capital that riddle South-South relations.   
While I move in the first two chapters from India to East Africa, I zoom into the traffic 
between these spaces across the Indian Ocean in chapter 3. These South-South relations, I argue, 
represent emergent modes of collaboration and dominance even while drawing on historical 
connections. In chapter 3 I focus on the Asian diaspora in East Africa, which may predate the 
arrival of European powers but they remain “Asian Shylocks,” a community of imperial 
collaborators who currently represent the vanguard of India’s expansion in that region. M.G. 
Vassanji’s novel The In-Between World of Vikram Lall offers a literary analysis of these 
complexities by taking seriously the racism facing the Asian diaspora as well as its historically 
troubling class politics. Vassanji uses what Gayatri Spivak calls counterfocalization as an 
aesthetic strategy to articulate a given text as well as mark ruptures that push readers to produce 
an alternative narrative in parallel. By demonstrating that Vassanji’s focalizer represents the 
caricature of a caricature, a hyper-Asian Shylock, I trace out the ignored histories of Black and 
Asian solidarity and the alternate futures they can help energize. Such futures are urgently 
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needed as India’s investments in, and exports from, Africa boom, rivaling only China in their 
exponential growth. I examine this dialogue with China further in Aravind Adiga’s novel The 
White Tiger, whose protagonist addresses the Chinese premier on entrepreneurship. The novel’s 
epistolary form as well as its concerns with the Indian Ocean and transnational technology 
showcase some of the concordant interests these two powers share.  
Chapters 3 and 4 also figure protagonists who emphasize capital accumulation as a mode of 
self-preservation. Vikram Lall, the namesake of Vassanji’s novel, argues that such accumulation 
both protects against, and is enabled by, the racism that sees the East African Asian diaspora as 
“Shylocks.” Meanwhile, Balram Halwai, Adiga’s focalizer, argues that capitalist 
entrepreneurship helps him escape the shackles of the caste system. Balram represents a 
caricature of neoliberalism’s success story—“development as bildungsroman”—while also 
appropriating the utopic potential within capitalism’s ability to profane the caste system’s sacred 
violence (Benjamin 147). Both Lall and Halwai, I argue, demonstrate the allure of capital 
accumulation within disenfranchised or discriminated populations and help us understand why 
their version of radical emancipation may not align with that advanced by anticapitalists. This 
troubling insight raises the broader question of how to negotiate the turn to neoliberal economic 
policy and the primacy of commercial development as well as the uneven spread of these forces. 
The exponential industrialization of India and China, as well as their rivalry in Africa and the 
Indian Ocean, amplifies other significant questions that must remain outside the scope of this 
dissertation. The first among these questions concerns the fate of women and sexual minorities in 
India and East Africa. While Uganda has recently repealed its draconian anti-LGBT legislation, 
for instance, India reinstituted its archaic colonial policy of imprisoning queer people. Would 
capital accumulation prove a similar defensive strategy for this half of the world's population or 
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is that reserved for the heterosexual males that dominate this dissertation? Another set of 
questions concerns the massive increase in resource consumption required by these economic 
development policies and its meaning for global climate change. While neoliberal capitalism 
promises a first world life for all, materializing even a fraction of such commercial and resource 
development may turn the Anthropocene into the next mass extinction event. How then do we 
address the 900 million living in extreme poverty across Africa and India at the moment when 
these trading partners invest heavily in extraction industries? Responding to these questions and 
others yet unknown to us requires thinking across disjunctive scales of human agency, emergent 
South-South relations, and the narrative modes that must engage these registers. This is the task 
of Postcolonial Literary Studies in the twenty-first century.  
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Appendix A: Endnotes 
 
Introduction 
1 The notion of "scapes" of various sorts comes from Arjun Appadurai's Modernity at Large.  
2 In chapter 1, I take up Jameson's argument on national allegory as articulated in his infamous 
essay “Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism.” 
Chapter 1 
3 For an excellent discussion of the tribunal with special attention to gender violence, see the 
special issue of Criminal Law Forum edited by Suzannah Linton.  
4 Shalija Sharma’s “Salman Rushdie: The Ambivalence of Migrancy,” offers a subtle reading of 
memory in relation to migrancy. Sharma maps Rushdie’s versions of cultural translation, which 
range from “an excess of memory,” those characters who refuse to be tainted by anything 
foreign, to a complete “refusal of memory,” such as those post-diaspora generations who would 
call Bangladesh “Bungleditch.”  
5 Fredric Jameson argues, in “Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism,” 
that “third-world” texts should be read as “national allegories.” This holds true “particularly 
when their forms develop out of predominantly western machineries of representation, such as 
the novel” (69). Thinking through a Marxist framework, Jameson contends that a central feature 
of capitalist culture “is a radical split between the private and the public, between the poetic and 
the political” (69). This split is not yet present in the third-world and consequently, “the story of 
the private individual destiny is always an allegory of the embattled situation of the third-world 
public culture and society” (69). Aijaz Ahmad offers the most searing critique of Jameson’s 
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argument in his In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures. Mark Mossman, on the other hand, 
grants Jameson’s theory a range of validity but argues it is insufficient for accounting the 
complex interiority presented in Midnight’s Children. Jameson originally articulates his claim as 
“a sweeping hypothesis,” which is to say he is well aware of its limitations (69). 
6 I had the great privilege of having a decorated veteran of the current US-led Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars in my classroom. This 25-year-old Marine served four tours in Iraq’s most 
hostile regions, including Baghdad and Fallujah. The war veteran told us that, during missions, 
nothing matters beyond the safety of their small four-person unit. All the training up to 
deployment, he said, places the highest importance on the cohesion and relationships of these 
units; no one is left behind. He returned for subsequent tours because he felt responsible for the 
new recruits who were going to be put on the front lines. As a sergeant at age 23, he wanted to 
make sure that “these 18-year-old kids” would get home safely. The initial patriotism driving his 
enlistment was forgotten, removed through training, in order to handle the circumstances. When 
we discussed the Rwandan genocide in class, another student cried that he would have “gone in,” 
and served in a US military mission to Rwanda had there been one to stop the genocide. The 
Marine student commended the comment but confided to me after class, “That kid doesn’t know 
what he’s talking about. You have to be trained to give your life.” Such training, however, would 
begin by channeling one’s nationalist energy into an absolute caring for the small unit, 
indivisible even by death.  
7 For an excellent discussion of Rushdie’s religious tropes see Roger Clark’s Stranger Gods: 
Salman Rushdie’s Other Worlds. “Saleem’s paradoic Buddhahood helps Rushdie to express his 
view that Pakistani leaders crush the liberating, mystical aspects of religion.” While the 
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Buddha’s sought transcendence through a “detached awareness,” Saleem achieves “forgetful 
ignorance” (82).  
8 A cyclone devastated East Pakistan in 1970, leaving a million dead. The central government in 
Islamabad (West Pakistan) responded slowly and ineffectively to the crisis. Rahman commented, 
“While we have a substantial army stationed in West Pakistan, it is left to British Marines to bury 
our dead in Patuakhali. While we have army helicopters sitting in West Pakistan, we have to wait 
for helicopters to come for relief operation from across the earth” (cited in Ayoob and 
Subrahmanyam 90). Rahman’s Awami League won an absolute victory in the subsequent 
elections and shifted political power to the East, to which the West Pakistani leadership 
responded with violent repressions in 1971.  
9 Rushdie may be drawing on John Locke’s work. For Locke, memory allows an individual to 
retain self-identity without the need to repeat the same behaviors. Given this, one is able to 
contradict or drastically alter behavior without necessarily identifying as a different person. 
Secondly, memory functions as a theater in which one views previous actions, their attendant 
consequences and compares them to the choices available in the immediate moment. Thus, an 
internal mnemonic landscape is crucial to establish both identity and responsibility.  
10 Sara Upstone offers a spatial critique of the novel’s domestic politics without damning 
Rushdie as a misogynist or glorifying him as a feminist. Drawing on Anne McClintock’s work, 
Upstone argues the novel centers on domestic spaces, which both prompt other remembrances 
and resist the smooth incorporation into a national allegory advocated by colonialism. 
Consequently, Upstone argues that postcolonial representations turn away from the metaphorical 
toward a (magical-realist) literalization.   
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11 “It was also an economic proposition which would put young Bengali leaving the portals of a 
school or college at serious disadvantage in comparison with his counterpart in West Pakistan” 
(Ayoob and Subrahmanyam 31).  
12 Sukhbir Choudhar’s Indo-Pak War and Big Powers reads as a screed rather than history but 
evinces the strong anti-US and China sentiment among Indian diplomats. Choudhar characterizes 
West Pakistan’s leadership as a military junta, China’s cultural revolution as Han chauvinism 
using the same repressive measures as their Pakistani allies, and comically, cites an editorial that 
derides Henry Kissinger as Dr. Strangelove. He also praises Indira Gandhi’s decisiveness and 
unflinching Soviet support. Choudhar’s work caricatures history without intending to.  
13 Jameson articulates his thesis on "third-world literature" in “Third-World Literature in the Era 
of Multinational Capitalism." The dictum "Always historicize!" opens The Political 
Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act.  
14 Paul Fussell’s The Great War and Modern Memory offers a brilliant account of the First 
World War’s cultural affects on Britain. He says nothing of the colonies or colonial soldiers.   
15 Patrick Colm Hogan’s “Midnight’s Children: Kashmir and the Politics of Identity” offers a 
rare account of these early chapters in Kashmir, reading Tai the boatman as a representative of 
Kashmiri traditions and customs while Aadam figures the transition to new modes of identity 
that both bind and rend the new nation. So far, Salman Rushdie’s best aesthetic negotiation of the 
Kashmir conflict is Shalimar the Clown (2002). 
16 Subramanian Shankar places two poles of postcolonialism, vernacular and transnational, along 
a continuum. The key entailment of this model reorients a theoretical practice in which “the point 
of departure for analysis is the global, in whose context the local and the traditional, if present, 
must be understood.” Consequently, “any idea of the local and traditional as a point of departure 
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for understanding the global” is “unthinkable” (84). Shankar’s model, on the other hand, insists 
that the vernacular can explicate the transnational. 
Chapter 2 
17 “International community” here signifies more than NATO or Security Council powers, which 
are the usual referent of this term. This essay investigates those Western powers—US, France, 
Belgium—as well as the role of Egypt and South Africa in weapons trafficking. 
18 Philip Gourevitch takes it up in part three of his book. David Reiff argues that the 
humanitarian response obfuscated the conflict’s politics and the especially the United States’ 
deliberate stall strategies. 
 Fiona Terry’s Condemned to Repeat? puts this disaster in the context of a history of 
militarized refugee camps. Terry also offers a detailed analysis of the weapons purchased, 
shipped, and circulated through the refugee camps in Zaire. 
19 Gourevitch’s formulation recalls Thomas L. Haskell’s canonical two-part essay “Capitalism 
and the Origins of Humanitarianism,” in which Haskell argues that humanitarianism depends on 
recipes, understood as a series of routine steps one can take to alleviate the pain of the starving 
stranger. These recipes are functional actions that lead causally from A to E. For Haskell, the 
spread and increasing ordinariness of global market transactions—buying tea from the colonies, 
for example—provides the ground for perceiving the causation necessary for humanitarianism, 
as well as the concrete mechanisms by which my simple action (e.g., a donation) will help the 
one suffering far away.  
 Although I do not use Haskell’s language in this chapter, I both endorse and apply his 
insight by following the material transactions already in place between the international 
community and Rwanda. 
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20 Uvimana’s final affirmations mesh well with his profession as a history teacher. His pupils in 
Djibouti never believed Rwanda’s beauty because “the word Rwanda evokes only blood and 
endless killings for everyone” (141). Even his girlfriend “had the same old stereotypes in her 
head: two ethnic groups who’ve hated each other since time immemorial” (65). Both Uvimana 
and the novel seek to redress these misconceptions held by the international community, from 
Djibouti to Paris to Washington. Michel Serumundo, the novel’s opening focalizer, laments, 
“Even Africans would say, during half-time of [the World Cup] match[es], ‘They’re 
embarrassing us, they should stop killing each other like that.’ Then they’ll go on to something 
else” (9-10). The novel’s critique of African nations advances beyond the Eurocentrism of other 
perspectives. This essay augments this critique by noting that Egypt, Uganda, and South Africa 
also overinvested in Rwanda by supplying arms. 
21 The French military built a volleyball court atop a mass grave.  
22 Joseph Slaughter argues that the “figurative act of human rights incorporation”—“how 
contemporary human rights law images and produces the human rights person”—“fulfills itself 
when the incorporated person acquires human rights literacy: the capacity to read itself and 
others as human rights persons, as creatures of dignity and bearers of international rights and 
responsibilities” (24-25). I would only add that such literacy and the resulting writing often 
doubles as a pedagogical practice that reminds others of violence that interrupts incorporation. 
23 In her article, “Writing on Bones: Commemorating Genocide in Boubacar Boris Diop's 
Murambi,” Nicki Hitchcott pays sensitive attention to the problem of representing genocide. 
However, Hitchcott repeats the narrative of global indifference only to review French military 
and political backing of Hutu Power a paragraph later. 
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24 Bret Benjamin offers a rich account of the World Bank’s role in subsidizing development 
narratives. On its turn to literary representational strategies, Benjamin summarizes: “The 
Banking bildungsroman announces itself as consistent with, in fact constitutive of, the 
development of the ethically refined, socially conscious, liberal, global citizen—a citizen who is 
figured by a character from the Global South but who is more likely embodied by the consenting, 
consuming subject in the overdeveloped North” (163). 
25 Barnett writes a more comprehensive history in his book Eyewitness to a Genocide: The 
United Nations and Rwanda. However, his article offers a potent summary of the main argument 
and a deeper insight into his own role and thinking during those debates at the Security Council. 
Barnett’s article appears in 1997, only a few years after the genocide and a solid five years 
before his book. The article reads as a rawer response, complete with some accounting errors. 
26 Such indifference relies on a “secular theodicy” that invokes the transcendental good of a 
given organization—the nation state or the UN. This bureaucratic faith believes in the “principle 
of the elect as an exclusive community, whose member individuals’ sins cannot undermine the 
perfection of the ideal they all share” (Herzfeld 10). Barnett believes the Security Council 
debates evinced such secular theodicy when member states argued for the best interests of the 
UN as an ethical demand that, however unfortunately trumped Rwandan lives. 
27 Barnett refers to New Zealand and Czechoslovakia as “‘the conscience of the council’ in both 
derision and admiration” for their support of military intervention to stop the genocide but failure 
to offer any troops for the mission. A tragic joke circulates: “the international community 
seemed willing to fight down to the last US citizen” (572). 
28 In the final chapter of his book, Barnett both extends and qualifies this argument. While he 
continues to scold the Secretariat and the DPKO for failing to pass on relevant information, 
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Barnett also argues that the UN narrated Rwanda as a civil war and read all incoming data in that 
framework. Dallaire’s cables never reached the Security Council partly because they were taken 
as evidence of an ongoing civil war, complete with arms caches and violence. Moreover, Barnett 
argues that the US “could not have predicted the genocide” while conceding that both Belgium 
and France “knew more than they revealed at the time” (161). 
29 Alison Des Forges’s definitive history verifies Dallaire’s claims.  “Belgium, the U.S., France, 
and Germany all had good sources of information within the Rwandan community and 
frequently consulted with each other, even though there was little formal interchange among 
their military intelligence services” or UNAMIR, which was not mandated to gather its own 
intelligence (113). 
30 Human Rights Watch, Arming Rwanda - The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the 
Rwandan War, 1 January 1994, A601, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a7fc8.html [accessed 19 June 2012]. 
This report also accounts for weapons shipments directly from France in response to the 1990 
RPF invasion. Rwanda imported arms from South Africa including “a wide range of light arms, 
machine guns and ammunition.” Although some of these weapons spread to the RPF from 
captured government forces, the former were supplied through Uganda. 
31 Dallaire also negotiates the colonial attitudes of the Belgian troops whose racism belongs 
neither to a historical past nor to fictive imaginings of novels; rather, these attitudes belong to a 
militant present that sees in Africans a chance for target practice. As the former colonial power 
in Rwanda, the UN does not want to deploy Belgium troops, but they must because no other 
nations step forward. The Belgian soldiers come to Rwanda after completing a tour in Somalia, a 
chapter-seven mission that allowed them to make peace rather than simply keep it. 
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Consequently, these troops are “very aggressive,” bragging that they “killed over two hundred 
Somalis” and “knew how to kick ‘nigger’ ass in Africa” (113). An infuriated Dallaire tells the 
Belgian commander that he will tolerate no “racist sentiments, colonial attitudes, [and] 
unnecessary aggression” (113). But these attitudes persist and infiltrate the mission’s already 
bare logistical capabilities.  
 Dallaire assigns the Belgian troops to secure the airport—a key link in a landlocked 
country—and needs them to “live out of camp garrisons” (120). Although he already provided 
guidelines that troops come prepared with basic camp stores, the Belgians refuse to live under 
canvas “as per national policy” (120). Dallaire learns of a “national Belgian army policy 
directive” stipulates that Belgian soldiers would never camp under canvas “in Africa.” They 
must be housed in hard buildings, “not necessarily for the sake of comfort or hygiene but 
because it was imperative that they maintain a correct presence in front of the Africans” (120-
21). The Belgian troops’ colonial baggage leaves no room for camp stores. 
32 Mahmood Mamdani’s brilliant analysis in When Victims Become Killers hinges on the 
construction of alterity. He contends that the genocide’s roots lay in colonial logics that produced 
various constructions of Hutu and Tutsi. Mamdani understands these as political identities that 
transformed under Belgian colonialism, which billed “Hutu as indigenous Bantu and Tutsi as 
alien Hamities” (16). The Tutsi were no longer ethnic minorities but racial outsiders that helped 
buffer and enforce colonial rule. Decolonization not only failed to overcome this understanding 
but rather empowered these identities. Consequently, the genocide pitted native Hutu against 
settler Tutsi whose armed return to Rwanda, in the form of the RPF, represented the return of 
foreign domination. This model allows Mamdani to explain, partly, the popular character of the 
genocide. 
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 In her essay “Global Humanitarianism, Race, and the Spectacle of the African Corpse in 
Current Representations of the Rwandan Genocide,” Heike Härting extends Mamdani’s account 
of racialized power dynamics by acknowledging that such political identities depend on the 
“management of the colonial subject’s body, gender, and sexuality” (69). Härting reads Guy 
Courtemanche’s novel A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali as a “necropoetic and pornographic 
narrative” that instrumentalizes brutal scenes of rape to “projects a particularly violent but 
apparently truthful reality of Africa as a place of rampant sexual depravity” (69, 71). In 
Courtemanche’s dark continent, the rape victim Gentille serves “as both an allegory of the 
Rwandan nation and the ultimate victim of international indifference and patriarchal 
opportunism” (70). 
33 Recent French interventions in Libya and Mali have proven Dr. Karekezi wrong, 
unfortunately. For an excellent analysis of the militant humanitarianism in Libya, see Vijay 
Prashad’s Arab Spring, Libyan Winter. 
34 Sara Guyer’s “Rwanda’s Bones” offers an insightful account of the role smell plays in the 
narration of memorial visits. She cites New York Times reporter Andrew Blum’s experience of an 
intense odor that “exempted us from the need for imagination. It relieved us of the need for 
understanding” (cited in Guyer 166). By contrast, Gourevitch does not smell anything and 
consequently, Guyer argues, “is arrested, rather than informed” by the memorial (169). Guyer 
elaborates that the contradictions inherent in Rwanda’s memorials produce such seizure, leading 
to “confusion, despondency and even senselessness” (169). She concedes that such memorials 
“provide a permanently visible ground for the victims’ claim to power” and can be used to 
enable political violence; Guyer has in mind the ruling RPF’s misuse of the genocide to 
exonerate their own crimes and shield themselves from voices critical of their political policies. 
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However, by reducing Gourevitch’s account of stepping on a skull to “an allegory for the 
impossibility of good conscience,” she misses his anger and the international violence that such 
memorials may enable (170). 
Chapter 3 
35 Stephanie Jones’s “The Politics of Love and History: Asian Women and African Men in East 
African Literature” applauds Vassanji’s text for taking on the “deepest taboo” of sexual 
relationships between Asian women and African men. Jones reminds us of central place 
diasporic women play in the reproduction of community, which in turn polices their bodies and 
relationships so that they remain ideal representatives and transmitters of homogenous (pure) 
traditions. Such policing, however, cannot be dismissed as internalized colonial logics but as part 
of conservative “Indian” culture in its diasporic iteration. This is not to dismiss the importance of 
colonial ideology or its use of the Asian diasporas as a settler class, but to map more vectors of 
(conservative) determinations and the (racist) agency they produce. Jones goes a step further in 
her analysis of Vassanji’s fiction—among the rare works to address this taboo directly—to indict 
the diasporic mother as the ultimate policemen. The most sophisticated iteration of this character 
occurs in Vikram Lall, in which the mother both loves Njoroge as her own son and absolutely 
prohibits her daughter Deepa’s relationship with him. Lall’s mother deploys a series of 
contradictory arguments, at once evoking the lovers' childhood friendship—“he’s like a brother 
to you”—ostensible tolerance—“I have nothing against Africans”— and absolute difference—
“But we are different” (247-48). Jones is right in all this but strangely omits another piece that 
would bolster her argument; Lall’s mother decries that she too has dreams, having Asian 
grandchildren she can raise to understand their culture. Vassanji allows her to voice both 
individual and communal desires, as if no slippage exits, so that she protects the community’s 
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unity and ensures the transmission of a culture that values community unity, racist or otherwise. 
All of this serves as a reminder that the diasporic community’s conservatism does not merely ape 
imperial ideology but represents a dark agency, policing the boundaries of fair skin and its 
communal homogeneity. 
36 Jones rightly notes that Lall’s father’s coupling with an African woman points to a more 
tolerant future even while being entirely “traditional,” insofar as the Malabouxs—an Asian man 
and African woman—are already a representative part of the Asian East African genealogy. 
37 Marie Louise Pratt's Imperial Eyes remains the canonical text on this subject. 
38 Through her historical research, Savita Nair argues that the East African Indian community 
claimed belonging on equal terms with the British and even saw themselves as rival colonists by 
dint of their history in the area and their work building its infrastructure. Lall’s claims, in 
contrast, route through a presentism that his forefathers would not have recognized; he belongs 
in Kenya as a national-citizen while East African Indians in the 1920s, according to Nair, 
claimed more. They saw themselves on equal footing with the British and drew on their long 
history of trading in the region as obvious evidence to support their claim. Even Winston 
Churchill agreed that the Indians were right in these claims. Unfortunately, so did Idi Amin. 
Amin readily acknowledged the long history of Indian traders, laborers and merchants in East 
Africa and, like 1924 British district commissioner Campbell, blamed the Indians for ruining the 
African and stunting native development. 
39 The British described their civilizing mission as a policy of "native paramountcy," which 
placed the improvement of the natives above all else. The Indian (Asians) were called on to be 
role models for the Africans and were especially hated for this patronizing role. 
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40 Simatei’s essay offers a broad overview of various East African Asian writers and their 
relation to postcolonial nationalism. He argues convincingly that diaspora and nation state are 
not oppositional but synthetic terms that coalesce uneasily for those generations of East African 
Asians born in Africa. Scanning all of Vassanji’s novels, Simatei has little time to focus on the 
particular tensions of The In-Between World of Vikram Lall, and offers nothing in the way of a 
material analysis. Railways, shops and bazaars, for him, symbolize modernity and nation 
building that, if accepted by new Kenya, have Asians as their chief architects. While this is 
useful for decentering dominant narratives of the nation, it does little to explain the chief conceit 
of Lall’s narrative; his facilitation of il/legal development by financial alchemy while claiming to 
be aiding the national project. 
41 Siundu, Godwin. “Locating Cultural Ambivalence and Afropolitanism: Nairobi and Dar-es-
Salaam as Heterotopia in the Fiction of Dawood and Vassanji,” 259-80. 
42 For Ojwang the Thousand and One Nights represents the ur-text of encountering exotic 
Africans. Ojwang discuss the text in relation to the Indian Ocean trade in African slaves. 
43 For more on the conflation between the Mau Mau resistance and Kikuyu nationalism, see  
Bethwell Ogot's article "Mau Mau and Nationhood: The Untold Story," in Mau Mau & 
Nationhood: Arms, Authority and Narration. 
44 When Seema, Lall's Canadian lover, accuses him of using the same complacent logic as the 
Rwanda genocidaires, Lall admits to trafficking weapons. He argues that he also sent money to a 
girl from a massacred village so that she may attend school. Lall recognizes the absurdity of 
equating those two actions: gun running and meager education aid. As I argued in chapter 2, 
however, these two actions—war mongering and humanitarianism—continually clash to produce 
 !  
153 
                                                                                                                                                       
indifference. But the weapons are merely capital in the form of “certain metal goods,” abstracted 
from their functions as agents of death. 
45 David A. Perocx's "Mau Mau & the Arming of the State" offers a detailed history of British 
efforts to arm and re-arm Kenya. These efforts include supplying Kenyatta's early independence 
regime "in the hope that Kenya would remain in the Western sphere of influence, in line with 
Britain's vital interests." 
Chapter 4 
46 Glancing at an Indian newspaper will provide daily testimonies to caste-based violence. 
47 Elizabeth Hewitt offered this analysis during a lecture at the Frei Universität in Berlin on June 
20th, 2013. I have included the full essay from which her talk drew in the works cited page.   
48 I have chosen to cite the open access version of The Annihilation of Caste in solidarity with the 
boycott against Navayana/ Verso India who republished this work with an introduction by 
Arundathi Roy, a non-Dalit writer. Like the choice of Roy for the author of the introduction, the 
book cover features a silhouette of Ambedkar inside a much larger silhouette of Gandhi. Some 
are using the former to "revaluate" the latter, which only repeats the very subservience 
Ambedkar fought. One does not need to rethink caste as Gandhi attempted but to annihilate it 
entirely.  
49 I cannot recap the full breadth of the debate between Ambedkar and Gandhi nor the thorough 
annihilation of the latter by the former. 
50 Such transnational flows also remind the reader of "the conditions of production and 
distribution of the novel, a Booker Prize-winning work in Indian English, to a worldwide 
audience" (Joseph 81). To my mind, this reading of the novel's attention to multinational capital 
contradicts the more banal critiques of "Adiga’s staging of a Dark India as a new-fangled object 
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of exoticist discourses" (Mendes 276). The latter can only frame caste as the subject of an 
orientalist fantasy rather than a living problem. Moreover, the attention to international flows 
refutes one critic's argument that the novel "cuts India off from the larger international world and 
its values, placing it in a kind of moral quarantine" (Goh 337).  
51 For a reading of Halwai's violence as Fanonian, see Sara D. Schotland's "Breaking Out of the 
Rooster Coop: Violent Crime in Aravind Adiga's White Tiger and Richard Wright's Native Son."  
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 The emergence of South-South relations in politics and economics refracts strangely 
through the literature produced in these postcolonial regions. Two primary worldviews emerge in 
these texts. The first focuses on the continued presence of imperial powers in the South and their 
culpability in eruptions of violence. The second shifts to modes of domination emerging within 
South-South interactions. Salman Rushdie's canonical Midnight's Children examines the 
Bangladeshi genocide through a variety of literary strategies, especially hyperbole, to produce a 
crisis of history that indicts the Cold War arms trade on equal terms with a war criminal. 
Similarly, Boubicar Boris Diop's novel Murambi, The Book of Bones helps contextualize the 
Rwandan genocide within the circuits of international attention—weapons supplies, political 
support and humanitarian aid—that put the lie to the world's supposed "indifference." On the 
contrary, Murambi's fragmented and polyvocal form evinces the multiple and contradictory 
investments Rwandans suffered through. East Africa is also home to a South Asian diaspora that 
arrived before the European powers and now advance India's exponential trade relations with 
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Africa. M.G Vassanji's The In-Between World of Vikram Lall caricatures one of these "Asian 
Shylocks" to critique the diaspora's class politics and, simultaneously, the racism and xenophobia 
that led to their 1969 mass deportation from Uganda by Idi Amin. Vassanji's focalizer 
weaponizes capital accumulation to claim that it protects against such racism, even if it confirms 
racist caricatures. This argument is not unlike that made by emergent economies from the 
postcolonial South, which have turned to neoliberal developmental policies to guarantee their 
independence. Despite the unsustainability of such policies, both Vassanji's novel and Aravind 
Adiga's The White Tiger take seriously capitalism's ability to nullify old hierarchies even while 
building new ones. Adiga's focalizer breaks free of his place in the caste system on the strength 
of capitalism's ability to profane this scared hierarchy. Such anticaste politics challenge the 
category of 'radical politics' as espoused by anticapitalists and adherents of Gandhi, who fought 
feverishly for the preservation of caste. Taken together, these two novels represent emergent 
Southern businessmen who fight local antagonisms through international capital, producing a 
complicated situation that helps us understand the allure of accumulation in emergent economies 
and its impact on South-South relationships.  
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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT 
 
 
“I am the sum total of everything that went before me, of all I have been 
seen done, of everything done-to-me. I am everyone everything whose 
being-in-the-world affected was affected by mine. I am anything that 
happens after I'm gone which would not have happened if I had not 
come.” ― Salman Rushdie, Midnight's Children  
 
Shashi Thandra practices martial arts and hopes to teach a new generation of peaceful warriors.  
